REPEAL OR AMEND ANTI-BLASPHEMY LAW? A SOCIO-LEGAL STUDY OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF INDONESIA’S ANTI-BLASPHEMY LAW

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# List of Abbreviations

ABL Anti-Blasphemy Law

FORB Freedom of religion or belief

IHRL International Human Rights Law

CCIR Constitutional Court of Indonesia Republic

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

FPI Front Pembela Islam / Islamic Defender Front

NU Nahdlatul Ulama

# Abstract

# CHAPTER I

# AN INTRODUCTION TO A STUDY OF INDONESIA’S

# ANTI BLASPHEMY LAW

## Background of the problem

The rule of law constitutes a crucial constituent of democracy, which relies on the existence of precise and unambiguous legal standards that ensure substantive justice and safeguard human rights (Tamanaha 2007). Preserving the rule of law is of utmost importance since it is instrumental in upholding justice and preventing the exploitation of laws for political purposes or marginalization of vulnerable communities (Creutzfeldt, Mason, and McConnachie 2020; Shaikh and Malik 2020). However, when legal provisions are vague and obscure, they can pose significant challenges in balancing legal clarity and protecting human rights since they are often susceptible to manipulation and selective implementation (Golder and Williams 2006). Hence, legal reforms are vital to overcome these challenges and uphold the rule of law in an effective manner. (Carothers 2010; Colbran 2015).

The Indonesian Anti-Blasphemy Law highlights the pressing need for legal reform, and discussions have arisen about whether the law should undergo amendment or repeal because of the disparity between the law's provisions and its application in practice (Tim Lindsey 2019). For a country committed to preserving the rule of law, it is crucial to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the law's history and formation, its influence on society, and the factors that shape its enforcement, to determine the direction of legal reform (Daniels and Trebilcock 2004).

Freedom of religion or belief (FoRB) constitutes a fundamental human right that plays an essential role in recognizing and safeguarding human dignity. Its infringement can negatively affect human rights (Abdulla 2018; Lintang, Martufi, and Ouwerker 2020). The interdependence of human rights means that the realization of FoRB guarantees the fulfillment of other rights, while the lack of it can jeopardize citizens' safety and right to life (Whelan 2010; Siregar and Sakharina 2019). On the other hand, practicing one's religion or belief without facing persecution or discrimination promotes peace, security, and individual freedom (Saiya 2015).

Preserving and guaranteeing human rights, including FoRB, is contingent upon a democratic state that respects the rule of law and separates power among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches (Banaszak, 2021; Shaheed, 2018). In a functional democracy, these branches serve as checks and balances to ensure the common good. In contrast, in non-democratic nations, they function as instruments for maintaining authoritarian rule, endorsing despotic legislation, and legitimizing human rights violations (Scheppele, 2018; Tamanaha, 2019). In such legal setups, the rule of law is theoretically present, but in reality, courts endorse human rights violations rather than upholding justice or providing relief to victims. In these political systems, human rights are exploited to present an image of compliance with human dignity to the international community while being violated in practice (Khan, 2019; Shaheed, 2018).

Indonesia's Anti-Blasphemy Law (ABL) has been a topic of contention for over a decade, serving as an example of despotic legislation that endangers the FoRB (Blitt, 2011; Buruma, 2007; Danchin, 2010; Dundon and Rollinson, 2011; Fagan, 2019; Fiss and Kestenbaum, 2017; Graham, 2009; Siddique and Hayat, 2008; Theodorou, 2016; Uddin, 2015). Despite other nations' revision or revocation of similar laws, such as Norway, Iceland, Denmark, and Canada, Indonesia continues to enforce the ABL (Fox and Sandler, 2005). Conversely, other countries have abolished their ABLs in response to human rights violations, constricting FoRB and freedom of expression, and threats to democracy.

Numerous scholars, human rights activists, and moderate religious groups have scrutinized the Indonesia Anti-Blasphemy Law (IABL) and concluded that it deviates from International Human Rights Law (IHRL), infringes on religious freedom, and punishes minority religious communities severely by accusing them of insulting the state-recognized orthodox religion (Crouch, 2015, 2014, 2011; Graham, 2009; Lindsey and Pausacker, 2017; Marshall, 2018a; Menchik, 2014a; Tømte, 2012; Uddin, 2015). Despite these findings, the Indonesian government has not rescinded or revised the law, despite several unsuccessful attempts to do so.

A decade ago, a proposal to replace the anti-blasphemy statute in Indonesia's legislature was introduced but never materialized. In 2009, the Constitutional Court of Indonesia Republic (CCIR) was asked to review the law after individuals wrongly convicted under the Indonesia Anti-Blasphemy Law (IABL) filed a petition supported by human rights NGOs. The CCIR, in several rulings, has urged the Indonesian Parliament to revise the IABL, including Decision No. 140/PUU/VII/2009, emphasized by No. 84/PUU-X/2012 and No. 56/PUU-XVI/2017. However, the CCIR declared the law to be constitutional and necessary to maintain public order, while acknowledging its legal vagueness. According to the CCIR, the IABL does not restrict an individual's faith but rather governing public remarks that insult or vilify a religious practice followed in Indonesia.

Though the CCIR recognized the legal uncertainties surrounding the IABL, researchers like Crouch (2011) and Tømte (2012) contend that the IABL does not align with the 1945 Constitution and Indonesia's governmental commitment to basic human rights principles. Nonetheless, the Indonesian Legislative Body (DPR) has made no strides to amend the IABL. Instead, it included articles on offenses against religion in the Bill of Criminal Code, which reinforced the legal status of the law. Despite public protests and the postponement of the criminal code bill ratification, the Indonesian government continues to enforce the IABL, and the number of blasphemy cases processed by the court has surged (Santoso, 2020). This study will scrutinize the socio-political consequences of the law and track its development since the CCIR's landmark ruling.

The IABL has been manipulated for political leverage, resulting in the discrimination of particular religious practices and the weaponization of religion through the law. This has led to a harmful influence on the politics of religion, with hate-based tactics used to push political agendas. In the cases of Ahok and Meiliana, the weaknesses of the IABL have allowed baseless accusations of blasphemy against individuals, thereby violating their right to religious freedom. The CCIR has cited the concern of establishing a legal void and the threat of interreligious conflict as causes for not repealing the IABL. However, this warrants further research to determine whether the repeal of the IABL would be likely to intensify interreligious conflict.

This study intends to investigate vigilante justice in connection with blasphemy cases in Indonesia, concentrating on the cause of the Habib Rizieq Shihab phenomenon and its association with the court's failure to provide justice. The study examines the impact of the expanding Islamic populism on the Shihab case and other factors that contribute to it. Furthermore, it aims to identify the genuine proponents of the implementation of the ABL and investigate whether bolstering the law has affected the endeavor to reinforce the right to religious freedom. The study's outcome is crucial in comprehending the socio-political consequences of ABL in Indonesia and the necessity of reforming it.

From a philosophical standpoint, discussing the existence of anti-blasphemy laws must consider the state's affiliation with religion. Preserving human rights necessitates a sovereign state that can fulfill its responsibility, as individual efforts prove insufficient. To safeguard FoRB as a negative right, the state should adopt a non-interference stance and avoid restricting religions. A secular approach, which entails the state abstaining from entangling in religious affairs, is considered the most optimal choice for realizing FoRB.

The Indonesian government regards the Indonesian Anti-Blasphemy Law (ABL) as critical in upholding the State ideology of Godly Nationalism, preserving interreligious harmony, preventing interfaith conflicts, and avoiding a reoccurrence of the nation's grim history with anti-religious movements (Menchik, 2014b). Crouch (2012) observes that the IABL was historically ratified to prevent the recurrence of earlier religious conflicts and prevent the killing of innocent individuals and Islamic leaders by the Indonesian Communist Party in 1965. Revoking the law would create a legal void for prosecuting criminal offenses related to blasphemy. Conservative and moderate Muslim organizations, such as Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and Muhammadiyah, support the law's continuation.

However, current research indicates that some blasphemy cases, such as Ahok and Meiliana, have been used to gain public support for local elections, which resulted in different levels of vigilante justice against minority communities (Marshall, 2018b; Andreas, 2019). Despite the surge in blasphemy cases, there has been limited study of the enforcement of the IABL, both within and outside the court, and no research on the variety of community responses to this issue (Harsono, 2019). Consequently, this research intends to study in-depth the factors and actors that have influenced the implementation of the IABL in each phase, updating previous research and considering the current socio-political scenario during the second term of Joko Widodo's presidency, where there has been an increase in the number of blasphemy cases (Pratiwi, 2019). This study aims to illuminate the enforcement of the IABL and provide insights into the variety of community responses to this issue.

Besides the legislative process, several factors impact the Indonesian Anti-Blasphemy Law (IABL), including conflicts between major and minor religions, the relationship between religion and politics, the emergence of Islamic populism, and political exploitation of religious concerns (Salim et al., 2003; Marshall, 2018b). High-profile blasphemy cases in Indonesia reveal the complicated interplay between religion, politics, and law enforcement, where apologies from offenders led to terminated cases, while conservative Islamic groups filed new blasphemy allegations and demanded justice (Hilmi, 2018). The politics of identity has also influenced public reactions to blasphemy cases, as in the case of Ahok, where the Chinese governor of Jakarta was the focus of the political debate, with issues of race and economic discrimination being central (Marshall, 2018a; Tehusijarana, 2018). Political dynamics have influenced the enforcement of the IABL, making it easier for authorities to interpret it as they desire. The vagueness of the law permits those in power to decide the law's interpretation, making it susceptible to manipulation for their interests. Writing the law with clear and unambiguous norms would make it more challenging for the powerful to manipulate it for their benefit. This study analyzes recent developments in the IABL and how political dynamics impact the relationship between state and religion, posing a threat to freedom of religion in Indonesia.

Notwithstanding the Indonesian Constitutional Court's choice to maintain the IABL, recent responses to blasphemy cases have been marked by anger, hostility, and violence, triggering discrimination and violating human rights (Harsono, 2019; Prud’homme, 2010). The continued enforcement of the IABL, combined with unclear legal policies, poses a significant challenge for Indonesia to honor human rights and maintain the rule of law.

The relationship between religion and state is a central topic in discussing Anti-Blasphemy Laws (ABLs). An-Naim (2008) argues for a secular state that remains impartial to religion and prevents religious laws from governing public life. He maintains that a secular state that does not enforce Sharia is essential for individuals to choose their religious beliefs without coercion or fear of state institutions. However, Durham and Scharffs (2019) challenge the idea that extreme secularism always results in religious freedom. In strictly secular states, public religious practices are often restricted, and discriminatory attitudes towards religion may still persist.

This study aims to scrutinize the Indonesian court's verdicts in blasphemy cases and how they affect the relationship between religion and the state. By analyzing the legal aspects of blasphemy cases, the study seeks to provide insights into how the state perceives religion and safeguards religious freedom. The examination endeavors to comprehend the nature of the relationship currently being reinforced as a result of these verdicts. Specifically, this study intends to illuminate how the issue of blasphemy impacts the relationship between religion and the state in Indonesia.

## Objectives of the study

The objectives of this study are:

1. To evaluate if the current progression of Indonesia's Anti-Blasphemy Law (ABL) and its corresponding laws decrease the adherence to the rule of law and impact the enjoyment of human rights.
2. To examine the factors and actors that have influenced the implementation of the IABL, including whether political exploitation of religious matters affects the application of the law.
3. To analyze the relationship between the state and religion in Indonesia and determine if the court's rulings result in practical cooperation between the state and religion in Indonesia, including identifying the nature of the relationship.

## Research questions

This study focuses on answering the following research questions:

1. What is the reason for the current progression of Indonesia's Anti-Blasphemy Law (ABL) and its correlated laws to reduce adherence to the rule of law? Does it have an impact on the enjoyment of human rights?
2. What factors and actors have influenced the court's decisions on the implementation of the Indonesian Anti-Blasphemy Law (IABL)? Does political exploitation of religious issues impact the application of the law?
3. Does the verdict of the court lead to enhancing the relationship between the state and religion in Indonesia, and if so, what type of relationship does it foster?

## Originality of the Study

In the past two decades, numerous studies have been conducted on Indonesia's Blasphemy Law, with varying research objectives and analytical methods. Al-Khanif (2008), Margiyono et al. (2010), Arifin (2010), Noorsena (2012), and Arief, B.N. (2012) all employed a top-down approach to evaluate the law and court rulings to assess the consistency of existing regulations with international human rights standards.

For instance, Al-Khanif's (2008) study focused on blasphemy cases of Ahmadiyya from the perspective of International Human Rights Law. Margiyono et al. (2010) reviewed the arguments presented by judges of the Constitutional Court during their examination of the Anti-Defamation Law. Noorsena (2012) concentrated on normatively reviewing blasphemy cases to reformulate Article 156a of the Criminal Code, which is frequently utilized as the basis for criminalizing blasphemy. Arief, B.N. (2012) conducted a comparative study of blasphemy offenses in Indonesia with other countries.

However, this study does not seek to avoid the top-down approach employed in those previous studies. Instead, it is a necessary approach to examine the current development of the latest anti-blasphemy law in Indonesia. This is due to significant changes that the legal politics of the Anti-Blasphemy Law have undergone, especially after the issuance of several Constitutional Court decisions on the judicial review of the Anti-Blasphemy Law and the enactment of new laws related to it in the last ten years. The primary question is whether the current legal politics uphold the principle of the rule of law and respect human rights, particularly the right to freedom of religion or belief, or whether they are violating it instead.

Aside from a top-down approach, this study also includes a bottom-up approach that seeks to shed light on the current development of the Indonesian Anti-Bribery Law (IABL). It aims to investigate whether the enforcement of the IABL by the courts is influenced by the limitations of the law itself or by other non-legal factors.

The purpose of this research is to analyze the factors and actors that have influenced the implementation of the IABL and determine the extent to which religious and political populism may have impacted the enforcement of the law.

This research differs from Arifin's (2010) study that examined the judge's ruling in the case of Shia vs. Sunni, adopting a sociological approach. Although Crouch (2014) also used a socio-legal approach, he focused on the conflict between the Muslim and Christian communities in West Java. Efendi (2017) chiefly focused on the contested aspects of court decisions in general criminal cases at the appeals level, while Kamil, A. (2012) concentrated on the independence of courts in deciding criminal cases in general. However, the analyses disregarded judicial considerations and the factors that influenced their decisions, which are critical aspects of this study.

In contrast, the present study employs an interdisciplinary approach to provide a more comprehensive perspective than previous studies. Using a socio-legal approach, it identifies the discrepancies between the law on paper and its practical implementation in the field. By examining various factors and actors that have shaped the court rulings on various blasphemy cases, this research aims to determine whether or not populism of religions and political manipulation of religions affect the enforcement of the IABL, and assess the impacts of court decisions on society and the ability to maintain justice.

Furthermore, this research also aims to analyze whether the court rulings have established a palpable relationship between the state and religion in Indonesia. All of the research objectives will aid the author in evaluating the possibility of repealing or modifying the blasphemy laws in Indonesia.

Telle's (2018) and Tyson's (2019) studies provided insight on how the enforcement of the blasphemy laws is influenced by the politicization of religion, which assists this research. Additionally, Moektiono's (2021) work places emphasis on the non-discrimination principle as the foundation for the court to decide cases of blasphemy. Despite the usefulness of these studies, none of them cover the further steps this research undertakes to examine the possible repeal or reform of the blasphemy laws in Indonesia.

## Outline of the Thesis

The research findings are presented in a structured and thorough manner throughout seven chapters. Chapter I outlines the purpose, research questions, and objectives of the study, while providing an introduction to the study of Indonesia’s Anti-Blasphemy Law. This chapter is intended to provide a comprehensive understanding of the issues surrounding Indonesia's Anti-Blasphemy Law, which have sparked debates on whether to repeal or modify the law.

Chapter II presents an overview of the theoretical and conceptual frameworks that form the basis of the study. The chapter delves into theories of justice and the rule of law and analyzes their connection. Additionally, it discusses the conceptual frameworks of the law enforcement of the ABL and Human Rights under the Anti-Blasphemy Law regime.

In Chapter III, the research design and methodology of this study are explained, employing a socio-legal approach. The chapter describes the research design and covers the data collection techniques and analysis methods used to investigate the enforcement of Indonesia's Anti-Blasphemy Law. Furthermore, this chapter provides an overview of the four case studies analyzed in this research.

Chapter IV explores the development of Indonesia's Anti-Blasphemy Law, as well as related laws, and their impact on human rights in the context of the rule of law. The chapter analyzes the legal and political context that resulted in the strengthening of the Anti-Blasphemy Law by the Constitutional Court of Indonesia and its judicial review decisions. Additionally, this chapter examines the existence of related laws, including the Law concerning Criminal Code and the Law concerning Informatic Electronic Transactions, and evaluates whether or not the current developments of the Anti-Blasphemy Law have undermined the rule of law by investigating their impact on the enjoyment of human rights.

Chapter V scrutinizes the law enforcement of Indonesia's Anti-Blasphemy Law and the potential for political manipulation. The chapter begins with an introduction and an overview of blasphemy law enforcement in Indonesia. The discussion and analysis section outlines various factors and actors that have shaped the enforcement of the Anti-Blasphemy Law, including the emergence of godly nationalism in the court's arguments, state monopolization of truth, and the continued strengthening of the flawed Anti-Blasphemy Law, which has undermined the rule of law. Additionally, the chapter identifies government interference toward religion and its effects. The chapter then delves into political dynamics surrounding blasphemy cases, with case studies on Ahok's case and Meiliana's case. Finally, the chapter examines how enforcement of the Anti-Blasphemy Law can prevent the achievement of justice. Overall, this chapter adds valuable insights into the potential for political manipulation in Indonesia's Anti-Blasphemy Law enforcement.

Chapter VI analyzes the relationship between the state and religion in Indonesia in the context of the enforcement of the Anti-Blasphemy Law. The chapter evaluates the impact of the law on the relationship between the state and different religious groups and explores how the relationship has been altered by the varying interpretations of the Anti-Blasphemy Law. This chapter provides valuable insights into the religious dynamics in Indonesia and the state's role in regulating religious expression, offering a detailed examination of the potential consequences of the Anti-Blasphemy Law on state-religion relations.

Chapter VII concludes the study by presenting the main findings and recommendations. The chapter provides an overview of the research, highlights the conclusions drawn from the theoretical, conceptual, and empirical analysis presented in the preceding chapters. The chapter evaluates the impact of the Anti-Blasphemy Law on the rule of law and human rights in Indonesia, and queries whether renewing or repealing the law is the best option moving forward. This chapter comprises crucial findings and recommendations which provide valuable insights into the complex dynamics of Indonesia's Anti-Blasphemy Law.

# CHAPTER II

# THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK TO STUDY INDONESIA’S ANTI BLASPHEMY LAW

## 2.1 Theoretical Framework

This thesis draws upon the theories of the rule of law and justice to examine the impact of Indonesia's Anti-Blasphemy Law on human rights and the rule of law. The rule of law and justice are interconnected, as the former supports justice by ensuring that laws and legal systems are fair and impartial, while the latter protects human rights by ensuring that everyone's basic needs and dignity are respected and upheld. The thesis highlights the crucial balance between human rights and law enforcement, which is essential for maintaining both security and liberty in society. Law reform plays a critical role in facilitating effective law enforcement, as it ensures that laws and legal systems are of high quality, efficacy and legitimacy. Law enforcement itself can further generate the need for law reform by revealing gaps or inadequacies in existing laws. Finally, the thesis underscores the importance of the rule of law evolving with the changing circumstances and expectations to remain relevant and effective.

Diagram

Description automatically generated

Anti-Blasphemy Law

Figure 1. Theoretical and conceptual framework of this study

### 2.1.1 Theory of the rule of law and its elements

The concept of "the rule of law" is fundamental to modern legal systems, and its meaning and implementation have been subject to extensive debate. A.V. Dicey identified three critical elements of the rule of law: the supremacy of law, equality before the law, and due process of law. Supremacy of law entails that the law is above all, including the government and its officials, guaranteeing the rights of all citizens without interference. Equality before the law asserts that the law must provide equal treatment despite an individual's characteristics, such as race, gender, religion, or class. Due process of law ensures the proper execution of justice by ensuring fair, transparent, and equitable administration of the law for all who have committed offenses.

Joseph Raz proposes that the rule of law protects human dignity and autonomy by ensuring objectivity and preventing the arbitrary and capricious exercise of power. Raz emphasizes the need for a legal system that follows the rule of law, as any law that does not apply to all can be deemed arbitrary. The second perspective highlights fairness and substantive democracy, whereby the law reflects the values and interests of society and promotes human rights, equality, and welfare. The rule of law must find balance with social needs and expectations, to ensure that legal frameworks work for the public interest.

Legal empowerment, as espoused by Amartya Sen, is integral to achieving development that fosters freedom by enhancing people's capacities. This perspective highlights the crucial role of the law in enabling individuals to realize their potential and achieve their objectives. The third perspective acknowledges that the rule of law is context-specific and complex, subject to different legal, cultural, and institutional traditions in different societies. Michael Trebilcock argues that an effective and sustainable legal system should consider contextual factors such as political, social, and economic dynamics.

Socio-legal studies are anchored on researching the law, through understanding the extent to which external factors such as social and political dynamics can impede judicial independence and influence legal interpretation and decision-making. In a country governed by the rule of law like Indonesia, any study of the Anti-Blasphemy Law necessitates a comprehensive understanding of the history of the legal system's development and its implications for human rights. Also, investigating how socio-political factors affect its legal enforcement is crucial.

Friedman (1975) posits that law is a sophisticated system that comprises institutionalized law, substantive law, and public understanding. The development of law involves systematic discussion of its legal content and processes with relevant institutions such as law enforcement agencies, and consideration of the community's awareness and culture. The Indonesian National Law Development Agency (BPHN) espouses this principle.

Bedner and Vel (2010) propose that the rule of law theory consists of three elements: procedural elements, substantive or legal content elements, and institutional elements (Bedner, 2010, p. 22-23). Substantive or legal content element shall be examined with Bedner's (2010) two indicators. It is crucial that the law and its enforcement maintain the concept of justice as a central condition. With regards to the legal procedure element, three indicators were evaluated, the first of which was whether the legislation had broad application rather than targeting specific groups.

Figure 3. Three Elements of Law Enforcement under the Rule of Law

The second indicator of the legal procedure element evaluates whether legislation applies broadly, rather than targeting specific groups. According to Raz, laws must be easily understood by society, apply to everyone, and prevent authorities from perverting them for goals that are counter to public interest. The actions of the government are subject to the law; discretionary acts and policies must have a rational basis. Bedner (2010) argues that the existence of the law should promote stability and clarity rather than uncertainty and stress in society. The second indicator of the legal procedure element assesses whether state activities are subject to the law. (Bedner, 2010, pp. 58-59).

The third element of the rule of law concerns legal institutions and how the law is enforced to safeguard human rights (Waldron, 2010, p. 2; Fuller, 1969, p. 162). In this study, it is necessary to examine fair trial and legal due process. As per Bedner (2010), the law enforcement factor assesses whether blasphemy cases are adjudicated impartially and independently. The concept of fair trial is based on case studies that demonstrate how legal institutions uphold the defendant's right to legal defense, including a fair opportunity for the defendant to present their arguments. The impartiality and independence of the judiciary in blasphemy cases will be analyzed, with a focus on instances that have generated significant public controversy and how the courts responded to the associated social and political pressures.

Therefore, this study will investigate the experiences of religious minority groups that have been punished under the blasphemy law and other non-legal factors. This will entail exploring whether vigilante attacks occurred, and if so, were they prosecuted? Did extraneous pressure impact the judges' decisions? In addition, according to the concept of due process of law, states are obligated to ensure that domestic courts' law enforcement procedures are aligned with international human rights law (IHRL). This study delves into relevant legal issues and facts regarding blasphemy cases to determine whether judges construct and decide on the criminal case appropriately.

Figure 4. Elements of the Rule of Law

This study's foundation is the theory of the rule of law because Indonesia is a country that adheres to this concept, as evident in Article 1 Paragraph (3), Article 27 paragraph (1), and Article 28D paragraph (1) of the Indonesian Constitution (Asshiddiqie, 2005). Initially, as a former Dutch colony, Indonesia's concept of the rule of law was closer to the "rechstaat" concept, which requires that the government is based on written law (Budihardjo, 2008). Written law, or positive law, is civil law that the country adopted from colonial powers. However, history, culture, and international relationships have influenced law development in Indonesia. The existence of customary law based on customary practices (Alting, 2019) and long-established Islamic law cannot be ignored. According to Arsekal and Azra (2020), Islamic law is gaining ground in Indonesia. This is evidenced by the enforcement of Islamic law as the basis for establishing Islamic-based political parties, Islamic political parties' continuing efforts to adopt Islamic law into national law, and the adoption of Islamic Criminal Law in Aceh.

Thus, Indonesia implements legal pluralism, where at least three legal systems apply: positive law, customary law, and Islamic law. Legal pluralism can influence how the rule of law experiences shifts and challenges in its implementation, particularly when they intersect, including when developing and enforcing the Anti-Blasphemy Law in Indonesia.

### 2.1.2 Theory of justice

The theory of justice is a concept that philosophers and scholars have discussed and debated for centuries. At its core, the theory of justice aims to define fairness and equity in society and how resources, opportunities, and benefits should be distributed among individuals and groups. John Rawls proposed one of the most influential approaches to the theory of justice. He argued that a just society could be created by rational people in a hypothetical "original position," where principles of fairness and equality guide them, and personal characteristics are unknown. Rawls identified two key principles of justice: the principle of equal basic liberties and the difference principle.

The principle of equal basic liberties posits that every individual should have the same rights and freedoms as everyone else, regardless of their social or economic status. Scholars such as Martha Nussbaum have emphasized the importance of this principle, arguing that basic capabilities such as life, bodily health, and freedom of movement are vital to justice. (Nussbaum 2003)

The difference principle, in contrast, holds that social and economic inequalities are only just if they benefit the least advantaged members of society and are open to everyone. Scholars have criticized this principle, arguing that it could discourage innovation and hard work. However, others defend the difference principle as a necessary aspect of a just society. (Sen 2008)

Another important aspect of the theory of justice is the concept of distributive justice, which is concerned with how goods and resources are distributed among members of society. Scholars such as Robert Nozick have argued for a "minimalist" conception of distributive justice, in which individuals are entitled to keep the fruits of their labor and are not subject to excessive taxation or redistribution. (Nozick 1974)

The right to freedom of religion is a multifaceted issue that can be explored using various theories of justice. The capabilities approach, developed by Martha Nussbaum, is one such theory. According to this approach, a just society must ensure that individuals have access to a set of basic capabilities, including the capacity to practice one's religion freely. In her book "Frontiers of Justice", Nussbaum argues that individuals should have the freedom to practice their religion without interference from the state or other actors, as long as it does not harm others. (M. C. Nussbaum 2007).

The capabilities approach stresses the importance of individual agency and autonomy, which is particularly pertinent to the right to freedom of religion. This approach acknowledges the diversity of religious beliefs and practices and recognizes that individuals have the right to choose their own religion and practice it without fear of persecution or discrimination.

The principle of equal basic liberties developed by John Rawls is another theory of justice that is applicable to the right to freedom of religion. According to this principle, every person should have the same rights and freedoms as everyone else, regardless of their social or economic status. This principle encompasses the right to freedom of religion, which ought to be secured and guaranteed for all. (Rawls 2020).

Both the capabilities approach and the principle of equal basic liberties emphasize individual agency, autonomy, and equality, which are crucial for safeguarding and promoting the right to freedom of religion. These theories acknowledge the diversity of religious beliefs and practices and recognize that people have the right to choose their religion and practice it freely, without fear of persecution or discrimination.

To summarize, the capabilities approach and the principle of equal basic liberties are two theories of justice that can examine the right to freedom of religion. These theories underscore the significance of individual agency, autonomy, and equality, which are vital principles in defending and promoting this essential human right.

### 2.1.3 The rule of law, Justice and Human Rights

Scholars and experts have extensively discussed the close relationship between the rule of law and justice. Both concepts are essential for fostering fair and equitable societies (Kramer, 2017; Merkel, 2013). The rule of law ensures that all individuals, irrespective of their social status or position, are subject to the same laws and regulations (Baxi, 2013). Justice, on the other hand, aspires to create a society that guarantees equal access to fundamental human rights and opportunities for all individuals, regardless of characteristics like race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, religion, etc.

The rule of law plays a critical role in advancing justice since it provides the legal framework under which justice can be realized (Baxi, 2013). By ensuring that laws are applied evenly to all individuals, regardless of their social status, the rule of law guarantees that everyone receives equal protection and due process under the law (Kramer, 2017). An impartial legal system is crucial in seeking justice for all individuals. Devoid of the rule of law, justice won't be possible since it would create an unfair legal system that could breach individuals' right to justice (Boer, 2020).

Justice, on the other hand, provides a broader framework that directs the rule of law. Justice aims to establish a society that is just and equitable and grants equal access to basic human rights and opportunities for all individuals. Therefore, the rule of law must be carried out in a way that supports justice and assures that everyone has comparable accessibility to justice (Baxi, 2013; Zaidi, 2021).

For instance, where income disparity is high, the rule of law must push for justice by ensuring that the legal system does not benefit individuals with more economic resources. This can involve providing legal assistance to those without sufficient resources to afford representation (Boer, 2020), or drafting laws and regulations in equitably all-inclusive ways that do not oppress marginalized groups (Zaidi, 2021).

### 2.1.4 Law enforcement uphold the rule of law to preserve justice

The principle of the rule of law is a critical element of governance that stresses the accountability of all individuals and entities, public and private, to laws publicly enacted. It is necessary to ensure that the laws are enforced equally and are compatible with international human rights norms and criteria. In addition, the rule of law requires procedures to guarantee observance of the principles of legal certainty, accountability to the law, equality before the law, participatory decision-making, procedural and legal transparency, and avoidance of arbitrariness (World Justice Project, 2022).

Law enforcement entails guaranteeing that individuals comply with the law and penalizing those who breach the law. It is a function performed by law enforcement officials such as police officers, sheriffs, and other authorized personnel (Delattre, 2017).

The relationship between law enforcement and the rule of law is complicated and mutually reinforcing. The rule of law provides a structure for law enforcement officials to operate within, guiding their conduct to be consistent with due process and equal protection principles. In contrast, law enforcement upholds the rule of law by ensuring the law is applied fairly and uniformly, while punishing those who break the law (Bingham, 2007).

However, difficulties can arise when either of these concepts, the rule of law or law enforcement, is weak or not mutually reinforcing. If the rule of law is fragile, law enforcement officials might abuse their authority and violate individual rights or engage in corrupt practices. On the other hand, if law enforcement is ineffective, the rule of law might be debilitated, and public trust in the legal system might suffer.

Thus, balancing the need for both law enforcement and the rule of law is crucial. Law enforcement ensures order and security, but must, nevertheless, subject to the rule of law to safeguard individual rights and freedoms (Bayley & Eckenrode, 2006).

Justice warrants treating everyone equitably and providing equivalent opportunities. Law enforcement is essential to preserving both of these principles as it is responsible for enforcing the law and protecting people from harm (Fukuyama, 2013).

In the absence of law enforcement, individuals would flout the law with impunity, leading to anarchy and chaos. Additionally, law enforcement is tasked with protecting individuals from harm, an essential requirement for upholding justice. If there were no law enforcement, citizens would be vulnerable to the mercy of wrongdoers and lawbreakers, resulting in a society where the strong prey on the weak, and the rich exploit the impoverished (Tyler, 2017).

In conclusion, the principles of justice and the rule of law are essential elements of creating societies that are fair and equitable. Justice highlights equal access to fundamental human rights and opportunities, emphasizing fairness, equity, and inclusivity within society. The rule of law guarantees that everyone is subject to the same set of legal regulations, creating the structural foundation that enables justice to be achieved. These interconnected concepts work together to provide equal access to justice and basic human rights and opportunities to all individuals, regardless of their social position or status. The principles and frameworks developed by justice theorists offer a valuable structure for recognizing and addressing the persistent inequalities and injustices in contemporary societies.

## 2.2 Conceptual Framework

### 2.2.1 Anti-Blasphemy Law in the world

The origins of anti-blasphemy laws date back to ancient times when blasphemy was considered a violation against the divine powers. Historically, according to Graham (2009), the Christianity doctrine influenced the Anti-Blasphemy Laws (ABL) which were later adopted in Act 1703 in South Carolina. In recent times, the relevance of ABL has been a subject of human rights debates. During the Middle Ages, blasphemy was regarded as a transgression against the Church, with severe penalties levied against offenders. The concept of blasphemy as an offense against God or religion remained in the modern era, with several countries still enforcing blasphemy laws.

In the United States, the First Amendment, incorporated as part of the Bill of Rights in 1791, guarantees the freedom of speech, religion, and the press. However, various states introduced blasphemy laws, and it was not until the 20th century that the Supreme Court started to invalidate these laws as unconstitutional. In 1952, the Supreme Court ruled that a state law prohibiting blasphemy was unconstitutional (Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson), and in 1971, the Court expanded this protection to include criticism of religious figures and institutions (Cohen v. California).

In Europe, blasphemy laws were widespread until the Enlightenment, which initiated a shift towards secularism and rationalism. Nonetheless, many countries, such as Ireland and Greece, retained blasphemy laws until recently. In recent years, several European countries have abolished their blasphemy laws in response to criticisms from human rights groups and concerns about their effect on freedom of expression. Ancient civilizations such as Greece, Rome, and Egypt, dating back to the 16th century, have had anti-blasphemy laws criminalizing speech deemed derogatory to religion. The Christian church has historically been associated with anti-blasphemy laws, which were used to suppress dissent and maintain religious conformity, while the Muslim-majority countries, particularly Pakistan, whose blasphemy laws were enacted during the colonial era, are presently associated with anti-blasphemy laws.

Blasphemy laws have been politically exploited for far-right religious politicians' propaganda and have often been directed at religious minorities, such as Christians and Ahmadis, and political opposition in Pakistan. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and Iran have strict anti-blasphemy laws that stifle freedom of expression, thought, and religion. These laws are not consistent with international human rights principles, as they strengthen and promote religious mindset and orthodoxy over individual freedoms. They often result in violations of freedom of expression, religion, and thought, which are protected by international human rights instruments. Blasphemy laws are also counterproductive, such as in Pakistan, where they lead to an informal restriction on inter-and intra-religious and belief debate and criticism (Baderin, 2015; Bielefeldt, 2012; UN Human Rights Council, 2011).

Anti-blasphemy laws (ABL) lack a precise definition and tend to vary in interpretation from country to country. They often have an unclear concept and tend to be contrary to the principle of lawfulness, mainly aimed at safeguarding the state religion and imposing excessive punishment (Fiss and Kestenbaum, 2017). Blasphemy encompasses different meanings[[1]](#footnote-1), but mostly involves an act of dishonor against God[[2]](#footnote-2) (Michael Glazer, Inc. 1981). ABL is responsible for curbing hate speech or religious offences against holy persons, customs, artefacts, or beliefs as a means of governmental intervention in citizens' religious lives aimed at maintaining religious tolerance. A clear distinction is absent as to whether the objective is to safeguard religious groups against offensive speech or merely shield majority religions[[3]](#footnote-3), thereby promoting censorship laws that penalize critics and pose threats to democratization[[4]](#footnote-4) (Berman, 2011; Marshall & Shea, 2011).

In Pakistan, the ABL is widely interpretable and prohibits blasphemous acts against God, religious symbols, prophets and any deemed sacred object. The vague concepts covered under ABL such as "insult," "criticism," or "blasphemous" lack clear legal interpretations and are predominantly based on a particular community's feelings. The law aimed at protecting the religious system, symbols, artefacts, and teachings, and as such, is characterized by biased norms that prioritize safeguarding the sacred over individual rights (Nash and Bakalis, 2007).

Numerous countries inherited[[5]](#footnote-5) their Anti-blasphemy laws from their colonial period and adopted them as national laws via the concordantial principle, which are still enforceable today. (Durham and Scharffs, 2019: p.223, Octora, 2016:p.369) However, as outdated legal conventions, these laws are maintained and strengthened by enacting various regulations at either the national or local levels[[6]](#footnote-6).

Blasphemy laws have been historically related to religion, serving to subvert opposition and uphold religious orthodoxy. Modern-day employment of such laws in Muslim-majority nations has arisen from political and religious considerations and has negatively impacted human rights and freedom of expression. As a result, the international community has recognized the potential dangers posed by anti-blasphemy laws and called for its abolition since it violates the basic principles of human rights and democracy.

**2.2.2 Human Rights Under Anti Blasphemy Law Regime**

It is crucial to examine the impact of Indonesia's enforcement of the Anti-Blasphemy Law on people's human rights guarantees and protection, considering that one crucial feature of the rule of law is human rights. As Indonesia has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and incorporated its provisions into its Constitution, it has an obligation to ensure that freedom of religion and belief (FoRB) is respected, protected, and fulfilled for all citizens.

Therefore, it is essential to evaluate to what degree the Indonesian court has made international human rights law (IHRL) the basis for considering blasphemy cases. As pointed out by Bolintineanu (1974), it is a general principle of the Vienna Convention 1969 on the Law of Treaties. Hathaway (2007) expounds that the enforcement of the treaty's provisions reflects a state's level of commitment at the domestic level.

The Indonesian Anti-Blasphemy Law's provisions that impede the freedom to express religious beliefs lie between the rights to freedom of religion (FoRB) and freedom of expression (FoE), two fundamental rights. The FoRB is emphasized in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). These documents embody values, principles, concepts, standards, and rules that international communities have adopted and practiced. In addressing FoRB, the State party of ICCPR must consider other resources such as General Comment No. 22 and General Comment No. 34, which deal with the Declaration of the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, precisely (Heiner, 2012).

Heiner (2012) postulates that FoRB is an inherent universal right that cannot be forfeited because neglecting such right would mean neglecting other rights (p.20). FoRB comprises two dimensions, forum-interum, and forum-externum, according to Heiner (2012, p.21). Forum-interum is an internal forum that includes an absolute right to choose, leave, or have no religion at all. It cannot be challenged by the state and cannot be denied under Article 4 (2) of the ICCPR.

Forum-externum, on the other hand, pertains to the right to worship, teach religion, and practice religious observance. These activities can be limited by the state within the framework of Article 18 (3), which permits restrictions mandated by law and necessary to serve legitimate purposes such as maintaining public safety, order, health, morality, or basic rights, subject to the proportionality test. The state must ensure that such restrictions are precise and do not undermine the essence of fundamental rights or discriminate against religious groups (Heiner, 2012, p.23).

The limitation of religious expression or manifestation must refer to Article 19, 21, and 22 of the ICCPR since the right to freedom of expression (FoE) is not absolute (Smith, 2007, p.268). Nonetheless, it is a fundamental right that cannot be denied by anyone or any state. The state can exercise the discretion to impose restrictions through its domestic law (Fraser, 2019; Altwicker, T., 2018), provided that the restrictions are rigorously interpreted, precisely regulated by law, and necessary to achieve their stated purpose (Debeljak, 2008; McDonagh, 2013).

Dworkin (1980) argues that censoring someone's opinions and deeming them insulting is tantamount to suggesting that their opinions are not "deserving of equal respect" (p.51). Therefore, a person should not be penalized for their beliefs, thoughts, or imagination (Medlow, 2017: 2345).

In addition, the right to FoRB is protected internationally by both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)[[7]](#footnote-7) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)[[8]](#footnote-8), specifically in Articles 19 and 20. These treaties are recognized as a universal benchmark for upholding human rights protections for all persons regardless of their location[[9]](#footnote-9). The United Nations General Comment (UNGC) No. 34[[10]](#footnote-10) is another tool for protecting this right. These documents encompass all the ideas, values, principles, norms, and laws that have been accepted and implemented by international communities, including Indonesia.

According to Article 19 of the UDHR and Article 19 (1) of the ICCPR:

“Everyone has the right to [FoE][[11]](#footnote-11) […] [that] includes the right to seek, receive and impart information and all ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of Art, or through any other media of his choice”.[[12]](#footnote-12)

Unlike the right to FoRB, the right to FoE is not absolute (Smet, 2011). A state may impose restrictions through its domestic law, provided that the restrictions are precisely interpreted, strictly regulated by law, and necessary to achieve their stated purpose (Debeljak, 2008; Fraser, 2019). Therefore, when a person needs to express their religious beliefs, that person cannot be punished for their thoughts, imagination, or belief, except if their religious expression involves advocating hatred or posing a threat to other people's life or safety, in accordance with Article 20 (3).

According to Scanlon (1972), "freedom" refers to each individual's ability to independently determine what they should think and do. Therefore, government policies that suppress an individual's expression of views, opinions, or beliefs through various media violate Article 19 of the ICCPR, unless IHRL provides a legitimate and proportional justification for the restriction, especially if it solely targets the government's political opponents or other minority groups through various types of restrictions or prosecutions. This is because the right "to seek, acquire, and disseminate information or ideas of whatever type" is equally protected and may only be restricted under Article 19 (3)[[13]](#footnote-13) or Article 20 (2) and (3).

The restriction of the right to FoRB is comparable to the restriction of the right to FoE, and their applicability may overlap (Howard, 2017; Uddin, 2015). Defending the right to FoE would also facilitate the exercise of FoRB. However, both rights may restrict and limit each other (Mondal, 2016). Additionally, the right to FoE is a precondition for the enjoyment of other rights, and limitations of FoE must not violate other rights, including the right to FoRB (Schmitter and Karl, 1991). A state may impose restrictions through its domestic legislation, such as anti-blasphemy laws (ABL)[[14]](#footnote-14).

C. Durham and Scharffs (2019) elaborate on four stages that the court must undertake in limiting the right to FoRB and FoE, based on Article 19 (3), the Syracuse principles, and UNGC No. 22[[15]](#footnote-15). These stages must be thoroughly applied in limiting the policy, and if the policy fails the test, the defendant must be set free according to the law.

Stage I: The restrictions must be properly outlined in the law. This requirement has two elements, a formal and qualitative one. The formal element requires that the State's interference is legally authorized (W. Durham, 2011). This means that the law is enacted by the appropriate legal body through a legitimate process and does not contradict the respective State's Constitution. The most crucial element is that the limitation on the right must be compatible with the objects and purpose of the Covenant[[16]](#footnote-16).

Stage II: The restrictions apply solely to violations committed in public. The Rabat Plan of Action (RPA)[[17]](#footnote-17) explains this aspect. The RPA (2011) recommends that the court first considers the speaker's status or position in society, particularly when the individual speaks in public and whether the speech is intentionally targeted towards specific groups. Second, the court looks at the speaker's intention, which necessitates a relationship between the object, speech subject, and the audience. Third, it looks at whether there is a likelihood or imminence of incitement, which implies that there must be some level of risk of harm[[18]](#footnote-18). Fourth, the speaker cannot be prosecuted if the expression is conducted in a private setting. Fifth, the speech must be classified as public, meaning that the statements should be circulated in a restricted or widely accessible environment to the general public. Lastly, the court considers the context's social and political conditions when the speech was made and publicized.

Stage III: The restrictions must pass the "necessity test" with at least one of the following objectives: (a) maintaining public order; (b) protecting people's morality; (c) protecting public health; or (d) protecting and respecting the rights of others. Durham notes that although limitations should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis when implementing such restrictions, the state may not violate the fundamental right of "freedom of thought, conscience, and religion," and the state cannot prioritize protecting a particular religion by imposing arbitrary punishments to restrict the right to manifest that religion (W. Durham, 2011). The most critical aspect is that the limitation grounds must be strictly linked only to the enumerated grounds and with precise interpretation[[19]](#footnote-19). Additional limitation grounds that are not specified in Art. 19 (3) or 20 (2) may not be cited to justify a restriction[[20]](#footnote-20).

Stage IV: The restrictions must pass the "proportionality test," which means that the restrictions must ensure equal treatment to all individuals, considering the proportional punishment and not being susceptible to discrimination against other minority groups.

To evaluate the effects of implementing Indonesia's Anti-Blasphemy Law based on the rule of law principles, an assessment of how the law impacts the right to FoRB and FoE is crucial. This requires ensuring that any restriction imposed is precisely necessary, serves a specific purpose, does not discriminate against others, complies with the reasonable limitations on legitimate restrictions under International Human Rights Law and the Indonesian Constitution, and does not undermine the fundamental rights safeguarded under Articles 18, 19, and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

**2.2.3 Factors shaped the Enforcement of Anti Blasphemy Law in the world**

Anti-blasphemy laws are legal provisions that prohibit speech or actions that are perceived as contemptuous towards God or people or objects deemed sacred. Such laws have often been used as tools by political and religious authorities to stifle opposition and marginalize minorities. One instance of religious populism and anti-blasphemy laws can be witnessed in Pakistan, a country with a Muslim majority that possesses some of the most stringent blasphemy laws globally, following Iran. These laws were inherited from British colonial rule and have been enforced by successive military regimes and civilian governments to appease Islamist groups and mobilize religious sentiments among the masses. Since 1986, blasphemy has been punishable by death for insulting the Prophet Muhammad, and in 2023, the blasphemy law was extended further to include insults to the Prophet's companions, which could discriminate against Shiite Muslims who criticize early Muslims. Blasphemy laws have been utilized to persecute religious minorities such as Christians and Ahmadis, in addition to secular activists, journalists, academics, and artists. Accusations of blasphemy have also led to mob violence and extrajudicial killings by vigilantes who purport to defend the dignity of Islam (Villa, 2022; Kuru, 2023).

Another example of religious populism and anti-blasphemy laws is Italy, a predominantly Catholic nation with one of the strictest blasphemy laws among non-Muslim-majority countries. Italy's blasphemy law dates back to 1930, when it was introduced by the fascist regime of Benito Mussolini as part of an agreement with the Vatican. The law prohibits any public offense to the "Deity" or to any religion recognized by the state and carries a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment. Despite the law's rare enforcement, it has been cited by populist politicians and conservative groups claiming to safeguard Italy's Catholic identity and values from secularization and multiculturalism. Blasphemy laws have been employed to target comedians, singers, writers, and activists who have criticized or ridiculed the Catholic Church or religion in general (The Conversation, 2017).

These two instances highlight how in different historical and cultural settings, religious populism and anti-blasphemy laws have been interrelated. Blasphemy laws are not only linked to religious doctrine or personal beliefs; they can also be leveraged as a means of political power and social regulation. Blasphemy laws infringe upon essential human rights, including the freedom of expression and the freedom of religion or belief. These laws have the potential to propagate bigotry, discrimination, and violence against those who maintain varying or divergent opinions.

### 2.2.2 The Impacts of ABL's enforcement towards society

Anti-blasphemy laws can have considerable effects on society, both positive and negative, depending on their interpretation and implementation. One potential effect of anti-blasphemy laws is that they can safeguard the beliefs and sentiments of the majority group and avert the social disorder or violence that can arise from religious provocation. For instance, some Muslim-majority nations have stringent anti-blasphemy laws that aim to preserve the dignity and honor of Islam and its Prophet Muhammad. Such laws may act as a deterrent, preventing individuals from expressing opinions or producing materials that could incite frustration or resentment among Muslims, thereby fostering peace and social order. Nevertheless, the impact of these laws may depend on the level of diversity and tolerance in society, as well as on the availability of alternative pathways for dialogue and debate.

Another potential impact of anti-blasphemy laws is that they can restrain the freedom of expression and religion of the minority groups, and violate their human rights. For example, in some Christian-minority countries, anti-blasphemy laws have resulted in persecution and partiality towards the majority religion or ideology. These laws may reduce the ability of Christians to practice their religion, voice their opinions, or criticize the authorities. Additionally, these laws could be exploited or misused by extremists or opportunists who attempt to quell dissent or settle personal scores. In certain instances, anti-blasphemy laws have led to death penalties or extrajudicial killings of alleged blasphemer(s).

One historical example of anti-blasphemy laws is the case of England and Wales, where blasphemy against Christianity was a common law offence until 2008. These laws originated from medieval canon law, which authorized bishops to imprison and execute heretics, often by burning them alive. The common law crimes of blasphemy and blasphemous libel, declared by the Court of King's Bench in the 17th century, were punishable by fines, imprisonment, or corporal punishment. However, these laws were seldom enforced in recent times and were eventually revoked by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008.

A modern example of anti-blasphemy laws is the case of Pakistan, where blasphemy against Islam is a criminal offense under section 295-C of the Penal Code. This law was introduced in 1986 by General Zia-ul-Haq as a component of his Islamization initiative, and it carries a mandatory death penalty for those insulting Prophet Muhammad. This law has been extensively criticized by human rights groups and activists for being ambiguous, arbitrary, and susceptible to abuse. According to a Pew Research Center study (2022), in Pakistan, at least 17 individuals were sentenced to death on blasphemy charges in 2019; however, none of them were actually executed. Asia Bibi, a Christian woman, became the most well-known blasphemy case in Pakistan's history when she was accused of blasphemy by her Muslim colleagues in 2009. After spending eight years on death row, Bibi was acquitted by the Supreme Court in 2019.

To sum up, certain consequences of anti-blasphemy laws may be favorable, such as safeguarding religious sentiments and preventing social turmoil; however, others may be detrimental, including abridging freedom of expression and religion and risking human lives. As a result, it is critical to scrutinize these laws thoroughly and cautiously, while balancing deference for diversity with deference for human rights. Law reform and human rights are connected, with law reform serving as a potent tool for promoting and safeguarding human rights. The relationship between law reform and human rights is highlighted in various sources. According to the Law Society, law reform is essential to ensure that laws align with global human rights standards and that they are implemented in a manner that respects human rights. Furthermore, law reform can be employed to enhance legal protections for underprivileged groups, which can aid in preventing human rights abuses.

**2.3. Reformation of Anti Blasphemy Law in the World**

Although various countries still retain anti-blasphemy laws, some have successfully altered and aligned these laws with international human rights law (IHRL) norms. However, Indonesia is still grappling with this issue. For instance, there is inadequate research on how to eliminate the ambiguity of anti-blasphemy laws and impose strict restrictive standards in compliance with IHRL. If IHRL permits states to enforce restrictive standards on free speech and religion, then the presence of anti-blasphemy laws should be acceptable as long as the norms accord with IHRL.

Secondly, the literature demonstrates that some nations have managed to amend their anti-blasphemy laws to conform to IHRL. For example, instead of abolishing anti-blasphemy laws, some Australian states - such as New South Wales and Melbourne - have revised the elements of the law relating to blasphemous offenses, replaced the kind of penalties imposed, and altered criminal procedures in order to protect all religions rather than concentrating on Christianity, thereby attenuating the law rather than reinforcing it and resulting in it being enforced less frequently (Blitt, 2010, p. 7-9; Doe and Sandberg, 2008). In another instance, Hillgruber (2016) argues that Germany's law on blasphemy has been amended to be more responsive to local contexts, specifically, by recognizing that insulting any religion may disrupt public order. Additionally, in Ireland, blasphemy qualifications have been revised to focus on banning hate speech with the threat of sanctions that are not always directed at criminal punishment but can also include administrative sanctions (Rollinson, 2011).

It is also important to consider IHRL's view on insulting other religions as an act or expression of hate. Although IHRL does not prohibit the "right to insult," it does recommend the norm of "the obligation not to insult others." Respecting other religions by prohibiting "defamation of religion" through blasphemy law with strict restrictions or high norms in accordance with IHRL is crucial to creating a middle ground that fosters harmonious religious relations, prevents incitement to religious hatred (Danchin, 2010), upholds public morality, avoids horizontal conflicts (Cox, 2014), and eliminates discrimination against minority religions.

Furthermore, learning from other countries' experiences, whether through amending or abolishing anti-blasphemy laws, it is vital to ensure that future laws align with the principles of the rule of law and human rights. Every new law should be developed with high legal standards, avoiding multiple interpretations, observing legitimate limitations, and adhering to the principle of proportional necessity. It should be oriented towards protecting individual rights rather than concentrating solely on protecting the religious system, creating an accommodative state-religion relationship for all religions.

### 2.4 History of the ABL in Indonesia

Indonesia, being predominantly a Muslim country, has enforced the Anti-Blasphemy Law (ABL) since the Guided Democracy period under Soekarno's leadership (1965). The law continued to be enforced during the New Order era of Soeharto (1965-1998) and the Reformasi period until before President Jokowi's administration in 2019. However, this study focuses on the evolution of the ABL during the presidency of Jokowi and beyond, which will be detailed in Chapter Four and beyond.

### 2.3.1 During the Guided Democracy of Soekarno (1965)

The Anti-Blasphemy Law (ABL) in Indonesia has a historical background that dates back to the period of guided democracy[[21]](#footnote-21) under President Soekarno. On January 20, 1965, Presidential Decree No. 1/PNPS/1956 was signed, intending to minimize social conflicts between conservative citizens and non-religious groups, including atheists. The government considered these groups to be opposed to Pancasila, Indonesia's founding ideology, and believed that their existence could threaten protected religions, national security, and the unity of the nation[[22]](#footnote-22) (Sihombing, 2008).

At the time, Indonesia was following President Soekarno's Decree of July 5, 1959, during a period of guided democracy. Presidential Decree No. 150 of 1959 further strengthened this period by ordering the return to the 1945 Constitution and the formation of a Provisional Consultative Assembly and Provisional Supreme Advisory Council[[23]](#footnote-23) as soon as possible.

The 1965 communist revolution in Indonesia created a sense of fear among its people who did not want a recurrence of similar incidents (Arief, 2012; Crouch, 2011). This led to the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia's issuance of No. XXV/MPRS/1966, which prohibits the teachings of communism, Leninism, and Marxism as they promote non-religious ideology and can be considered as blasphemy of religion.

Presidential Decree No. 1/PNPS/1956 subsequently changed its title to Law No. 1/PNPS/1965, also known as the Indonesian Blasphemy Law (IABL). The law remains the same, despite the changes in its title. It is worth noting that Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan are predominantly Muslim nations[[24]](#footnote-24), and their blasphemy laws are not original, as they have different historical contexts.

In Indonesia, the blasphemy laws consist of two components. President Soekarno signed the first component, President Stipulation No. 1/PNPS/1965 concerning the Prevention of Abuse and/or Defamation of Religion (Law No. 1/PNPS/1965), on January 20, 1965[[25]](#footnote-25). The second component is the corporation law, Indonesia's Criminal Code Article 156a, which adopted its concepts from the colonizing country, the Netherlands.

Soekarno's decision to declare Indonesia in a state of emergency was motivated by two conditions. First, the fall of Ali Sastroamidjojo's Cabinet prompted him to use martial law as a reference basis to form a new cabinet and appoint himself as the supreme commander of the armed forces (Mardani, 2019). The cabinet that Soekarno formed was known as the Gotong Royong Cabinet and consisted of major parties such as PNI, Masyumi, NU, and PKI. Djuanda Kartawijaya was appointed as chairman, with several non-party figures becoming ministers (Fealy, 1998). However, the Gotong Royong Cabinet did not receive support from some political parties, such as Masyumi, the Catholic Party, and the Indonesian People's Party.

The emergency situation arose due to the Darul Islam (DI)/Indonesian Islamic Army (TII) rebellion, aiming to establish an Islamic state. The idea of establishing the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) came to fruition during the Conference of Muslims in West Java in 1948. It was motivated by the Islamic fighters' disappointment over the Renville agreement (Dewanto, 2011). The rebellion began when the Dutch invaded Yogyakarta, announced the fall of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), and simultaneously proclaimed the birth of the NII, making West Java the NII's de facto area. Kartosoewirjo, the leader of the rebellion, encouraged the proliferation of religious sects to hundreds of groups and was a follower of traditional Islam (Gus Sholahuddin, 2011; Dewanto, 2011).

The government was apprehensive about the increase in traditional beliefs as it viewed them as contrary to the Pancasila Precepts I "Belief in One the Only God" and Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution, "A State based on One the Only God" (Kahin, 1952). The Kartosuwirjo rebellion, which was finally quelled in 1962, killed 22,895 people, destroyed 115,822 houses, and caused state losses of more than Rp. 650 million (Fealy, 1998).

Soekarno issued Presidential Decree PNPS No. 1/PNPS/1965 to protect the country from rebellions caused by deviations or misunderstandings in interpreting a particular religion in Indonesia. This decree aimed to prevent the rise of traditional beliefs and maintain the state's foundation based on the belief in one and only God (Mardani, 2019).

In 1957, Indonesia faced two significant political crises, prompting President Sukarno to declare a state of emergency. The first crisis was the fall of the Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet, leading to Sukarno's appointment as the supreme commander of the armed forces and a member of the board formation to create a new cabinet under martial law. The newly formed cabinet was known as the Gotong Royong Cabinet and consisted of major political parties such as PNI, Masyumi, NU, and PKI. However, other political parties, including the Catholic Party and the Indonesian People's Party, did not support it (Dewanto, 2011).

The Darul Islam (DI)/Indonesian Islamic Army (TII) rebellion in Indonesia aimed to establish an Islamic state and was a significant crisis. The rebellion was triggered by the Islamic fighters' dissatisfaction with the Renville agreement, which they felt did not safeguard the citizens of West Java. In 1948, the Conference of Muslims in West Java gave birth to the idea of establishing the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII)[[26]](#footnote-26). The rebellion was led by Kartosuwirjo, a follower of traditional Islam who believed in mysticism. He successfully encouraged the proliferation of religious sects and established hundreds of groups[[27]](#footnote-27) (Gus Sholahuddin, 2011; Dewanto, 2011).

The DI/TII rebellion gained momentum when the Dutch invaded Yogyakarta, the capital of Indonesia, and declared the fall of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) while announcing the birth of the NII, making West Java the NII's de facto area. The Soekarno government was deeply concerned about the DI/TII rebellion, which inflicted significant losses on the state, including the deaths of 22,895 people, the destruction of 115,822 homes, and losses exceeding Rp. 650 million[[28]](#footnote-28). In response, President Sukarno issued a Presidential Decree (PNPS No. 1/PNPS/1965) aimed at securing the country from rebellions caused by deviations or misunderstandings in the interpretation of a particular religion in Indonesia (Dewanto, 2011).

The Soekarno government viewed the rise of traditional beliefs as being contrary to the Pancasila Precepts I, "Belief in One the Only God," and Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution, "A State based on One the Only God". The Presidential Decree allowed the government to take measures to curb the spread of these beliefs and maintain Indonesia's unity. The state of emergency was lifted in 1962 after the DI/TII rebellion was quelled, but its impact on Indonesia's political and social landscape persisted for many years (Dewanto, 2011).

The DI/TII rebellion had significant implications for religious-based movements in Indonesia, underscoring the need for the Indonesian government to prioritize religious harmony and maintain the country's unity. The rebellion had a lasting influence on Indonesia's social and political environment, further highlighting the importance of addressing sources of dissatisfaction and ensuring equal protection for all citizens in the country. An appreciation of the historical context and factors that led to the DI/TII rebellion is necessary in developing strategies that will mitigate the likelihood of similar crises.

President Soekarno utilized the 1965 Presidential Decree on the Prevention of Abuse and Blasphemy of Religion (PNPS) as a tool to control belief systems that posed a potential threat to the existence and power of the Republic of Indonesia, drawing upon the First Principle of Pancasila and Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution. PNPS was enacted to prevent the abuse and blasphemy of religion and safeguard public peace, but its fundamental purpose was not to safeguard religions. It was instead used as a means of suppressing belief systems that threatened the unity of Indonesia. The decree remained in effect even after the state of emergency imposed in 1962 to suppress Kartosoewirjo (DI/TII) was lifted.

### 2.2.7 During New Order of Soerharto (1965-1998)

Under Soekarno's guided democracy, the 1965 PNPS's status was elevated to law and significantly strengthened by various legislative measures. Nonetheless, the legitimacy of the PNPS was called into question due to its origin as a decree made solely by the President. This led to the MPRS Decree Number XIX/MPRS/1966, which provided the review of legislative products not aligned with the 1945 Constitution, such as the 1965 PNPS. This decree required that the DPR conduct a comprehensive review of all legislative products that were intended to improve the 1945 Constitution. Presidential Decrees and Regulations that aligned with the public conscience and the national revolution were deemed valid laws, while those that failed to meet these requirements were declared invalid[[29]](#footnote-29). The DPR was obligated to conclude this review process within two years (Dewanto, 2011).

Between 1950 and 1965, the socio-legal and political-ideological environment in Indonesia focused on national law development, requiring a choice between legal pluralism and national law unification. The legitimacy of the 1965 PNPS was based on Oemar's proposal. Oemar's 1963 National Seminar on offenses against religion argued that all religious adherents in Indonesia had the same right to practice their religion and that everyone was obligated to respect the religious rights of others. This aspect was crucial to guarantee that Indonesia, as a pluralistic country, would avoid any religious conflict (Wignjosoebroto, 1994).

“[…] Doesn’t the acknowledgment of the precepts of One the Only God as the prime cause states in the Pancasila, with article 29 of the 1945 Constitution which must be the basis of religious life in Indonesia, justify and even oblige us to create the religious offenses in the Criminal Code? […] Religion in our life and legal reality is a fundamental factor, so it can be understood if this factor can be used as a strong basis for bringing religious offenses to life.”

Oemar's idea aimed to ensure that the State properly implemented Pancasila's precepts and Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution to maintain the rule of law. The rationale was to prevent Indonesia from becoming a secular state that separates religion from the state, similar to the scenario in liberal countries. In terms of line Oemar views as follows:

“[..] Our rule of law is based on Pancasila, which is not a religious state, based on “Einheit” between religion and the state and which does not adhere to “separation” within sharp and strict boundaries, as adopted by western countries, and socialist countries that even include criminal sanctions on the principle of “the separation […]” (Adji, O., 1983: 50).

Oemar underscored the importance of safeguarding religion for three reasons. Firstly, as per the Friedensschutz theory or the "religious interconfessional joy," religion is a legal interest that must be protected. Secondly, the Gefühlsschutz theory or "holiest inner life of the community" reinforces that protecting religion aims to secure citizens' sense of security. Finally, the Religionschutz theory or the "cultural property of religion and the immense idealism that emerges from it for a large number of people" highlights the state's responsibility to safeguard religion as a legal interest (p.50).

The TAP MPRS No. XIX provisions and Oemar's ideas led to the conversion of Presidential Decree No. 1/1965 into Law No. 5/1969, with the requirement that there must be modifications, changes, or additional material added to the content for the succeeding law's development. However, Law No. 1/PNPS/1965 has not been altered, expanded, or modified to date. Although the law received formal approval from the President and the DPR, the two authorized institutions for drafting laws, it has not yet been perfected as mandated by Law Number 5 of 1969.

Under the New Order period, Suharto's administration continued to enforce the IABL and reinforced it by introducing Article 156a to the Indonesian Criminal Code. Article 4 of the IABL, in conjunction with Article 156a of the 1981 ICC, states:

To be punished with a maximum imprisonment of five years whoever deliberately in public expresses feelings or commits an act: which are principally hostile, misuse or desecrate a religion held in Indonesia; with the intention that people would not adhere to any religion, which has believed in the One Supreme God.

The enactment of Law No. 1/PNPS/1965 aimed to address social conflicts between conservative religious groups and non-religious, belief groups, and atheists in conflict with the First Sila of Pancasila[[30]](#footnote-30), which were perceived as threats to the established religion, national security, or the country's integrity (Densmoor, 2013)[[31]](#footnote-31). The 1965 communist revolution remained a dark episode that haunted Indonesian society, prompting them to avoid a similar incident from occurring again (Arief, 2012). Consequently, the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia issued No. XXV/MPRS/1966, which prohibited the teachings of communism, Leninism, and Marxism[[32]](#footnote-32). The resulting revolution led to President Soekarno's resignation[[33]](#footnote-33) and mandated Soeharto to take his place, marking a drastic shift in the administration's law under President Soeharto's administration, or the "New Order."

### 2.3.4. During Early Reformation Era (1998 – before Jokowi’s Era of 2014)

During the Reform era in Indonesia, which spanned from 1998 until the beginning of the Jokowi administration, the Anti-Blasphemy Law did not experience significant changes, remaining similar to the law during the Soeharto era. However, during this period, which included the presidencies of Habibie, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and Megawati, the Anti-Blasphemy Law was seldom used to punish religious minority groups.

As such, the development of the Anti-Blasphemy Law in Indonesia exhibited significant changes throughout the Old Order (post-Indonesia's independence), New Order, and early Reform. During the Old Order, the Anti-Blasphemy Law focused on preventing religious-based movements that could disrupt national stability, reflecting Sukarno's priority of national unity. Interestingly, although the Constitution used during the Old Order lacked articles on human rights, the Anti-Blasphemy Law lacked criminal sanctions and was not yet linked to the Criminal Code. This differed from the New Order era when the Anti-Blasphemy Law was used to criminalize political opponents deemed blasphemous to Islam to maintain national stability and protect the established religion (Islam) to encourage support from the majority Muslim population. During the early Reformation era, when the Indonesian Constitution amended human rights articles, instances of blasphemy were infrequent.

During the Joko Widodo administration, the number of Anti-Blasphemy Law cases significantly increased. This study aims to examine (i) the extent to which the enforcement of Indonesia's ABL erodes the rule of law, (ii) the factors and actors that shape court decisions regarding the ABL's enforcement, and whether political manipulation of religions influences its enforcement. The study will also analyze the impacts of its enforcement on society and whether it effectively upholds justice, as well as (iii) if the court's decisions lead to a substantive relationship between the state and religion in Indonesia, and the nature of such a relationship. The following chapters will systematically address all of these questions.

# CHAPTER III

# METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

## 3.1 Introduction

This chapter details the methodology and research design implemented for this study. As previously stated, this study employs a socio-legal research approach, which is presented in this chapter along with the rationale for its selection. The chapter explains the significance of the study, research tools, data collection methods, study period, data analysis, and research ethics. As diverse data were utilized, including statutes, case studies, interview results, and other secondary data, this chapter details the types of data used to ensure a clear and systematic description.

## 3.2. Rational for choosing methodology of socio-legal study approach

The socio-legal study approach is a suitable methodology for researching anti-blasphemy laws because it enables researchers to examine the law as a social construct that interacts with various aspects of society, such as culture, religion, politics, and human rights. This interdisciplinary approach can draw on perspectives and methods from the humanities and social sciences, such as sociology, anthropology, political science, and economics. As such, the researcher can explore the origins, functions, effects, and challenges of anti-blasphemy laws in different contexts and jurisdictions.

The socio-legal approach employs a variety of qualitative and quantitative methods to collect and analyze data, such as participant observation, interviews, surveys, document analysis, case studies, and comparative analysis. These methods can help the researcher gain a deeper understanding of the views, experiences, and behaviours of various actors involved or affected by anti-blasphemy laws, such as lawmakers, judges, lawyers, religious leaders, activists, victims, and offenders. The researcher can also use these methods to examine legal texts, doctrines, principles, and precedents that shape and constrain anti-blasphemy laws (Banakar & Travers, 2005).

Moreover, the socio-legal study approach permits researchers to critically evaluate anti-blasphemy laws from different theoretical and normative perspectives, such as legal pluralism, human rights, democracy, secularism, and religious freedom. Such perspectives enable questioning of the assumptions, values, and interests underlying anti-blasphemy laws and assessing their implications for justice and social change (Sussex University, n.d.).

Therefore, the socio-legal study approach is a credible methodology to examine anti-blasphemy laws, providing a comprehensive, contextualized, and critical framework to analyse and interpret these laws as social phenomena with multiple dimensions and impacts on society.

## 3.3 Significance of the study

The objective of this study is to contribute to the comprehension of the sociopolitical context of Indonesia's Anti-Blasphemy Law (IABL) application in relation to the right to freedom of religion or belief (FoRB). The study expands upon current knowledge in this field by adopting a socio-legal approach that analyzes the factors and actors responsible for influencing the law's enforcement.

Existing studies on IABL have primarily taken a top-down normative perspective of Human Rights Law. However, this study provides an additional understanding of the gap between the IABL and its enforcement by examining the sociopolitical context that shapes the application of the law.

The data and findings from this study can be valuable to law enforcers examining blasphemy cases. It emphasizes the potential for the misapplication of the IABL, which may deprive citizens of their fundamental rights, and the importance of courts prioritizing the rule of law, protecting rights, and upholding justice that fosters humanity in blasphemy cases. Moreover, this study may also contribute to the field of social science by enhancing legal system performance.

Regarding legislative impact, the findings of this study can enable legislators to comprehend that the vague concept of IABL significantly impacts legal certainty and justice in its enforcement. This study argues that reforming the cryptic, repressive, and discriminatory anti-blasphemy law can prevent Indonesia from evolving into an authoritarian regime that infringes on citizens' rights. The data, findings, and results from this study can enrich academic studies and facilitate the formulation of legal norms that meet high standards and provide a complete picture of blasphemy law development and its enforcement. Doing so can prevent public debate or vigilante justice from threatening democratization.

This study aims to enrich the knowledge base on the sociopolitical context surrounding the IABL's enforcement and its impact on FoRB. It aspires to provide insights for law enforcers and legislators promoting human rights and upholding the rule of law while enhancing legal certainty and justice in Indonesia.

## The research tools and data collection

To answer the research questions comprehensively, this study employed diverse research tools and methods to collect data, including:

## 3.4.1 Constitutional Court Decisions and Statutes studies

To evaluate the present state of legal politics surrounding the Anti-Blasphemy Law (ABL) and its impact on the rule of law and human rights, it is crucial to investigate the legal-political developments of the anti-blasphemy regime, particularly following the issuance of several Constitutional Court decisions related to the judicial review of the 1965 ABL, such as Decision Numbers 140/PUU-VII/2009, 140/PUU-VII/2010, 76/PUU-XVI/2018, and 84/PUU-X/2012. This study also examines the contents of Law No. 1/PNPS/1965 regarding the Prevention and Eradication of Religious Abuse and/or Defamation (hereafter the 1965 ABL), Article 156a of the 1981 Criminal Code of Indonesia (hereafter the 1981 CCI), Law No. 11 Year 2008 concerning Information and Electronic Transactions (hereafter the IET Law), and other related regulations and public policies supporting the blasphemy law.

This study investigates the Constitutional Court judges' reasons and considerations on the judicial review of the ABL by referring to the Indonesia Constitution Pasca Amandemen, particularly Chapter X article 28 A-J and 29, as well as the human rights treaties ratified by Indonesia, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other related statutes, such as the Law Number 39 Year 1999 concerning Human Rights. All current statutes and regulations concerning anti-blasphemy are critically analyzed for their meanings, implications, and impacts on the rule of law and justice, particularly the human rights of citizens.

## 3.4.2 Criminal Court Decisions studies

To illustrate the legal politics encompassing Indonesia's Anti-Blasphemy Law's current developments and their impact on human rights, we conducted a comprehensive analysis of criminal court decisions in blasphemy cases spanning from 2008 to 2020. The aim of this analysis is to reveal trends in court verdicts, such as the demographics of the religious groups that most frequently utilize the blasphemy law as plaintiffs, the types of blasphemy accusations most frequently imposed on defendants, the length of prison sentences handed out by the courts, as well as the individuals or religious groups most frequently targeted for punishment.

## 3.4.2 In-depth interview and semi structured interview

This study aims to provide valuable insights into the enforcement of Indonesia's Anti-Blasphemy Law, its impact on justice, and related issues. To achieve this goal, we conducted interviews with two types of respondents: experts and informants. A total of 42 respondents were interviewed, including experts such as the Commissioner of the National Commission of Women, justices of the Supreme Court and the CCIR, human rights experts, parliamentarians, staff of the National Human Rights Commission and Human Rights NGOs, and the former head of YLBHI - Jakarta. Open-ended questionnaires were used to interview experts to explore their experiences with the cases that shaped ABL enforcement, identify the actors who push for strengthening blasphemy laws, and examine public views for defending, revising, or deleting the ABL. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, these in-depth interviews were conducted face-to-face or through online media such as Zoom, Skype, email, or other related applications.

Additionally, this study also interviewed informants and victims who have experienced or been involved in blasphemy cases, including perpetrators or victims of religious minority groups as the target of blasphemy cases. Due to various reasons, data from government officers, lawyers, and members of minority religious groups regarding law enforcement were extracted from various secondary sources, such as documentary videos published by mass media, interviews with the parties involved and published societies by various media, including YouTube channel officials and news from Islamic organizations, FPI, and others.

## 3.4.3 Case studies

This study adopts a case study approach, examining a selected number of blasphemy cases, specifically the Ahok case, the Meiliana case, the Gafatar (Millah Abraham) case, the Ahmadiyya case, and the Bambang Bima case. Each case is explored in-depth to support the arguments provided in each chapter, providing a comprehensive understanding of the socio-political dynamics of IABL enforcement, including factors and actors that shaped blasphemy prosecutions, the vigilante actions against religious minority groups that occurred during law enforcement, and the state's preferential treatment of certain religious groups.

Although there are similarities in certain aspects, each of the four cases is unique and distinguished by its own set of distinctive features. The following is an overview of the four cases under consideration:

This study uses a case studies approach of a selected number of blasphemy cases, namely the Ahok case,[[34]](#footnote-34) the Meiliana case,[[35]](#footnote-35) the Gafatar (Millah Abraham) case,[[36]](#footnote-36) the case of Ahmadiyya and the case of Bambang Bima.[[37]](#footnote-37) Each case are discussed in depth to support the arguments provided in each chapter to explain a complete picture of the socio-political dynamic of the enforcement of the IABL, factors and actors that shaped blasphemy enforcements, including the vigilante actions against minority groups of religion that happened during the law enforcement, and how the state has favor towards certain religious groups.

Despite similarities in certain respects, each of the four cases under examination is unique and distinguished by its own set of distinctive features. The following is an overview of the four cases under consideration:

1. **Ahok Case**

Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, commonly known as Ahok[[38]](#footnote-38), is a Chinese Christian politician who represented the Jakarta area, Indonesia's capital city, which is known for its multicultural and highly educated population. The case of Ahok contains strong political nuances where Islamist groups mobilized the masses and utilized the issue of blasphemy to confront Ahok during the 2019-2024 Governor election. As a result, Ahok was convicted and sentenced to two years in prison, eventually losing in the 2019 local election.

Ahok's case was initiated by a report from the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) of South Sumatra by Habib Novel Chaidir Hasan to the Criminal Investigation Agency (Bareskrim) LP/1010/x/2016, under charges of violating Article 156a of the Criminal Code in conjunction with Article 28 paragraph (2) of Law Number 11 2008 concerning Electronic Transaction Information, which carried a prison sentence[[39]](#footnote-39) of up to five years. This was followed by a report from the Muhammadiyah Youth[[40]](#footnote-40) under report number TBL/4846/X/2016/PMJ/Dit Reskrimum.2016/PMJ/Directorate of Crime. Ahok was accused of blaspheming Islam because of his statement:

“[...] this [local] election is being pushed forward, so if I am not elected, I will stop it in October 2017 so if we run this program well, ladies and gentlemen, even though I am not elected as governor, this story will inspire you, so it doesn't matter. Don't worry, ah... later if you don't vote, Ahok's program will be disbanded, no... I'm until October 2017, so don't trust people, you can just in your heart you can't choose me, right? right, being lied to using Al-Maidah 51, various kinds of things are the rights of parents, so if you feel you can't be elected because I'm afraid to go to hell because of being fooled like that, it's okay papa, because this is your personal call, ladies and gentlemen, this program just goes on, So ladies and gentlemen, you don't have to feel bad, in your conscience you can't choose Ahok, you don't like Ahok, but if you accept the program, it's not good, so I owe you a debt of gratitude, don't you have a bad feeling, you'll die slowly from a stroke.”

1. **Ahmadiyya Case**

The Ahmadiyya case[[41]](#footnote-41) in Cikeusik, Pandeglang, Banten of West Java involves a new religious movement in a conservative religious society. Ahmadiyya followers faced different forms of violence from vigilantes, and hardliner groups were supported by local and central governments to enact public policies that stigmatized Ahmadiyya as a deviant group, although formally Ahmadiyya is a legitimate religious organization. Eventually, the court sentenced the Ahmadiyya leader to several years in prison and continued to ban the activities of his followers.

Ahmadiyya is a legal entity founded by the Indonesian Islamic Community approved by the Ministry of Law in 1953. However, since 1980 Ahmadiyya has been declared heretical by the Indonesian Council of Ulema, following several fatwas. Therefore, Ahmadiyya adherents have often been victims of vigilantism in various parts of Indonesia, such as in Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara, Tangerang, Bogor, East Java, and others, including expulsion, death threats, and burning of places of worship. Prior to the MUI Fatwa declaring Ahmadiyya heretical, Ahmadiyya adherents lived peacefully side by side with other Muslims since its establishment in 1953. However, the MUI considered Mirza Gulam Ahmad as the last prophet and claimed to have a holy book other than the Qur'an, leading to the declaration of Ahmadiyya as heretical.

The former chairman of the MUI, who once issued a heretical fatwa against Ahmadiyya and currently serves as Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia, Ma'ruf Amin, stated the following to the BBC:

''Because Ahmadiyya considers there is a prophet after Prophet Muhammad. It's an opinion that can't be disputed anymore. In the agreement of all Muslims in the world, tajdid (reform) is allowed but it is a movement. But if the tajdid then says there was a prophet after the Prophet Muhammad, it is a deviant. It goes beyond the definition of tajdid. carry the name of Islam.”[[42]](#footnote-42)

The Ahmadiyya has denied this claim, yet, MUI continues to declare Ahmadiyya as a heretical religion. Ahmadiyya adherents argue that mainstream Muslims misunderstand Ahmadiyya and there is a misinterpretation of Ahmadiyya's beliefs. This is as stated by JAI spokesman, Yendra Budiandra:

“The Qur'an is the holy book of the Ahmadiyya Muslim community that must be read and is a guide for life, while the Tazdkirah is like other books of Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad that are recommended to be read, but not a holy book as in the context religious scriptures. We Ahmadiyya Muslims are the same as following and believing in these criteria, both from the creed, the Pillars of Faith, the Pillars of Islam, and the Holy Qur'an.”[[43]](#footnote-43)

The MUI's recommendation that advocates for Ahmadiyya to leave Islam is viewed as an inadequate solution that is unlikely to be accepted since Ahmadiyya adherents adhere to Islamic teachings and practice them. This was stated by an expert and explained by Alauddin Makassar, Professor DR. Qasim Mathar, a theology lecturer at the State Islamic University (UIN), who stated that:

“It is impossible for them to be called a religion that is not Islam, for example they are told to take another name. Because their practice of religion is Islam, their mosque and way of praying is Islam. They fast during Ramadan, they go for Hajj too, and so on.”[[44]](#footnote-44)

The rejection of Ahmadiyya as part of the Muslim community in Indonesia was influenced by similar rejection in other countries, including Pakistan, Malaysia, and among members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Ahmadiyya is a religious sect of Islam that is often targeted by vigilante justice, especially following the enforcement of the ABL against them.

In the case of Ahmadiyya, various MUI's fatwas declared Ahmadiyya as a heretical religion and elicited reactions from a hard-line Islamic group calling itself the Islamic Defenders Front. According to Table 6, vigilante actions against Ahmadiyya have resulted in damage to houses of worship and buildings, victims suffering minor and serious injuries, the death of some victims, and the expulsion of Ahmadiyya followers from their homes.

Table 6. Main Hakim Sendiri experienced by Ahmadiyya in Indonesia.

| No | Date & Place | Forms of Vigilantism Violence |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | In Cisalada, West Java, in October 2010 | A group of individuals burned down the An Nur mosque belonging to the Ahmadiyya congregation. In 2007, a Joint Decree was issued at the district level in Ciampea, signed by the Camat, MUI, and KUA, which prohibited Ahmadiyya congregational activities. On July 12, 2010, thousands of residents in Cisalada visited the location of Ahmadiyya followers and opposed the construction of several buildings. The group demanded the demolition of Ahmadiyya places of worship, schools, and mosque foundations. The foundations of buildings belonging to Ahmadiyya were dismantled by the local Civil Service Police Unit. On August 9, 2010, a child of an Ahmadiyya follower was stoned.[[45]](#footnote-45) |
| 2 | 6 February 2011 in Cikeusik, Bogor, West Java. | Hundreds of individuals attacked and killed three members of JAI while injuring five others. In 2000, violence against Ahmadiyya residents escalated in West Java. The MUI issued a "heretical" fatwa against Ahmadiyya in 2005. Hardline Islamic groups attacked the Ahmadiyya Congregation in Bogor. In 2008, FPI committed violent acts against Ahmadiyya residents who rejected the Three Ministers Decree prohibiting Ahmadiyya from carrying out activities deemed as deviant in public. The decree was issued on June 9, 2008. In February 2011, three FPI members were killed and five injured. Twelve criminals were sentenced to 3-6 months in prison, while Ahmadiyya followers who defended themselves were given a six-month sentence.[[46]](#footnote-46) |
| 3. | Friday, February 17, 2012, Cianjur Regency, West Java. | Twenty individuals caused damage to the Nurhidaya Mosque belonging to the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Congregation. The Cianjur Resort Police have identified 20 suspects, who are residents of Cisaar Village, Cipeuyeum Village, Haurwangi District, Cianjur Regency, West Java.[[47]](#footnote-47) |
| 4. | May 23rd, 2016, in Kendal, Central Java | A group of people caused damage to the Al-Kautsar Mosque, which belongs to the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Community in Purworejo Village, even though the mosque had obtained a certificate and building permit (IMB) since its construction in 2004.[[48]](#footnote-48) |
| 5. | On May 19-20, 2018, in East Lombok Regency, West Nusa Tenggara. | A group of individuals attacked, vandalized and expelled members of the Ahmadiyya Congregation in Grepek Tanak Eat Hamlet, Greneng Village, East Sakra District. The destruction was carried out for two consecutive days. The initial act of vandalism was reported by JAI to the local police, but no action was taken, which resulted in a second act on May 20, 2018. On October 1, 2010, the Ahmadiyya Mosque in Cisalada was attacked and completely destroyed by arson.[[49]](#footnote-49) |
| 6. | September 3rd, 2021, in Sintang Regency, West Kalimantan. | Various acts of violence were committed against the Ahmadiyya Congregation, including the destruction of mosques and burning of buildings in Balai Harapan Village, Temunak District, Sintang Regency. In order to protect themselves, twenty heads of families and seventy-four members of JAI were relocated to a safer location. Two hundred individuals who carried out vigilante justice in the name of Aliansi Umat Islam were taken into custody by the Indonesian National Police..[[50]](#footnote-50),[[51]](#footnote-51) |

1. **Gafatar Case**

The Gafatar case[[52]](#footnote-52) in Kalimantan involved members from various regions of Indonesia with middle to lower economies. This case is similar to the Ahmadiyya case, which is also characterized by numerous incidents of violence carried out by vigilante justice groups. Initially, Gafatar invited its followers to be independent, which was supported by many parties. However, the organization was later accused of being affiliated with Millah Abraham, whose leader, once considered a heretic, was still serving time when the Gafatar case emerged.

During the ongoing process of criminalizing the Ahmadiyya, new allegations emerged in 2017 involving five members of the Fajar Nusantara Movement (Gafatar) who were accused of using the organization to revive the heretical teachings of Millah Abraham[[53]](#footnote-53). Consequently, Gafatar's followers became targets of vigilante justice conducted by two villages, Moton Panjang Village and Tanjung Pasir Village, in East Mempawah District, Mempawah Regency, West Kalimantan, which they founded by clearing forests.

According to Adam, a member of Gafatar, the organization was established in January 2012 in Jakarta, with a membership of 55,000 and branches in 34 provinces across Indonesia. The Gafatar organization received a permit from the Ministry of Home Affairs. However, the Ministry refused to extend Gafatar's permit in 2015, causing the organization to disband. In the interview, AD explained that:

“Gafatar is not a religious organization, members of Gafatar go to West Kalimantan to farm, make Kalimantan a national food barn, we plant rice, vegetables, so that our members have food sovereignty.”[[54]](#footnote-54)

1. Table 7. Vigilante violence experienced by Gafatar

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| No | Date and Place | Form of Vigilantism Violence |
| 1. | Wednesday on 15-18th January 2016 | Between January 15 and 18, 2016, an armed mob consisting of baton and machete-wielding individuals approached the Gafatar farmer group located in Mempawah District, West Kalimantan, demanding their evacuation from the area. As many as 700 members of the Gafatar farmer group had their homes destroyed by thousands of local residents on January 20, 2016. This act of arson also caused women and children to become victims. It is noteworthy that Gafatar members had already sold their homes and property in their hometowns and decided to improve their fate by farming in the Kalimantan region, which led them to acquire the land. |
| 2. | January 19th, 2016. | Following the torching of numerous Gafatar houses, 1,124 members of Gafatar, who stated their disassociation from the organization, were nonetheless forced out of their residences in two villages of Mempawah Regency, West Kalimantan. The local government permitted this act of eviction. These displaced individuals were relocated to the Bekangdam Supply and Transportation Complex of Kodam XII/Tanjungpura in Pontianak, West Kalimantan.[[55]](#footnote-55) |

Similar to the Ahmadiyya community, members of the Gerakan Fajar Nusantara (Nusantara Sunrise Movement) or Gafatar, were subjected to various forms of violence. Although defendants T. Abdullah Fattah, Fuadi Mardhathilla, Ridha Hidayat, and Althaf Mauliyul Islam were found guilty under Article 156a of the Indonesian Criminal Code for mixing the teachings of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity, the Indonesian government's pressure against Gafatar continued. On January 14, the Minister of Home Affairs, Tjahjo Kumolo, instructed the local government to close all Gafatar offices. On March 24, Attorney General Muhammad Prasetyo announced a Joint Decree (SKB), signed together with Minister of Religion, Lukman Saifuddin, and Minister of Home Affairs, Tjahjo Kumolo, warning that "former members and administrators of Gafatar" involved in "dissemination, interpretation, and activities that deviate from the main teachings of Islam" may face up to five years in prison, based on the 1965 blasphemy crime article[[56]](#footnote-56).

Additionally, the Human Rights Watch reported that from January to the end of February, 2,422 families, comprising a total of 7,916 individuals including children, were expelled from West and East Kalimantan. The Indonesian government detained over 6,000 Gafatar members who were forcibly expelled from Kalimantan to six illegal detention centers in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Bekasi, Boyolali, and Surabaya[[57]](#footnote-57). Subsequently, these members were evacuated to the Bekangdam Supply and Transportation Complex of the Tanjungpura Military Command XII in Pontianak, West Kalimantan. The former chairman of Gafatar, Mahful M Tumanurung stated that:

*“We, ex-Gafatar members, deeply regret and strongly condemn actions in the form of systematic forced evictions, destruction of fires and looting of assets on land that we legally own.”[[58]](#footnote-58)*

1. **Meiliana Case**

Meiliana[[59]](#footnote-59), a Chinese Buddhist resident of Tanjung Balai Medan, where the people have a strong Malay culture and uphold customary principles known as "Adat bersendikan Syarak, Syarak bersendikan Kitabullah" or "the tradition is based on Sharia, and the Sharia is based on the Koran," was accused of blasphemy against Islam for protesting a nearby mosque's loud call to prayer. This case, involving a hardliner Islamic group's accusation of Meiliana representing identity politics, exemplifies the politicization of religion and economic sentiment. The case was further tainted by vigilante justice's attack on the Vihara Temple, blaming Meiliana's actions as insulting to Islam and attacking the temple under the guise of protecting religion.

The court's decision can shed light on to what extent religion and identity politics influenced it. Before the case was processed by law enforcement, vigilante justice targeted Meiliana and her family. During the mediation process, vigilante groups provoked residents and spread the narrative that "Meiliana forbade the Adhan calls," stoking their anger. However, Meiliana's legal advocate argued in her defense that she had merely conveyed to a shop owner, in a low tone on July 22, 2016, "Sis, the voice of our mosque was not that big, now it's a bit bigger, right?"[[60]](#footnote-60)

Meiliana's Muslim neighbors resorted to vigilantism, damaging not only her home but also several Buddhist temples such as the Tri Ratna Temple and the Dewi Samudera Temple on the banks of the Asahan River. In total, three monasteries, eight temples, two Chinese foundations, a medical center, and Meiliana's home were damaged. Consequently, the police named eight suspects for acts of violence and charged Meiliana with blasphemy against Islam. The eight suspects were tried at Tanjung Balai Court and received a lenient sentence of 1.5 months in prison, which was reduced from their original sentence[[61]](#footnote-61). Meanwhile, Meiliana received a harsher sentence of 18 months in prison.

## 3.4.4 The period of study

Through this multifaceted approach, the study aims to address the enforcement of Indonesia's blasphemy law (IABL) and its impact on the rule of law and justice in the last decade, while considering significant changes in legal, political, and social contexts. The study will focus on four blasphemy cases that took place during Joko Widodo's presidency (2019-2020).

## 3.4.5 Analysis of the data

In a socio-legal study approach, legal analysis is conducted first to evaluate the current development of Indonesia's anti-blasphemy law (ABL). The findings from the legal analysis are then used to explore empirical data in the field. Heidegger's philosophical perspective suggests that the text must be understood in its historical context, including the circumstances under which it was written. Thus, the initial step in data analysis is to identify research questions and determine the qualitative data needed to address all questions.

This study aims to investigate the current development of Indonesia's anti-blasphemy law and its impact on the rule of law and justice. The legal content analysis methodology, along with a doctrinal and hermeneutic approach, is employed to collect qualitative data in the form of textual data such as constitutional court decisions, statutes, and other relevant regulations and public policies. The collected data is systematically categorized into themes and patterns to facilitate analysis and answer research questions.

Furthermore, correlation analysis is utilized to identify the factors and actors influencing the enforcement of the ABL and its impact on justice. Tamanaha (2011) underscores the importance of connectedness and the law's relationship to various societal factors such as history, culture, religion, and politics. Hence, empirical data, court experiences, and regulations are investigated to explore the sociopolitical dynamics and factors influencing the enforcement of anti-blasphemy laws in Indonesia.

The study employs a case study approach to collect empirical data from various interviews and juridical experiences on different blasphemy cases. In addition, to evaluate the effectiveness of the law and understand how it is treated and applied to specific contexts, criminal court rulings on blasphemy cases are studied.

To present the research findings, the collected data is first reduced and categorized based on emerging themes, as suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994). Finally, the research findings are analyzed using theoretical concepts to draw conclusions.

## 3.5 Research ethics

The objectives of this study do pose a moderate risk to the researcher when conducting interviews, especially when the interview questions are not carefully formulated. The risk of the study becoming viral on social media and attracting public criticism is also present. Law enforcement officers may arrest the researcher to subdue the public's response. However, the research is possible for several reasons: scholars have discussed this issue at various forums, and most of the data is obtained from secondary data resources such as news, judge verdicts, legislation, and local regulations that are easily accessible through the Parliament's, Supreme Court's, or Constitutional Court's website.

Nonetheless, the study could still face rejection, particularly from the respondents who belong to minority religious groups or may feel social discomfort due to prejudice or discrimination against them. To overcome this issue, the researcher must obtain voluntary participation consent from these groups before conducting any surveys.

For the success of the study, to reduce the risk and referring to the guiding principles of "do no harm", this research will be conducted based on some aspects:

1. The methods of research will be well-thought-out before the field research starts. For example, interviewing key persons such as judges, experts, public officers, the leader of minority religious groups, can minimize the risk rather than an open survey to ordinary people. For online interviews, the researcher will use more secure online-platforms to safeguard the identity of participants and researchers, as well as to reduce data leaking. To ensure the confidentiality of data or information shared and the privacy of conversations, the researcher will use Signal app which is a safer and more secure online platform than most messengers because of a process called end-to-end encryption and Zoom meeting at participants and researcher's convenience.
2. To avoid deception, the researcher will introduce herself openly, and the aims of the research will be well explained before the interview to all participants to obtain either a written and signed form of consent or verbal consent.
3. To respect and protect participants' privacy, all participants will be anonymous, and the researcher will keep the data anonymous. To ensure confidentiality, the data obtained will be saved in a personal external drive.
4. The data will also be collected from the experts in human rights law, and the NGO concerned with the religious freedom issue so that the identity of vulnerable subjects from minority groups of religions remain covered.
5. Finally, for safety reasons, the researcher should not put herself in the way of harm, whether it is political, physical, or psychological harm. The researcher will not discuss the teachings of each religion or belief.

To ensure the researcher's neutrality, data analysis will be free from any bias based on the researcher's background, position, or perspective. It will be based on valid and trustworthy data or evidence. Despite the risks involved, the study provides an opportunity for religious minority groups to be heard. This will facilitate a better understanding of the pressure these individuals experience and enable us to optimize the protection of FoRB in Indonesia.

The study also guarantees confidentiality for all participants. Any information related to their identity, such as names, addresses, and positions, will not be revealed. Instead, the study will use abbreviations, fake names, or codes to label them and ensure that nobody can be identified within the research. Interviews will be conducted at a safe and confident venue and time for the respondents, either recorded or noted down. The study will use a code system with categorization such as gender and age, without mentioning their name or address, to further protect their privacy. To ensure the safety of the respondents, the researcher will be the only person with access to the data, and all data will be destroyed after two years.

# CHAPTER IV

# DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDONESIA’S ANTI-BLASPHEMY LAW UNDER THE RULE OF LAW

# AND ITS IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS

## 4.1 Introduction

The reformation era in Indonesia, marked by the fall of Suharto in 1998, had significant impacts on the development of the Anti-Defamation Law. The legal politics that took place during this period influenced the evolution of the law, particularly in relation to the 1965 ABL. Despite the need for amendments and improvement, the 1965 ABL remained unchanged until the reformation era, and its norms were reinforced by various new laws and public policies at the local level (Kusumawijaya & Chozin, 2018). In reality, during Joko Widodo's administration, the legal politics surrounding the Anti-Blasphemy Law (ABL) continues to be implemented, reinforced by Article 156a of the Criminal Code as well as various related regulations such as the ratification of the Law Number 11 of 2008 on Electronic Information and Transaction (EIT Law) which was later revised in 2016, culminating in the New Criminal Code's approval in 2022.

Originally, the 1965 Anti-Blasphemy Law (ABL) did not stipulate any criminal sanctions. Moreover, even after the insertion of Article 156a into the Criminal Code, it was seldom utilized to prosecute individuals for religious blasphemy. However, since the enactment of the EIT Law and the Constitutional Court's judicial review ruling affirming the constitutionality of the 1965 ABL, the application of the blasphemy law has become more frequent in Indonesian courts during Joko Widodo's administration. According to Crouch, at least 130 individuals were convicted under the ABL from 1988 to 2012, with an additional 66 cases being resolved by the courts between 2012 and 2018.

The law is not a static or fixed set of rules, but rather a dynamic and evolving system of norms, principles and values that respond to the changing needs and circumstances of society. Culture, morals, beliefs, and norms influence law development. These factors can affect how people and groups view law and justice. Gender, race, faith, and caste discrimination can limit legal rights and freedom for certain groups. The governance framework, system, and effectiveness of a nation shape law development. These factors affect legal decision-making and execution. Political turmoil and violence can weaken the rule of law and public faith in legal institutions.

During Jokowi's administration, from 2019 until the time of writing this thesis, the Blasphemy Law (ABL) used is the same as the one implemented since 1965, as there have been no amendments to the law until now. In addition to the Blasphemy Law Year 1965, other related laws used by the government when charging someone with blasphemy include the Information and Electronic Transactions Law (ITE Law) 2008 jo 2016, as well as the Criminal Code. In 2009, the Indonesia's ABL 1965 underwent judicial review by the Constitution Court of the Republic of Indonesia (CCRI). The CCRI is responsible for determining whether a law's provisions are inconsistent with those of the 1945 Constitution. This study focuses on at least four requests for additional investigation, namely Decision Numbers 140/PUU-VII/2009, 140/PUU-VII/2010, 76/PUU-XVI/2018, and 84/PUU-X/2012. Various decisions made by the Constitutional Court provide guidance on the legal status of the ABL 1965, which subsequently led to the creation of new provisions on religious offenses in the Criminal Code.

This chapter examines why the current development of the Indonesia’s ABL and its related laws and regulations degrade the rule of law and to what extent the law development give impacts towards human rights.

**4.2. The Current Development of the Indonesia’s ABL**

**4.2.1. The Prolong Application of the Law Number 1/PNPS/ Year 1965**

As previously mentioned, despite being validated in 1965, Indonesia's Anti-Blasphemy Law (ABL) has never been substantially revised. This study has discerned that during Joko Widodo's administration, the ABL has continued to be enforced and even reinforced, as revealed in numerous laws and related public policies. Thus, the ABL under Joko Widodo's administration continues to remain in effect.

The law consist of four articles. In Article 1 prohibits actions that are considered blasphemy of religion. Article 1 states:

*“Everyone is prohibited from intentionally telling in public, recommending and seeking public support, to interpret a religion adhered to in Indonesia or to carry out religious activities that resemble religious activities from the main points of religious teachings.”*

As mentioned in Article 1, the use of the term "everyone" indicates that this Law is aimed at prohibiting everyone, without distinction based on their religion or beliefs. However, in the following sentence: "religion adhered to in Indonesia or to carry out religious activities that resemble religious activities from the main points of religious teachings," it suggests that this Law will only protect religions that are practiced in Indonesia. The use of the term "religion" here also narrows the meaning, where "traditional beliefs" or "new religions" outside of the six religions practiced in Indonesia are not included in the definition of religion that this law intends to protect.

The scope of defiling religion is extensive in Indonesia and includes:

1. Telling in public to interpret a religion adhered to in Indonesia
2. recommending and seeking public support to interpret a religion adhered to in Indonesia
3. to carry out religious activities that resemble religious activities from the main points of religious teachings.

With the qualification of blasphemy as stated in Article 1, teachings of religions that are different from the religions practiced in Indonesia can be categorized as "blasphemy". This can certainly attack the right to freedom of religion, which is an internal freedom. The use of the term "intentionally" indicates that the prohibited actions are indeed deliberately committed with the intention consciously known by the perpetrators.

In Articles 2 and 3 provide for administrative sanctions if blasphemy is committed by an organization or a sect of belief. Article 2 paragraph (1) and (2):

*“(1) Whoever violates the provisions in Article 1 is given an order and a stern warning to stop his actions in a joint decision of the Minister of Religion, the Minister/Prosecutor General and the Minister of Home Affairs.*

*(2) If the violation referred to in paragraph (1) is committed by an organization or sect of faith, the President of the Republic of Indonesia may dissolve the organization and declare the organization or sect as a prohibited organization/cult, one after the other after the President has received consideration from the Minister of Religion, Minister/Prosecutor General and Minister of Home Affairs.”*

Article 3:

*“If, after taking action by the Minister of Religion together with the Minister/Prosecutor General and the Minister of Home Affairs or the President of the Republic of Indonesia according to the provisions in Article 2 against a person, organization or sect of belief, they still continue to violate the provisions in Article 1 , then the person, adherent, member and/or member of the management of the organization concerned from that sect shall be sentenced to a maximum imprisonment of 5 years.”*

Actually, the ABL prioritizes the use of administrative sanctions over criminal sanctions, as stipulated in Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the law. The prohibited actions include advocating or seeking general support for carrying out religious interpretation or deviant religious activities. Bagir Manan emphasized the need for a gentle approach in dealing with violators, with warnings being the first resort and criminal sanctions being imposed only if violations persist. If an organization commits a violation, it can be dissolved, and members of the management or adherents of the organization can be punished with a maximum of five years imprisonment. However, in practice, the administrative sanctions were rarely proceed. In accordance with Mudzakir's view that the application of Articles 1, 2, and 3 of this Law emphasizes more on gradual development and efforts. This means that administrative sanctions are more sought if there are interpretations or activities that deviate from the religions adhered to in Indonesia. Thus, the approach chosen is a gentle approach, namely those who violate the provisions will be subject to a warning. If the violation continues then criminal sanctions may be imposed; Second, if the violation is committed by the organization, the organization can be dissolved, and if an action has been taken and still violates, the person, or adherents, members and/or members of the management of the organization concerned from that sect shall be punished with imprisonment for a maximum of 5 years. Therefore, law enforcers should apply Article 4 only if the act seriously endangers state security and has gone through the administrative procedures as regulated in Articles 2 and 3, then this is too much.

Article 4 orders a new article, Article 156a, to be added to the criminal code (Kusumawijaya & Chozin, 2018). Article 4 states:

*“In the Criminal Code, a new article is issued which reads as follows: Article 156a.” “Criminalized by a maximum imprisonment of five years whoever intentionally publicly expresses feelings or commits an act: a. basically hostile, abusing or blaspheming against a religion professed in Indonesia; b. with the intention that people do not follow any religion, which is based on the belief in the One God.”*

Article 4 is the basis for the insertion of Article 156a in the Criminal Code, so that if someone violates Article 1 and the action results in the impact as referred to in Article 4.

(a) *basically hostile, abusing or blaspheming against a religion professed in Indonesia;*

*b. with the intention that people do not follow any religion, which is based on the belief in the One God.”*

Article 4 does not provide a detailed explanation of what is meant by "hostile, abusing or blaspheming", therefore, the definition is wholly left up to the subjectivity of law enforcement.

**4.2.2. The Problematic Extended Regulations**

**(i) Insertion of Article 156a on Indonesia Criminal Code**

Previously, the Criminal Code did not recognize the crime of "blasphemy". The crimes against religion were regulated in Articles 156, 175, 176, 177, 503, 530, 545, 546, and 547. However, after the enactment of Law No. 1/PNPS/1965 or the 1965 ABL, Article 4 ordered the legislature to insert a new crime, namely "blasphemy", into Article 156a of the Criminal Code (Sidharta, 2007). It is noteworthy that Article 156a was incorporated into the Criminal Code twenty years after it officially became positive law in Indonesia through the enactment of Law No.1/PNPS/1965.

Therefore, the 1965 ABL cannot stand alone or apart from Article 156a of the Criminal Code. Article 156a was inserted into the Criminal Code to make the 1965 ABL more repressive. Article 156a reads as follows:

To be punished with a maximum imprisonment of five years whoever deliberately in public expresses feelings or commits an act: which are principally hostile, misuse or desecrate a religion held in Indonesia; with the intention that people would not adhere to any religion, which has believed in the One Supreme God.

In that provision, there is no definition for “hostile,” “misuse,” and “desecrate” of religion even though it was intended only to protect “religions adhered to in Indonesia” from those actions. The phrase “religions adhered to in Indonesia” is defined narrowly as “recognized religions,” namely Islam, Catholic, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. The combination of Article 4 and Article 1 and 2 of the 1965 ABL and Article 156a of the Criminal Code, the religions other than those five could be labelled as “heretical religions”.[[62]](#footnote-62)

The insertion of Article 156a in the Indonesian Criminal Code created the concept of blasphemy of religion, which was not present in the original provisions of Article 156. While Article 156 prohibited statements of hostility, hatred, or insults against groups in Indonesia, Article 156a specifically prohibited interpreting religious teachings adhered to in Indonesia. Moreover, Article 156a of the Criminal Code protects only the six religions recognized in Indonesia: Islam, Protestant Christianity, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. This means that other religions and sects of belief do not receive the same protection, and the provisions of this article may target them.

However, these articles are multi-interpretative and do not provide clear limitations. It is unclear what is meant by a statement that creates "feelings of hostility, hatred and contempt" or "blasphemy". The principle of legality in criminal law requires clear formulation of articles to prevent subjective interpretations by law enforcers and to avoid sanctions being imposed arbitrarily. In various blasphemy cases, Article 156a of the Indonesian Criminal Code was applied in all blasphemy trials, and the culprits were found guilty of “issuing emotions or carrying out deeds that degraded a religion in Indonesia.”[[63]](#footnote-63) For instance, in the case of Gafatar, If Gafatar was accused of disrupting public order by applying coercive regulations to its devotees in order to impose its new teachings and renounce their former beliefs, then the Court must establish this. Therefore, the court has not deviated from its primary objective of “safeguarding the sentiments of the majority of faiths,” but it has never examined “the feelings of Gafatar adherents.” In this case, the court could not comprehend the distinction between *the forum-internum* and *the forum-externum* with regard to the right to FoRB. The court should conclude its investigation of this case and pronounce the defendant’s innocent. However, this has never occurred in blasphemy trials in Indonesia, with the exception of situations with strong political undertones, beginning with the police ceasing their investigation (Tehusijarana 2018).

**[**Masukan table kasus penodaan agama yang dihukum dengan 1965 ABL dan Pasal 156a KUHP]

**(i) The Enactment of the Law Number 16 Year 2008 junto Year 2016 concerning Informatics and Transaction of Electronic**

During Joko Widodo’s administration, various criticisms of the flaws in the Blasphemy Law (ABL) were not sufficient to urge the legislative body to amend the law. In 2008, the BL have been strengthened by the reformation government when the legislative body ratified the Law Number 11 of 2008 on Electronic Information and Transaction (hereinafter the EIT Law) in conjunction to the previous laws (See **Table 2.).** The 2008 EIT Law, which were originally intended to prevent illegal electronic transactions and harm the people, has drawn criticism, one of which is because this law has strengthened the legal standing anti-blasphemy which has many weaknesses. Religious minority groups who spread religious teachings that are seen as heretical or criticize mainstream religious teachings through social media or other electronic media will be charged with the articles contained in the ITE Law, Article 28.

Article 28 states:

(1) Any Person who knowingly and without authority disseminates false and misleading information resulting in consumer loss in Electronic Transactions.

(2) Any Person who knowingly and without authority disseminates information aimed at inflicting hatred or dissension on individuals and/or certain groups of community based on ethnic groups, religions, races, and inter-groups (SARA).

Furthermore, in 2016, the 2008 EIT Law was amended. However, the core of the issue of the existence of Article 28 which strengthened Article 156a of the Criminal Code regarding blasphemy did not undergo significant changes. The crucial issue that is the subject of discussion of the existence of the ITE Law is the emergence of the phrase “hostility” which is difficult to prove and is abstract and depends on the feelings of the complainant. Among the five cases studied in this study, all the defendants were not only charged with Article 156a of the Criminal Code as an article related to the Anti-Defamation Law, but the defendant was also charged with Article 27 and Article 28 of the ITE Law.

Therefore, after the enactment of the EIT Year 2008 and its updating in 2016, many followers of minority religions are still being criminalized for allegedly committing blasphemy. In a study conducted by YLBHI, Asfinawati (2021), the former chairman of YLBHI, stated in an interview:

"There is a trend of using the EIT Law to prosecute those accused of blasphemy. There were 67 cases of blasphemy in 2020, almost half of which, 32 cases, were prosecuted using Article 27 and Article 28 of the EIT Law. The use of the EIT Law is considered worrying because there is no clear definition of blasphemy and the investigation is inadequate."

This shows that despite improvements to the EIT Law, the lack of clarity in the definition of "blasphemy" under the 1965 ABL has not been resolved. The concept of hate speech regulated in Articles 27 and 28, which is often used in cases of blasphemy, only adds a new concept, thus equating "blasphemy" with "hate speech". Moreover, neither the 1965 ABL nor the EIT Law Year 2008 jo. 2016 provide a clear regulation regarding the requirements for restricting the right of religious expression.

## 4.2.2. The ABL After the Constitutional Court Judicial Review’s Decisions

The Constitutional Court of Republic of Indonesia (the CCRI) has the authority to review a statute and to decide the constitutionality of the statute if the statute established by Parliament comply with the relevant Constitution (Arato 2012). When the content of legislation violates or conflicts with the Constitution, they are unconstitutional. Typically, the judicial branch, such as the Constitutional Court or Supreme Court, interprets legislation and determines whether a statute or law is unconstitutional through the process of judicial review. According to several sources, the CCIR often employs the Austrian model based on Hans Kelsen's thesis. According to this paradigm, a Constitutional Court review of a statute of law seeks to determine whether the laws passed by the legislative body are consistent with the nation's constitution. On this issue, the CCIR has the authority to declare a portion of the law null and invalid, and its rulings have an erga omnes impact, binding all persons and organizations (Asshiddiqie 2018).

As an effort to restore constitutional rights that have been violated due to the application of the 1965 ABL, various followers of minority religions have filed for judicial review of the provisions in the 1965 ABL that are deemed to violate their constitutional rights guaranteed under the 1945 Constitution. There are at least three verdicts by the CCRI on judicial reviews of the 1965 ABL, namely the Decision Number 140/PUU-VII/2009, the Decision Number 84/PUU-X/2012, and the Decision number 76/PUU-XVI/2018.

In brief, the arguments of the petitioner, the responses of the respondents in this case the DPR and the Government, and the verdicts of the CCRI are as follows:

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Nomor Putusan | Alasan Pemohon | Alasan Termohon | Inti Putusan |
| Decision number 140/PUU-VII/2009 |  |  | * The CCRI declared that *the substance of the Law on the Prevention of Blasphemy against Religion has to be modified in terms of the form of regulation, formulation, and legal principles.* * *The CCRI argues that* “*the need for a revision of the Law on the Prevention of Blasphemy Against Religion, both within the formal framework of law and in content, in order to have more clear material aspects that will not lead to ambiguity in reality” (Crouch, 2011).* * However, the CCRI concluded that the 1965 ABL is constitutional because it does not restrict the freedom to believe, but rather restricts public religious speech that is antagonistic, abusive, or desecrates the religion practiced in Indonesia. |
| Decision Number 84/PUU-X/2012 | Shia’s follower claimed that Article |  |
| Decision Number 76/PUU-XVI/2018 | Ahmadiyya’s follower claimed that Article |  |

In the decisions Number 140/PUU-VII/2009, 84/PUU X/2012, and 76/PUU XVI/2018, the CCIR has stated that the IABL does not prohibit a person from holding beliefs that differ from other religions or beliefs; however, the IABL does restrict how these beliefs may be expressed in public or disseminated to others. The Court believes that, pursuant to Article 28J and the IHRL, religious speech can be restricted by law. It is true that FoRB and FoE limits also apply to the IHRL, Article 18 (3), and Article 19 (3) of the ICCPR.

## 4.6 Discussion and Analysis

**4.6.1 The Current Development of the ABL Degrade the Rule of Law**

**(i) Ambiguous norms result in a lack of clarity.**

The development of blasphemy law in the Joko Widodo era has not improved compared to the previous administration, particularly as its position has become even stronger. Following the enactment of the EIT Law and its subsequent amendments, it has failed to improve the ambiguous legal norms. Various MK (Constitutional Court) judgments on the Judicial Review, which declared the 1965 ABL as constitutional, have disregarded the principles of the rule of law.

Firstly, in reference to Article 1 and 2 of the 1965 ABL, as well as Articles 27 and 28 of the EIT Law, there is no clear definition of what constitutes "religious defamation". The vague definition of defamation of religions in Article 1 has a very broad application. At least five actions could be categorized as religious blasphemy: (a) insulting a religion; (b) persuading someone to be an atheist; (c) disrupting a religious ceremony or creating noise near a place of worship; (d) insulting a clergyman while conducting a ritual; and (e) criticizing the teachings of religion, including criticizing other religious activities.

The lack of specific definitions regarding the scope of the action or utterance of "blasphemy" shows that "blasphemy" will continue to be interpreted broadly, without clarity, and subjectively by law enforcement officers. This law will find it difficult to distinguish between incitement or violence based on religious hatred, criticism of religious teachings, and practicing, believing, and adhering to religious teachings that happen to differ from the teachings of the majority religion.

Limitations on the first action are justifiable restrictions. However, restrictions on the second and third actions could threaten the essence of the right to freedom of religion and freedom of expression itself.

As elaborated in previous section, to qualify as an incitement to hatred under the Rabat Plan of Action (RPA), a statement must satisfy the following criteria: “context, speaker, intent, substance, extent, and likelihood of incitement to hatred.”[[64]](#footnote-64) The only individual who may be accused with hate speech is a leader who purposefully incites his audience to attack another person based on their hatred of his religion or race while speaking in public at a public assembly. In reality, therefore, the Court exclusively criminalizes actions or statements that qualify as blasphemy under Article 1 of the IABL, rather than hate speech. The five types of blasphemy listed above aim to preserve the “feelings of the major faiths' adherents.” Whether one is humiliated depends on the sentiments of the others. Therefore, each form's interpretation rests on the subjectivity of the judge who analyses the deed. Each form is open to interpretation (Crouch 2011).

In the case of Gafatar, Musadeq, a key leader of Gafatar, was sentenced in the East Jakarta District Court under Article 28 (2) of the EIT Law, which stipulates, *“[...] a remark that incites enmity is criminal [...].”*  However, there is no precise description of “hostility sentiments.” The term is overly vague and might be subjectively construed by the authorities. The court failed to establish whether the act of Gafatar could be classified as a hazardous expression or encouraged the assault of particular groups, as required under Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The court's judgment was intended to 'maintain public order' in accordance with the precepts of Islam and Christianity, the two major religions recognized by the state. However, all offenders are criminalized based on vague legislation and punished severely.

Second, according to the CCIR’s ruling repeatedly in its various judicial review decisions concerning the judicial review of the ABL argues that religious expression is not an absolute right and that the IABL is a lawful statute limiting rights: *“The Court simply compares the provisions of the statute to the 1945 Constitution.”* [[65]](#footnote-65) The court also said, *“The law concerning the prevention of religious blasphemy is still necessary and has no problem with the 1945 Constitution's protection of human rights.* [[66]](#footnote-66)*“* The judgment is based on Article 28J of the 1945 Constitution and is limited to communication with the IHRL accepted by Indonesia. The CCIR did not address the law's flaws, which may have been sufficient grounds to declare it illegal.

Moreover, the CCIR indicates that *“the anti-blasphemy law threatens anybody who openly shows enmity against other religions or who communicates divergent doctrines to the major religions.”* However, as previously discussed, the definition of blasphemy is so broad that it has become too generic and a typical weapon for criminalizing minority religious groups. Criminalization becomes evident when it includes minority faiths because the government or the dominant religion feels under assault by adherents of the minority religion.

In conclusion, the current development of ABL in Indonesia during the Joko Widodo’s administration still maintains the deficiencies in the substance of legislation. It means the Court allows the 1965 ABL to remain in effect and ignore if its implementation violates the rights of citizens, particularly the right of minority groups of religion. In this sense the Court just disregarded the rule of law.

### (ii) Godly nationalism may threaten the supremacy of law.

Underpinning of Godly Nationalism manufactures the prolong enforcement of the anti-blasphemy law that applaud the presence of mob violence or public protest. Menchik (2014) in his study argues that Godly nationalism that is upheld in Indonesia produces religious intolerance. Menchik believes that the value of God Almighty is central to the First Sila of Pancasila, “Believe in One God the Almighty,” in which every citizen has an intrinsic moral commitment to maintain religion as part of safeguarding the nation. In this view, insulting, blaspheming, blaspheming religion, and urging others to have no faith are acts that oppose holy nationalism. The Soekarno administration extended recognition to six religions, enacted the Law on Anti-Defamation of Religion, and founded the Indonesian Ulema Council in accordance with this notion of godly nationalism (p. 607–610). During his administration, Soekarno issued Presidential Decree No. 1/1965, often known as the 1965 Anti-Defamation Law, which stated:

“Every person shall be prohibited from deliberately before the public telling, encouraging, or soliciting public support for making an interpretation of a religion adhered to in Indonesia or performing religious activities resembling the activities of such religion when the interpretation and activities are deviant from the principal teachings of such religion.”[[67]](#footnote-67)

This definition of “godly nationalism” also emerges in the Constitutional Court's legal arguments in support of the Blasphemy Law's legality. The Chairperson of the Leader of Muhammadiyah is likewise of the opinion that Indonesia is not a secular state. However, Indonesia is a country that believes in God Almighty, and as such, it has values that cannot be matched with those of a secular state.

Godly nationalism condemns anarchist activities or taking the law into one's own hands by persecuting religious groups or beliefs that are not among the six recognized by the government.

Traditional values are thriving in Indonesia. However, godly nationalism is perpetually warped by various state policies that are oppressive, accusatory, or condemning of diverse religious groups or views and that encourage individuals to behave as their own judges.

Furthermore, Telle (2017) contends that the current political dynamics in Indonesia, which emphasizes godly nationalism, are responsible for the growing tendency of legal enforcement against blasphemy. It is provided to repel atheism, safeguard “orthodox” religion from “deviant” religious teachings and protect existing faiths from intolerant acts or remarks that degrade their sanctity. The Soeharto Administration maintained the BL during the period of the new order because he desired national stability and wished to avoid horizontal confrontations that would disrupt government operations. Numerous times, the BL has been used to destroy communism and atheism and to restrict the liberties of non-recognized religions. At least three concerns posed a potential danger to Indonesia's unity. The first was the propagation of mystical ideas that contradicted Pancasila and its first premise, “Belief in One God, the Almighty.” This notion has been interpreted as requiring Indonesians to be religious or to believe in God. In this way, many Indonesians who did not believe in God were expected to learn and acquire information from other recognized faiths in order to live according to Pancasila's fundamental principle.

After the reform era, the BL found itself at a crossroads. On the one hand, the state strives to increase the protection of human rights, but on the other, national stability and security remain of the utmost significance. As the defender of the Constitution and the protector of human rights, the Indonesian Constitutional Court has determined that the BL must be revised since it is not in conformity with the Indonesian Constitution and human rights legislation. In the meanwhile, socio-political situations in Indonesia continue to need this law. According to the Constitutional Court, godly nationalism is reflected in Pancasila Sila I, “Belief in One God,” which is enshrined in Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution and reaffirmed by the Constitutional Court in its ratio decidendi decision when examining the constitutionality of the 1965 Anti-Blasphemy Law.[[68]](#footnote-68) In contrast, the vigilante justice phenomenon rises when the blasphemy law regime is robust. According to research done by Yilmaz and Barton (2021), Front Defenders of Islam (FPI) is a radical Islamic group whose actions are always defined by vigilantism under the leadership of Rizieq Shihab (RS). Thus, vigilantism has been crucial to the FPI's operations (p. 8). RS employs hate narratives to provoke individuals outside the organization, including politicians and the government, and urges its adherents to conduct vigilante justice against all types of action that are harmful to Islamic beliefs (p. 8–10). Under the guise of protecting Islam (the “Action of Defending Islam”), RS utilized his popularity to influence the FPI in many anti-Ahok rallies where he was accused of damaging Islam (p. 12). When charges of blasphemy are made against an individual or group of individuals, the FPI is frequently involved in the vigilante justice.

The objective of sustaining the BL in Indonesia rapidly switched from preventing public disruption and safeguarding national unity to “preventing national stability.” It indicates that the BL must prioritize political goals over maintaining public order. Instead of preserving the rights of people or religious groups, the government uses the BL as a repressive instrument against resistance. The legislation is also used to punish minority religions in an effort to garner the support of the majority and preserve their political power.

But on the other hand, when the blasphemy law regime is strong, the vigilante justice phenomenon increases. For instance, a study conducted by Yilmaz and Barton (2021) states that Front Defender of Islam (FPI) is a hard-liner Islamic organization, where under the leadership of Rizieq Shihab (RS) its activities are always characterized by vigilante justice. “Thus, a core part of FPI’s activities has been vigilantism (p.8). RS uses hate narratives to antagonize those outside its group, including politicians and the government, and encourages its followers to take vigilante justice against all forms of action that are contrary to Islamic values (p.8-10). RS used his popularity to influence FPI in various anti-Ahok protests accused of tarnishing Islam, under the pretext of defending Islam (Action of Defending Islam) (p.12). When there are accusations of blasphemy against a person or group of people, the action of Main Hakim Sendiri accompanies it which FPI is often involved in.

There was a swift aim in maintaining the IABL from maintaining to avoid public disorder and protecting national unity into “preventing national stability.” It means that the IABL are needed to support more to political interest rather than maintaining public order. Therefore, in practice the IABL are used by the government as a repressive tool against opposition rather than protecting the right of individual or religious groups. The law is used also to prosecute minority religions to get sympathy from the majority’s voices to maintain their political power.

**4.6.2 The impact of the ABL’s Development on Enjoyment of Human Rights.**

**(i) The threat to religious freedom rights continues to persist.**

The rule of law requires that the state fulfills its obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill the human rights of every citizen. However, the development and implementation of the ABL during Joko Widodo's era further threaten the right to freedom of religion. The guarantee of the right to freedom of religion in the Constitution (Article 29, Article 28E) and international instruments, such as Article 18 of the UDHR and Article 18 of the ICCPR were not used as a basis for the creation of the EIT Law and the Criminal Code to address the weaknesses in the 1965 ABL.

Various regulations threaten "the right to freedom of religion for individuals." Firstly, according to Article 1, the primary purpose of the ABL is to defend orthodox religions instead of treating all religions or beliefs equally. Anyone who spreads teachings that are different from orthodox religious teachings is prohibited or can be classified as committing the offense of "religious blasphemy". This means that there is no protection for those who embrace, believe, or spread new religious teachings.

Secondly, although the 1965 ABL or EIT Law does not provide categories for deviant sects, the policies used to determine those sects are based on MUI Fatwas.

**List of new religious sects accused of deviance based on MUI Fatwas from 1976 to 2010.**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **No.** | **Nama Aliran** | **Stigmatized as Defiant Sect based on:** |
| 1. | Kerajaan Ubur-ubur | MUI Fatwa of Serang, Banten Province. |
| 2. | Hakekok Bslakatsu | MUI Fatwa, in Banten Province. |
| 3. | Ahmadiyah Qadhiyan | MUI Fatwa 26 May 1980 claimed that |
| 4. | Lia Eden or Salamullah | MUI Fatwa Number 768/MUI/XII/1997 December 22th 1997 |
| 5. | Al-Qiyadah Al-Islamiyah | MUI Fatwa Yogyakarta Province Number B-149/MUI-DIY/FATWA/IX/ 2007 |
| 6. | Gerakan Fajar Nusantara (Gafatar) | MUI Fatwa Number 04 Year 2007 |
| 7. | Tarekat Tajul Khalwatiyah Syekh Yusuf Gowa | MUI Fatwa Number 01/MUI-Gowa/XI/2016 November 9th Year 2016. |

Regardless of the veracity of the claims articulated by MUI, their fatwas that declare these religious schools of thoughts as "deviant" have been cited by the government to craft policies that discriminate against their adherents. This testifies to the fact that public laws and policies are enacted by the state to afford special protection to adherents of established religions, namely Islam. The government has thus confined the meaning of the right to religious freedom, limiting it to "established religions" exclusively. In addition, Article 1 of the ABL presupposes uniformity of religion, thereby prohibiting advocacy of atheism or non-conforming interpretation of the doctrines of major religions (Lindsey and Pausacker, 2017). Although the essential principles of FoRB are expressed in several articles of the Indonesia Constitution, such as articles 28D, 28E, 28I, and 29, the ABL assigns distinctive ideals and standards, as Article 29 of the Constitution proclaims that Indonesia is founded upon the "Belief in One God, the Almighty".

Thus, under the ABL regime, the respect and fulfillment of the right to religious freedom are challenging to achieve. This is mainly because Indonesia still differentiates orthodox religions, new religions, and beliefs or non-religious groups. The ABL only protects the right to religious freedom for orthodox religions, yet it fails to provide a place for or even criminalizes those who practice or propagate different beliefs, new religions, or atheism.

**(ii)** **Targeting religious minorities**

The concept of the rule of law dictates that laws must be applied equally to everyone, regardless of their religion, race, gender, or other differences. Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) protect an individual's freedom to maintain a neutral religious identity or practice his or her chosen faith. The state, through its legal and political systems, has the obligation to treat every person equally, without any interference, restriction, or other conditions that impede the exercise of this right (Henkin, 2009). In Indonesia, principles of non-discrimination and equality are expressly safeguarded by Articles 27, 28I, 28D, and 28H of the 1945 Constitution (Eddyono, 2016).

Article 1 of the ABL defines "religions" as the six religions recognized by the government: Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Catholicism, and Confucianism. Law enforcement's interpretation of this article is that the law only protects these major religions. As a result, faiths outside of these six are often excluded from legal protection. Furthermore, Article 4 of the ABL in conjunction with Article 156a of the Criminal Code, as well as Articles 27 and 28 of the EIT Law, threaten punishments for those who propagate religious teachings that deviate from orthodox religions or those who advocate for non-religious beliefs. Under these provisions, the main targets for punishments under the ABL are minority religious groups whose doctrines differ from orthodox religions or non-religious groups. Empirically, the existence of Indonesia's ABL has manifested as a law that is unequal and discriminatory, particularly for minority religious groups. Studies indicate that the primary targets of punishment using the ABL are members of minority religious groups. These groups can be divided into two categories: first, religions practiced in Indonesia with a small number of followers (minorities) such as Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Catholicism. The second category includes new religions and minorities' beliefs. Evidently, in various blasphemy trials, more than 150 individuals from minority religious groups were convicted and criminalized under the ABL (Andreas, 2019).

The decisions made by the CCIR during Joko Widodo's era are vastly different from the previous rulings of the Constitutional Court, which strongly upheld the principles of non-discrimination and equality in a number of important cases. For instance, in judgment number 97/PUU-XVI/2016, the Court invalidated a provision of the Residency Law that deprived traditionalists of obtaining resident identification cards and family cards. The Court reasoned that "restrictions based on religious beliefs that result in unequal treatment of citizens are discriminatory." This consideration is consistent with previous decisions, including judgments 070/PUU-II/2004, 27/PUU-V/2007, and 024/PUU-III/2005. Additionally, the Court has nullified discriminatory laws in other cases, such as decision number 011-017/PUU-1/2003, wherein the Court determined that Article 60s of the General Election Law, which prohibited former Communist Party members from running for office, is a form of discriminatory policy that is inconsistent with Articles 27 and 28D of the 1945 Indonesian Constitution. In decision number 006/PUU-IV/2006, the Court ruled that Article 2c and 3 of the Law of Commission Reconciliation and Rehabilitation were invalid as they discriminated against victims of past human rights violations, by denying them their right to compensation and rehabilitation unless they forgave the culprits.

In conclusion, unlike the rule of law principle, which demands that no individual or group should receive special protection based on their religion, the ABL comprises discriminatory provisions as it solely targets minority religious groups. Rather than preventing hatred, numerous cases tried under the ABL only punish those who insult religious symbols or hold beliefs different from major religions. Therefore, the ABL does not comply with the principles set forth in the IHRL because it merely safeguards the religious establishment or personal feelings of others (Temperman, 2015).

### (iii) The Right to religious expression

Based on the concept of the rule of law, if two rights overlap, any limitation on those rights should be done lawfully, with important and proportional reasoning, and without any discriminatory intentions. The ABL not only restricts the right to freedom of religion but also restricts the right to freedom of expression, especially religious expressions. Article 28E of the Indonesian Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of expression, which states that "everyone shall have the right to the freedom of worship and to express his opinion and thoughts in accordance with his/her conscience." The IHRL has been incorporated into the Indonesian Constitution in Chapter IV Articles 28A to 28J since 2002.[[69]](#footnote-69) However, the ABL tends to curtail the ability of members of religious or philosophical minorities to express their religious beliefs, which contradicts the IHRL. Limitations on the expression of religious beliefs under Article 4 of the ABL in conjunction with Article 156a of the Criminal Code are not consistent with Article 20 (2) and General Comment No. 34 because the limitation does not fall under "incitement to discrimination, hatred, or violence."[[70]](#footnote-70) Moreover, the prosecution of someone because of their religious beliefs is considered to be irregular and violates Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). While a person's freedom to express their religious convictions may be subject to restrictions under Article 18 (3) or 19 (3), the State is not allowed to penalize the individual unless the speech incites discrimination, hatred, or violence as stated in Article 20 (2) and (3).

The ABL protects something abstract like "religious feelings," which is different from the objective of IHRL that aims to protect "an individual's right to express oneself." According to Jeroen Temperman (2015), Article 19 protects the right to freedom of speech for everyone, but the ICCPR does not protect an individual's right not to have their feelings hurt or offended. However, in the Otto Preminger v. Austria case, the ECtHR[[71]](#footnote-71) ruled that protecting the right not to offend others' religious sensibilities was a reasonable objective.[[72]](#footnote-72) State intervention in the freedom of expression is permissible if such an expression intends to hurt or offend the religious sentiments of others. In light of this, the Otto Preminger v. Austria case should be viewed as contradictory to Article 20 (2), and the accused should be acquitted (Temperman, 2015).

Moreover, the 2012 Rabat Plan of Action recommends that, when regulating religious speech, States parties to the ICCPR evaluate six factors, namely “context, speaker, intent, content, extent, and possibility of incitement to hatred” (Shepherd 2017). This strategy strives to defend the freedom of individuals to be free from harmful speech encouraging violence or discrimination against persons of a certain race, religion, or ethnicity, as provided by Article 20. An individual is obviously a right holder from a human rights standpoint. Therefore, Heiner argues that honouring the human dignity of every individual is essential to the protection of human rights. This means treating everyone equally regardless of colour, religion, gender, or other factors (Bielefeldt 2012).

As elaborated in previous section, to qualify as an incitement to hatred under the Rabat Plan of Action (RPA), a statement must satisfy the following criteria: “context, speaker, intent, substance, extent, and likelihood of incitement to hatred.” [[73]](#footnote-73) The only individual who may be accused with hate speech is a leader who purposefully incites his audience to attack another person based on their hatred of his religion or race while speaking in public at a public assembly. In reality, therefore, the Court exclusively criminalizes actions or statements that qualify as blasphemy under Article 1 of the IABL, rather than hate speech. The five types of blasphemy listed above aim to preserve the “feelings of the major faiths' adherents.” Whether one is humiliated depends on the sentiments of the others. Therefore, each form's interpretation rests on the subjectivity of the judge who analyses the deed. Each form is open to interpretation (Crouch 2011).

From a legal and political perspective, the CCIR’s emphasis on the constitutionality of the flawed ABL in Indonesia has ignored the essential principle of non-discrimination. The CCIR contends that if a limitation on religious expression is enacted by law, then the limitation is reasonable, regardless of whether or not it results in discriminatory treatment of certain religious groups.[[74]](#footnote-74)

### 4.7. Conclusion

As an institution with the designation of defender of human rights, the court's judgment regarding the blasphemy legislation demonstrates that it has failed to protect the freedom of religion of its inhabitants. The Court is likewise entangled in religious (Islamic) populism, since every time the anti-blasphemy statute is reviewed in court, visitors to the hearings invariably support for the keeping of the law. There were also demonstrations in front of the courtroom. The Court failed to educate the public on the significance of respecting the freedom of every person to choose, embrace, and believe in their own religions and/or beliefs without interference from any party, including the state.

However, the CCIR disregards the fact that the FoRB has two components: the forum-internum, which cannot be limited under any circumstances, and the forum-externum, which can be limited. While the Court has strictly construed Article 28J of the 1945 Constitution, it does not distinguish between the forum-internum and the forum-externum, both of which may be limited by the State. This view is problematic since neither the Constitution nor the IABL expressly define the normal ban on religious speech. The four phases of legitimate and proportional limits under GC No.22, namely, the legitimacy test, the necessity test, the proportionality test, and the non-discrimination test, are not considered by the CCIR (W. Durham 2011).

The Court's analysis was extremely unclear and inconsistent since, on the one hand, the court asserts that the IABL protects those with diverse religious or philosophical beliefs. The CCIR overlooked the fact that shortcomings in law enforcement and legal content cannot be separated. In blasphemy cases, the government is not impartial. First, the government, through the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, requested that the Indonesian Ulama Council issue a fatwa on heresy against Gafatar. Secondly, the government issued a letter of prohibition to Gafatar, stating that the dissemination, interpretation, and activities of Gafatar deviate from the main points of Islamic teachings. In terms of permitted limitations on the right to FoE, notably the legality test, Durham (2011) asserts that neutrality is a prerequisite for satisfying the legality test. However, as there is no such limiting criterion listed in the IABL, the legality test cannot be used to Gafatar. As a result, several courts have condemned Gafatar's followers.

Article 156a of the Indonesian Criminal Code was applied in all blasphemy trials, and the culprits were found guilty of “issuing emotions or carrying out deeds that degraded a religion in Indonesia.”[[75]](#footnote-75) If Gafatar was accused of disrupting public order by applying coercive regulations to its devotees in order to impose its new teachings and renounce their former beliefs, then the Court must establish this. Therefore, the court has not deviated from its primary objective of “safeguarding the sentiments of the majority of faiths,” but it has never examined “the feelings of Gafatar adherents.” In this case, the court could not comprehend the distinction between the forum-internum and the forum-externum with regard to the right to FoRB. The court should conclude its investigation of this case and pronounce the defendant’s innocent. However, this has never occurred in blasphemy trials in Indonesia, with the exception of situations with strong political undertones, beginning with the police ceasing their investigation (Tehusijarana 2018).

The State is obligated, through its law and system, to treat all individuals equally, without any interference, limitation, or other conditions that make it difficult for any individual to exercise this right (Henkin 2009). Articles 27, 28I, 28D, and 28H of the Indonesian Constitution of 1945 expressly protect both the nondiscrimination and equality values (Eddyono 2016). Consequently, there is no dispute that these principles constitute the fundamental human rights principle that the CCIR must examine while assessing human rights issues.

The CCIR has supported the principles of nondiscrimination and equality in a number of significant cases in the past. First, in judgment number 97/PUU-XVI/2016, the Court invalidated a provision of the Residency Law that prevented traditionalists from acquiring resident identification cards and family cards. The Court held, *“Restrictions based on religious convictions that result in differential treatment of citizens are discriminatory.”* [[76]](#footnote-76) This consideration is comparable to the preceding decisions, including 070/PUU-II/2004, 27/PUU-V/2007, and 024/PUU-III/2005. In addition, the Court has invalidated discriminatory laws in other cases, such as the decision number 011-017/PUU-1/2003, in which the Court ruled that Article 60s of the General Election Law, which prohibited former Communist Party members from running for office, is a form of discriminatory policy that contradicts Articles 27, 28D of the 1945 Indonesian Constitution. In decision number 006/PUU-IV/2006, the Court ruled that Article 2c and 3 of the Law of Commission Reconciliation and Rehabilitation were in conflict with the constitution because they discriminated against victims of past human rights violations by preventing them from claiming their right to compensation and rehabilitation unless they were willing to forgive the criminals. In the instance of the IABL, however, the CCIR disregarded the fundamental principle of non-discrimination. The CCIR argues that if a restriction on the freedom to religious expression is imposed by law, then the restriction is justified, regardless of whether or not it results in discriminatory treatment of specific religious groups.[[77]](#footnote-77) In this regard, the CCIR has utilized the Particular Constitutionalism theory, which interprets the Constitution's enshrined Human Rights principles in a restrictive meaning.

In addition, with reference to Article 18(3) of the ICCPR and Article 20(2) and (3), the IABL should focus on religious statements that incite discrimination against other religious groups and not on limits on one's beliefs. The diverse religious views between Islam and Protestantism, Protestantism and Catholicism, and Islam and Hinduism are a sort of variety that has been embraced by Indonesians for a long time due to the country's social diversity. Society may embrace the multiplicity of schools within a religion without using it as a justification to persecute other diverse groups. However, the state does not need to restrict the beliefs of its citizens, since the main six faiths have flourished due to the freedom of their adherents to choose, accept, and practice their beliefs without governmental sanction or punishment.

Lastly, there is little question that hate speech against any religion should be prohibited and offenders punished. As a correction to the Resolution on Anti-Defamation (of Islam), Resolution No. 16/18 underlines that all member states should confront acts of intolerance against all religions and beliefs, not only Islam. [[78]](#footnote-78) In the meanwhile, but the government must also respect all religions and beliefs equally. Indonesia is among the nations that continue to preserve and implement anti-blasphemy legislation. Although the UPR findings in documentation rounds I, II, III, and IV urged that Indonesia repeal or amend the Anti-Defamation Law quickly, Indonesia did not comply. However, based on the above information, Indonesia is reluctant to declare that the IABL is unconstitutional or needs to be changed. As a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which started Resolution 16/18, Indonesia should increase its efforts to implement it. The purpose of the Combating Blasphemy Act is to safeguard faiths or religious symbols, not individual rights. In accordance with international standards, Indonesia should take urgent action to abolish the IABL and change its draft Criminal Code by changing the punishment of blasphemy to the criminalization of inciting to discrimination, hatred, and violence.

Based on the above analysis, it is evident that the Constitutional Court does not completely comprehend the notion of the rule of law highlighted in Article 1 paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution. The flaws in the blasphemy law's legal essence were not examined in depth by the Constitutional Court. The Court also does not comprehend that the history of legal standards might depart from the most fundamental constitutional rights provided by the Constitution. The history of legal substance is a crucial issue that might lead to a law's loss of validity. If a legislation loses its authority, it can no longer be utilized to restrict the rights of citizens.

The current development of Indonesia's ABL, especially during the era of Joko Widodo, has increasingly undermined the principle of the rule of law. The principle of the rule of law requires law to be supreme, which necessitates precise and clear laws that cannot be achieved under the ABL regime, which contains ambiguous provisions that have yet to be revised or even maintained with the approval of the EIT Law in 2008 and its amendment in 2016.

Upholding the rule of law means giving optimal respect for the human rights of citizens. The Constitutional Court, expected to be a human rights protector, failed to annul the discriminatory provisions of the ABL. The ABL, which provides primary protection for orthodox religions and targets new religions or traditional beliefs or non-religious beliefs, was not deemed discriminatory by the Constitutional Court as a norm that could damage the constitutionality of a Law. The inability of the Constitutional Court to distinguish between the internal and external aspects of freedom of religion and its failure to incorporate the principle of non-discrimination in limiting the right to practice religion in external spaces indicates that the Court does not fully understand the norms of international human rights law. Though the Court has been able to effectively adopt the principle of non-discrimination in other cases, such as when it invalidated an article in the Citizenship Law that prohibited citizens from indicating their "belief" on their identification card, it did not consider the principle of non-discrimination as violated by the Anti-Blasphemy Law when it was reviewed. The pressure from hardline Islamic groups and strong government support for upholding the Anti-Blasphemy Law during the trial indicate that the Court's independence is being questioned.

Furthermore, the Constitutional Court has also disregarded the principle of legitimate and proportionate limitations. The ABL is continually being used to criminalize any act or statement that contains an interpretation of religious teachings that differs from orthodox religion or an urging to not follow a religion, which could be stigmatized as a deviant religious teaching and subject the perpetrator to criminal charges. This indicates that the development of the Anti-Blasphemy Law's legal and political aspect is moving in the opposite direction to the principles of the rule of law and degrading human rights.

# CHAPTER V

# LAW ENFORCEMENT OF THE INDONESIA'S ABL AND POLITICAL MANIPULATION

## 5.1 Introduction

Several publications on Indonesia's anti-blasphemy legislation have highlighted normative legal study throughout the past decade (Cohen 2018; Crouch 2011; Fiss and Kestenbaum 2017; Prud’homme 2010). These scholars are particularly critical of the normative flaws inherent in the legislation against blasphemy of religion, where the substance is inconsistent with international human rights law, resulting in discriminatory treatment of minority religious groups and a danger to religious liberty.

The enforcement of anti-blasphemy laws around the world is influenced by various factors and actors, including political, social, and cultural factors. One factor that influences the enforcement of anti-blasphemy laws is religion. In countries where religion plays a significant role in society, such as Pakistan and Iran, blasphemy laws are often strictly enforced to protect religious sensitivities. Religious leaders and groups have significant influence in these countries and may pressure the government to enforce these laws. For example, in Pakistan, the blasphemy law has been used to target religious minorities, such as Christians and Ahmadiyya Muslims (Human Rights Watch, 2021). In Iran, criticism of Islam is considered a serious offense and can lead to severe punishment, including death (Freedom House, 2021). Another factor that influences the enforcement of anti-blasphemy laws is political stability. In some countries, anti-blasphemy laws are used as a tool to maintain political control and suppress dissent. For example, in Saudi Arabia, criticism of the royal family or Islam can result in imprisonment or even execution (Freedom House, 2021). In such cases, the enforcement of anti-blasphemy laws is used to suppress political opposition and maintain the status quo.

Furthermore, the international community also plays a role in the enforcement of anti-blasphemy laws. International human rights organizations and advocacy groups have been instrumental in raising awareness about the negative impact of these laws on human rights and freedom of expression. For example, Amnesty International has called for the repeal of blasphemy laws worldwide, stating that they "violate the human right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion" (Amnesty International, 2021). Similarly, the United Nations has urged countries to review their blasphemy laws and ensure they comply with international human rights standards (United Nations, 2011).

The essence of the rule of law stresses that social problems must be tackled through legal mechanisms established by law or by leaving the resolution to law enforcers, rather than by the community through vigilantism. Allowing individuals to take the law into their own hands is not only against the law but also a violation of human rights. The state, through its law enforcement system, has a primary obligation to safeguard the human rights of its citizens if they become victims of vigilante attacks or any other type of violence. Article 1 paragraph 3 of the Indonesian Constitution states that "the State of Indonesia is a state based on the rule of law." However, in enforcing the ABL, there has been a noticeable phenomenon of vigilante justice or "Main Hakim Sendiri" against minority groups. Vigilante justice is one of the most prominent effects of the enforcement of the ABL, and it will be the focus of examination in this chapter.

Accusations of blasphemy against religious minorities, such as the Ahmadiyya, Gafatar, and Meiliana cases, have led to the occurrence of vigilantism judgments, which continue to gain public attention. Previous research suggested that MHS activities typically happened during political transitions (Marzuki 2017). Other experts focused to study MHS in relation to perpetrator's criminal liability (Panjaitan and Wijaya 2018; Rambe 2018). This study focuses on examining the activities of *MHS* that have escalated over the past decade following the enforcement of the ABL. The administration continues to defend the necessity of maintaining this rule in order to prevent horizontal conflict and disruption of public order. In contrast to the execution of the law, social reality is just the reverse. In 2020, USCIRF stated that 76 out of 164 instances of anti-blasphemy legislation being enforced in various nations were accompanied by efforts at public mobilization, threats of violence, and violence. However, in blasphemy cases, vigilantism has changed from spontaneous action to more planned acts backed by the government. Pratiwi, CS., and Sunaryo, S. (2021) argue that vigilante violence surrounding charges of blasphemy in numerous nations, including Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia, cannot be isolated from structural violence caused by the state through the preservation of legislation.

This chapter seeks to investigate factors and actors shaped blasphemy enforcement and to what degree is political manipulation of religion behind Indonesia's widespread prosecution of blasphemy cases?

**5.2. An overview of blasphemy law enforcement in Indonesia**

Table 12. The Criminalization of Blasphemy Cases Based on the IABL Junto Article 156a Indonesia Criminal Code with Punishment for Maximum 1 Year in Prison

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| No | Year | Court’s Location | Defendant’s Name / Religions | Allegation of Crime | Charges |
| 1 | 1968 | Medan District Court | HB. Jassin / Moslem | As the head publisher of Sastra magazine that published the short story "The Sky is Getting Cloudy" by Ki Pandji Kusmin, in the year 1968. | A sentence of one year of incarceration, in addition to a two-year probationary term. |
| 2 | 2005 | Polewali Mandar District Court | Sumardin Tappayya / Moslem Minority | The village elder who practices whistle during prayer as a form of worship. | A sentence of six months of incarceration, in addition to a one year probationary term. |
| 3 | 2008 | Makassar District Court | Hikmat Faturiddin, Abdul Qadri, Fadli, Maulid Syawal and Asrul AB / Moslem Minority | To become a member of the Al-Qiyadah faith. | A sentence of four months of incarceration, in addition to a six months probationary term. |
| 4 | 2009 | Kupang District Court | Nimrot Lasbaun and Friends / Christian | They held a belief that Zion was the divine city of God. | A sentence of six months of incarceration. |
| 5 | 2009 | District Court Ambon | Wilhelmina Holle / Christian | Musohi - Maluku Public Unrest | A sentence of one year of incarceration. |
| 6 | 2011 | Blitar District Court | Miftakhur Rosyidin bin Winarko (RIP) / Moslem | A Muslim person who drew a cross inside a mosque. | A sentence of four months of incarceration. |
| 7 | 2012 | Garut District Court | Sensen Komara / Moslem minority | A follower of Indonesian Islamic Nation. | 1-year treatment in mental Institution |
| 8 | 2012 | Sampang District Court | Tajul Muluk / Moslem minority | A Shia leader | A sentence of 1-year incarceration and Increased to four years by High Court |
| 9 | 2012 | Dompu District Court | Charles Sitorus / Christian | Christianity Teaching of Kindness Books distribution | A sentence of 1-year and two months incarceration |
| 10 | 2013 | Kalabahi District Court | Alfred Waang / Christian | Forced a moslem kid to eat pork. | A sentence of one year of incarceration. |
| 11 | 2013 | District Court Denpasar | Rusgiani / Christian | Disrupt the harmony amongst religious communities and could potentially dishonor the Hindu religion. | One year and 2 months of incarceration. |
| 12 | 2018 | Medan District Court | Meiliana / Buddhist | Complaining to a mosque’s admin for setting the mosque’s loudspeaker too loudly for Athan. | A sentence of 1 year and 6 months incarceration. |

Table 13. The Criminalization of Blasphemy Cases Based on the IABL Junto Article 156a Indonesia Criminal Code with Punishment for 2 to 5 Year in Prison

| No. | The Court | Year | Defendant’s Name | Defendant’s Religion | Indictment | Punishment |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | District Court Central Jakarta | 1990 | Aswendo Atmowiloto | Muslim who published a survey the favorite leader in Indonesia and put Muhammad as the second rank | 156a CC | 5 years sentence |
| 2 | District Court Situbondo | 1996 | Muhammad Saleh | Islam | 156a CC | 5 years sentence |
| 3 | Kalabahi District Court | 2004 | Ir. Charisal Matsen, Agustinus Manu M.Sc. | Muslim who made a Book cover design of “Alor in numbers” | 156a CC | 2 years sentence |
| 4 | District Court Bale Endah | 2004 | Mangapin Sibuea | Christian who Apostle and Prophet of the world cottage | 156a CC | 2 years sentence |
| 5 | Probolinggo District Court | 2005 | Ardi Husain and 6 managements of YKNCA | Muslim who wrote and published a book “Penetrating the dark towards light 2” | 156a CC | 4 years and 6 months sentence |
| 6 | District Court Jakarta | 2006 | Lia Aminuddin | Lia Eden Community | 156a CC 157 paragraph (1), and 335 CC | 2 years sentence |
| 7 | District court Central Jakarta | 2006 | Abdul Rachman | A Salamullah follower | 156a CC | 3 years sentence |
| 8 | District Court Central Jakarta | 2007 | Ahmad Musadeq | A follower of Alqiyadah Al Islamiyah and the leader of Gafatar | 156a CC | 4 years sentence |
| 9 | Malang District Court | 2007 | Djoko Widodo SH and Nur imam Daniel or Daniel as part of 41 members of LPMI (2007) | Islam | 156a CC | 3 years and 6 months sentence |
| 10 | District Court Padang | 2007 | Dedi Priadi and Garry Lutfi Yudistira | Al-Qiyadah Al-Islamiyah | 156a CC | 3 years sentence |
| 11 | Jambi District Court | 2008 | Edi Ridwan, Amir, Sudibyo and Warsito | A leader of Islamic New Model | 156a CC | 5 years sentence |
| 12 | District Court of Tasikmalaya | 2008 | Ishak Suhendra | A writer of Religion and Reality Book | 156a CC | 5 years sentence |
| 13 | District Court Central Jakarta | 2009 | Lia Aminudin / Salamullah | Habib Abdurrahman Assegaf / Islam | 156a CC | 2 years and 6 months sentence |
| 14 | District Court Central Jakarta | 2009 | Wahyu Andito Putro Wibisono / Salamullah | Habib Abdurrahman Assegaf / Islam | 156a CC | 2 years sentence |
| 15 | District Court South Jakarta | 2009 | Agus Imam Solihin / Satriyo Piningit | - / Islam | 156a CC | 2 years and 6 months sentence |
| 16 | Ciamis District Court | 2011 | Ondon Juhana | Sri Asriyati and Victims / Islam | 156a CC and 378 CC | 4 years sentence |
| 17 | District Court of Tasikmalaya | 2011 | Oben Sarbeni | MUI / Islam | 156a CC | 4 years sentence |
| 18 | Temanggung District Court | 2011 | Antonius Richmond Bawengan / Distribution of 3 brochures and 2 books | Community members and administrators | 156a CC | 5 years sentence |
| 19 | District Court Sumber Cirebon | 2011 | Ahmad Tantowi / Heaven of Eden | Victim / Islam | 156a CC and article 289 CC | 10 years sentence |
| 20 | Klaten District Court | 2012 | Andreas Guntur Wisnu Sarsono, Mandate of Divine Greatness | FKAM / Islam | 156a CC | 4 years sentence |
| 21 | District Court Padang | 2012 | Alexander Aan / Account Atheis | / Islam | 156a CC | 2 years and 6 months sentence |
| 22 | Ciamis District Court | 2012 | Subastian Joe Bin Abdul Hadi / FB Allah Stingy and Arrogant | FPI, LPI and MUI / Islam | 156a CC | 4 years sentence |
| 23 | Ende District Court | 2013 | Herison Yohanes Riwu / Host Case | Church leadership / Catholic | 156a CC | 4 years and 6 months sentence |
| 24 | District Court Lubuk Pakam | 2013 | Khairuddin or Udin / Islam Kaffah sect | society / Islam | 156a CC | 4 years sentence |
| 25 | Pati District Court | 2013 | Muhamad Rokhisun bin Ruslan | victim / Islam | 156a CC, Art. 45 & Art. 28 ITE Law. | 4 years sentence |
| 26 | District Court Bale Bandung | 2013 | Rohmansyah / Qur'aniyah sect | Bandung / Islamic Organizational Society | 156a CC | 2 years and 6 months sentence |
| 27 | Sangatta District Court | 2014 | Syeh Muhammad (Teacher of Bantil) | ex-student / Islam | 156a CC & 378 CC | 3 years sentence |
| 28 | District Court North Jakarta and Supreme Court |  | Ahok |  | 156a CC & 27 (3) & 45 (1) | 2 years sentence a |
| Sources: Cited from Court Decision Directory at Indonesia Supreme Court and Categorized by Author. | | | | | | |

## 5.3 Discussion and Analysis

### 5.3.1 Factors and Actors Shaped the ABL’s Enforcement in Indonesia.

#### **(i) Godly Nationalism Emerges in the Court’s Arguments**

Godly nationalism was the basis for Soekarno's approval of the ABL in 1965 (Menchik, 2014a: p.607-610). Article 1 of the ABL emphasizes punishment for acts of blasphemy.[[79]](#footnote-79) Underpinning of Godly Nationalism manufactures the prolong enforcement of the anti-blasphemy law that applaud the presence of mob violence or public protest. Menchik (2014) in his study argues that Godly nationalism that is upheld in Indonesia produces religious intolerance. Menchik believes that the value of God Almighty is central to the First Sila of Pancasila, “Believe in One God the Almighty,” in which every citizen has an intrinsic moral commitment to maintain religion as part of safeguarding the nation. In this view, insulting, blaspheming others religions, and urging others to have no faith are acts that oppose holy nationalism.

This definition of “godly nationalism” also emerges in the Constitutional Court's legal arguments in support of the Blasphemy Law's legality. The Chairperson of the Muhammadiyah organization believes that Indonesia is not a secular state, but a country that believes in God Almighty. It has values that cannot be matched with those of a secular state. Godly nationalism condemns anarchist activities or taking the law into one's own hands by persecuting religious groups or beliefs that are not among the six recognized by the government. The principle of Godly nationalism is perpetually warped by various state policies that are oppressive, accusatory, or condemning of diverse religious groups or views and that encourage individuals to behave as their own judges.

Furthermore, Telle (2017) contends that the current political dynamics in Indonesia, which emphasizes godly nationalism, are responsible for the growing tendency of legal enforcement against blasphemy. It is provided to repel atheism, safeguard “orthodox” religion from “deviant” religious teachings and protect existing faiths from intolerant acts or remarks that degrade their sanctity. Under Soeharto’s administration, numerous times, the ABL has been used to destroy communism and atheism and to restrict the liberties of non-recognized religions. At least three concerns posed a potential danger to Indonesia's unity. It was the propagation of mystical ideas that contradicted Pancasila and its first premise, “Belief in One God, the Almighty.” This notion has been interpreted as requiring Indonesians to be religious or to believe in God. In this way, many Indonesians who did not believe in God were expected to learn and acquire information from other recognized faiths in order to live according to Pancasila's fundamental principle.

After the reform era, the BL found itself at a crossroads. On the one hand, the state strives to increase the protection of human rights, but on the other, national stability and security remain of the utmost significance. As the defender of the Constitution and the protector of human rights, the Indonesian Constitutional Court has determined that the BL must be revised since it is not in conformity with the Indonesian Constitution and human rights legislation. In the meanwhile, socio-political situations in Indonesia continue to need this law.

Furthermore, according to the CCRI, Godly nationalism is reflected in Pancasila Sila I, “Belief in One God,” which is enshrined in Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution and reaffirmed by the Constitutional Court in its ratio decidendi decision when examining the constitutionality of the 1965 Anti-Blasphemy Law.[[80]](#footnote-80) In contrast, the vigilante phenomenon rises when the blasphemy law regime is robust. According to research done by Yilmaz and Barton (2021), Front Defenders of Islam (FPI) is a radical Islamic group whose actions are always defined by vigilantism under the leadership of Rizieq Shihab (RS). Thus, vigilantism has been crucial to the FPI's operations (p. 8). RS employs hate narratives to provoke individuals outside the organization, including politicians and the government, and urges its adherents to conduct vigilante action against all types of action that are harmful to Islamic beliefs (p. 8–10). Under the guise of protecting Islam (the “Action of Defending Islam”), RS utilized his popularity to influence the FPI in many anti-Ahok rallies where he was accused of damaging Islam (p. 12). When charges of blasphemy are made against an individual or group of individuals, the FPI is frequently involved in the actions of *MHS.*

The objective of sustaining the BL in Indonesia rapidly switched from preventing public disruption and safeguarding national unity to “preventing national stability.” It indicates that the BL must prioritize political goals over maintaining public order. Instead of preserving the rights of people or religious groups, the government uses the BL as a repressive instrument against resistance. The legislation is also used to punish minority religions in an effort to garner the support of the majority and preserve their political power.

But on the other hand, when the blasphemy law regime is strong, the vigilante phenomenon increases. For instance, a study conducted by Yilmaz and Barton (2021) states that Front Defender of Islam (FPI) is a hard-liner Islamic organization, where under the leadership of Rizieq Shihab (RS) its activities are always characterized by vigilante action. “Thus, a core part of FPI’s activities has been vigilantism (p.8). RS uses hate narratives to antagonize those outside its group, including politicians and the government, and encourages its followers to take vigilante action against all forms of action that are contrary to Islamic values (p.8-10). RS used his popularity to influence FPI in various anti-Ahok protests accused of tarnishing Islam, under the pretext of defending Islam (Action of Defending Islam) (p.12). When there are accusations of blasphemy against a person or group of people, the action of Main Hakim Sendiri accompanies it which FPI is often involved in.

There was a swift aim in maintaining the IABL from maintaining to avoid public disorder and protecting national unity into “preventing national stability.” It means that the IABL are needed to support more to political interest rather than maintaining public order. Therefore, in practice the IABL are used by the government as a repressive tool against opposition rather than protecting the right of individual or religious groups. The law is used also to prosecute minority religions to get sympathy from the majority’s voices to maintain their political power.

#### **(ii) State Monopoly Truth**

The increasing acts of intolerance in Indonesia, which are marked by vigilante justice against groups accused of blaspheming religion or having deviant sects, are rooted in the attitude of hard-liner religious adherents who claim to be the most correct in interpreting religion or the contents of religious scriptures. Hard-line religious groups tend to monopolize the truth; they impose their interpretations of the Holy Book on others and do not want to accept different interpretations. This rigid attitude of religious leaders is supported and followed by students, including their families.

Two great Indonesian scholars, Gus Mus (Nahdlatul Ulama) and Quraish Shihab (an expert in Qur'anic Exegesis), shared the view that the monopoly of religious truth from certain groups is the root of intolerance. Shihab, in a national program on television, stated that:

“God never asks what is five plus five because there will be only one answer. What God asks is, what makes 10? It can be seven plus three or eight plus two etc. Therefore, truth is diverse. Don't think that what you believe is the truth that one believed on others would trigger social friction, a situation with which Indonesia was currently struggling.”[[81]](#footnote-81)

Gus Mus (Ulama from NU) similarly said that:

“Imposing an interpretation of the Qur'an is really dangerous, especially by those who refer to themselves as ulama, or not as ordinary people.” [[82]](#footnote-82)

If referring to Hashim Kamali's view, “God reveals the truth in variety of ways, some explicit and others by allusion, the latter mainly through the modality of the “verse”, to provoke and engage the human intellect (Kamali 2006).

So, the views of the two scholars should be understood, namely, that the Qur'an itself is aware that humans use their ears to hear, their brains to think, their eyes to hope to see, their mouths to ask questions, their knowledge to understand, and so on. Hashim Kamali also asserts that “approximately 750 verses, or nearly one-eight of the Qur'an, exhort the readers to study nature, history, the Qur'an itself, and humanity at large.” [[83]](#footnote-83) Thus, when *Meiliana* challenged the sound of the Adhan, which was too loud, and then said that *Meiliana* had tarnished religion, such an attitude was an example of the monopoly of truth that understands religion (Islam) without reason, conscience, or science. Likewise in the cases of *Ahmadiyya* and *Gafatar.* The attitude of the Indonesian Ulema Council, which issued a heretical fatwa against the *Ahmadiyya* and *Gafatar* groups based solely on a one-sided truth claim, did not give *Ahmadiyya* room for freedom to believe in their choice of belief or at least provided room for *Ahmadiyya* to be heard for their explanations. Then *Gafatar,* which admits that it is not a religious organization and never committed blasphemy as alleged in the MUI fatwa of heresy, The MUI truth claims are made with eyes, ears, and minds close to the real facts. Truth claims followed by false statements, bans, and disbandment of an organization are no longer just truth claims but have stimulated public anger in the form of vigilante justice.

The one-sided truth claim by the MUI was also corroborated by the Court. This can be seen in the sentencing decision handed down by the South Jakarta District Court and confirmed by the High Court decision in Jakarta, which stated that Mahful Muis and Ahmad Musaddeq were perpetrators of blasphemy who violated Article 165a of the Criminal Code. In an interview with the former Head of YLBHI, who is also the legal adviser to the two defendants, Asfinawati,[[84]](#footnote-84) she stated that:

“(1) [……] (2). The Appellant strongly agrees with the legal considerations of the East Jakarta District Court according to the facts that the trial has not proven at all the charges of the two public prosecutors and acquitted the defendants of the second indictment; (3) That the appellant strongly objected to this decision in which the defendants were declared legally and convincingly proven to have committed blasphemy and were sentenced to prison terms because there was not a single witness or piece of evidence that could corroborate or prove the public prosecutor's first charge.”[[85]](#footnote-85)

In the Ahmadiyya case, both the court of first instance and the high court shared the belief that a person who has religious teachings that are different from the religion adhered to in Indonesia is prohibited from being the perpetrator of religious blasphemy. The emphasis given by the court to Ahmadiyya adherents was “**intentionally committing an act publicly that is basically blasphemy against a religion adhered to in Indonesia**.”[[86]](#footnote-86) This means that Ahmadiyya followers can't preach their religion in Indonesia if it goes against the mainstream Islam, which is the main religion there.

Furthermore, the Ahmadiyya is not a new religious organization. It has existed for a long time, and the Ahmadiyya have long lived side by side with other Muslims. However, when public policies declare Ahmadiyya to be “perverted,” vigilantism occurs, and is even repeated. Likewise, with *Gafatar,* as an organization that has a license, *Gafatar* has various work programs and collaborates with various state institutions. Before there was a deviant fatwa, people did not consider this organization a deviant organization. Pressure on the Ahmadiyya adherents has occurred since 1980, when the MUI issued a Fatwa on Ahmadiyya Qadiyan (as a result of the second National Conference, held May 26–June 1, 1980) and recommended that the Indonesian government ban the dissemination of Ahmadiyya in Indonesia through the national working meeting. In total, there have been three decrees of the MUI on Ahmadiyya: two fatwas issued in 1980 and 2005, and one recommendation issued in 1984 that declared Ahmadiyya as heretical and not practicing Islamic teachings properly. Not only did MUI issue a deviant fatwa to *Ahmadiyya*, but also to *Gafatar* and *Meiliana.* Meiliana's actions against the call to prayer were also declared by MUI as blasphemy. All acts of persecution against *Ahmadiyya, Gafatar, and Meiliana* followers took place after the MUI Fatwa was issued.

### (ii) Continuing to strengthen the flawed ABL diminishing the rule of law

In the previous chapter, the legal framework of the ABL was examined, focusing on the ambiguity of the law. It was concluded that the ABL lacks clear definitions and boundaries regarding what constitutes "blasphemy", "defamation of religion", or "interpretation of religion that differs from the religion practiced in Indonesia". This lack of clarity has resulted in these terms being interpreted broadly and subjectively by law enforcement officials.

### (iii) The Government interference toward religion

Due to the lack of law enforcement to prevent vigilante justice, *Ahmadiyya* and *Gafatar* adherents, as well as *Meiliana*, were victims of vigilante justice, as described in the preceding subchapter. The expansion of vigilante organizations and the inability of law enforcement to prevent recurring vigilante justice violence are examples of the government's unwillingness to take decisive action against vigilante groups that flagrantly violate the law. Consequently, the vigilante groups believe they have the support of the government to continue their efforts.

“In a striking example of official reluctance to tackle vigilante justice, video footage taken in February showed the police in West Java standing by as a mob killed three Ahmadiyya members and mutilated their bodies. Rather than lead to crackdown on vigilante justices, the incident prompted provincial and local governments to issue decrees curtailing the rights of Ahmadis to worship.”

The Ahmadiyya experienced vigilantism in the form of persecution of Ahmadiyya followers, expulsions, burning of houses of worship, and other prohibitions.[[87]](#footnote-87) This act of vigilantism cannot be separated from the government's policy during the reign of Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, namely the issuance of a Joint Decree of the Three Ministers Year 2008 declaring Ahmadiyya to be a heretical religion (the 2008 Join Decree). The 2008 Join Degree essentially calls for Ahmadiyya to return to Islamic teachings and prohibits their adherents from carrying out religious activities that lead to the spread of Ahmadiyya. The 2008 Join Decree was then followed by various policies at the local level, namely the Regulations of the Governors of East Java and West Java which also prohibited Ahmadiyya from using the symbols of their organizations, prohibited the use of houses of worship and schools. While in various other provinces the prohibition of Ahmadiyya has been carried out in almost all provinces. The Joint Decree (SKB) of the Minister of Religion, the Attorney General and the Minister of Home Affairs concerning Warnings and Orders to Adherents, Members and/or Management of JAI and Community Members, is one of the causes of discrimination against Ahmadiyya.[[88]](#footnote-88)

Reinforcing the discussion of the previous chapter, political manipulation of the implementation of the Blasphemy Law also occurred in the Ahmadiyya case. The ban on Ahmadiyya cannot be separated from SBY's political interest in seeking the support of a Muslim majority in the 2019 election. Then the ban on Ahmadiyya also continued during the Jokowi administration, which advanced as a presidential candidate after SBY stepped down. The Jokowi administration continues its repressive measures against the Ahmadiyya. Throughout his campaign, Jokowi emphasized the importance of religious tolerance. But when Jokowi came to power in 2014, the Jokowi administration tended to allow the actions of MHS to be carried out by hard-line Islamist groups such as the FPI.

1. FPI keeps asking the local government to ban the Ahmadiyya group's religious activities. This has led to a number of local policies, such as:
2. Joint Decrees 3 and 199 of 2008 say that the Ahmadiyya Mosque will be shut down.
3. Governor's Regulation No. 12 of 2011 says that the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Congregation can't do anything in West Java.

Depok Regional Regulation Depok Regional Regulation Number 9 of 2004 concerning Civil Investigating Officers and Depok Mayor Regulation Number 9 of 2011 concerning the Prohibition of the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Congregation in Depok.[[89]](#footnote-89)

#### 5.3.2.1 Criminal Offense without strong evidence

#### 5.3.2.2 Questioning Judiciary Independency

With the advent of several MUI fatwas and court rulings that label organizations with religious teachings and views that differ from the dominant religion adhered to in Indonesia as deviant, violence against persons accused of blasphemy against religion is increasingly justified by certain groups. As it became apparent that the law enforcement procedure was not moving as expected, this fury grew. In the sociological heritage of Indonesian culture, amok refers to a violent social act prompted by extreme rage (Collins, 2002; Smith, 2006). Typically, lawlessness arises when criminals are caught red-handed or when fraud occurs. In blasphemy instances, governmental choices that favor the majority predominate. Therefore, amok's culture, as stated by Collins or Smith, is not too prominent in cases blasphemy because almost all accusations of blasphemy are always granted by the indictment and the perpetrators are punished. The vigilante justice by the FPI continue because the state allowed them to happen and was justified by various public policies declaring Ahmadiyah and Gafatar teachings heretical long before a court decision was made.

The vigilante justice phenomenon against religious followers accused of being heretics shows the strengthening of hard-line Islamic populism in Indonesia. Hard-line Islam views “deviant religion as a common enemy” and continues to influence society against it. Such extreme views are echoed by Islamic organizations such as FPI in various religious lectures or speeches. Hard-line Islamic views are continuously manufactured and have become the daily consumption of millennials. Hard-line Islamic groups continue to campaign for the view that the right to practice one's beliefs is not an absolute right if it offends other religious people. The Ahmadiyya group must choose whether they will defend their faith or follow the true teachings of Islam. If they choose to defend their religion, then don't promote that religion because it will hurt most Muslims.

Unfortunately, the violent actions of hard-line Islamic groups and their intolerance did not get firm action from law enforcement. In fact, the government either supports or ignores this. Hard-line Islamic groups that continue to push for the enforcement of the Anti-Defamation Law are also supported by the moderate Islam group that supports the populism of Islam and maintains the Blasphemy Law. Various efforts made by NGOs concerned with human rights and the right to freedom of religion to test the validity of the Blasphemy Law continue to stagnate because moderate Islamic groups such as NU or Muhammadiyah are on the same page with hard-line Islam and the government to defend the law.

The failure of democracy in Indonesia opens space for hard-line Islamic groups to continuously proffer and promote an Islamic State as an alternative solution. The idea of an Islamic state began to be discussed in various academic institutions and on social media. Various discussions regarding the idea of an Islamic state continue to roll along despite criticism from moderate Islamic groups. Capitalism is thought to be the root of the paralysis of the Indonesian economy. Low economic growth reduces people's purchasing power. When the economy is not growing, various companies do mass layoffs, so the unemployment rate rises sharply in Indonesia. The capitalist economy that workers and the lower economic class cannot feel makes the stunting rate in Indonesia very high. This is what causes hard-line Muslim communities supported by millennials to look for alternative economic systems that can build prosperity.

Islamic populism is increasing, and the division of society between *hard-line* Islam and moderate Islam continues to sharpen. Intolerance rose sharply, either in the form of hate speech or the criminalization of religious minorities by hard-line Islamic groups. Through the campaign that “blasphemy is a common enemy,” it encourages the public to continue to report parties deemed insulting to Islam. Religious minority groups seem to be allowed to grow and develop. But when they manifest their religion, they are accused of blasphemy. Various calls against religious minority groups have been made by hard-line Islamic leaders, stating that they should “embrace religion without promoting it.” The stigma of heresy continues to be pinned on minority groups if the religious teachings they believe to be the truth are considered contrary to the main religious teachings adopted in Indonesia.

This is the main reason for declaring *Ahmadiyya* and *Gafatar* as heretical religions. MUI is a semi-government agency. It is not a law-forming institution, nor is it an institution that sits in the executive ranks. However, the MUI was given the authority to act as regulator and as religious police. Although the term “heretical” is not found in the Criminal Code, if MUI says a religious teaching is heretical, this will be equated with the terminology contained in Article 156a of the Criminal Code, namely “crime against religion” or “blasphemy.” In this case, the authority granted by the MUI shows that the state is adopting a concept known in Islam, namely the concept of heresy. According to Assyaukanie, heresy is derived from theological terms. Ma'ruf Amin, a former MUI chairperson, said that a belief or religion is considered heretical if it covers one of the ten criteria of heresy, such as denying the principles of faith or believing or following a belief that is not in line with the argumentation from the Holy Qur'an and the Prophetic Traditions (dalil syar'i).[[90]](#footnote-90)

In the case of *Ahmadiyya* and *Gafatar*, minority religions have no representative in the MUI. They do not have a voice that can be heard or addressed. The last word is “religions professed to in Indonesia,” which means it only refers to the six official religions. Other religions or beliefs than those mentioned in the explanatory clause of Article 1 of the Law No. 1/PNPS/ 1965 are not protected by the Law No. 1/PNPS/ 1965. Article 1 of the Law contradicts Article 29 of the 1945 Indonesian Constitution, which recognizes the right to religious freedom but never mentions the sixth official religion. While Article 1 of the Law creates the new norm and discriminates against or excludes other religions or beliefs that have existed in Indonesia for a very long time, but there is no element concerning the permissible limitation to the rights of freedom of religion and freedom of expression as stated in Art. 18 (3) of the ICCPR.

### State actors

Studies conducted by USCIRF (2020) with the title “Violating Rights Enforcing the World’s Blasphemy Laws” observed the implementations of blasphemy laws around the world, including in Indonesia,[[91]](#footnote-91) states that violence or threats of community violence that accompany accusations of blasphemy generally target the accused perpetrators or bystanders and are mobilized by non-state actors, either individually or in groups (p. 7).[[92]](#footnote-92) However, in some cases, public officials tolerate civil unrest (p. 8). This chapter does not intend to refute USCIRF's findings but rather to provide a more accurate picture of the vigilantism actors accompanying accusations of blasphemy in Indonesia, particularly in the cases of *Ahmadiyya, Gafatar, and Meiliana*. In contrast to USCIRF, the author divides it into three categories in this case: state actors, non-state actors, and semi-state actors. Non-state actors are actors who work in the field, including provoking hate speech against perpetrators accused of blasphemy against religion. Meanwhile, semi-state actors are non-state institutions that receive authority from the state, namely the MUI, to assess whether a word or action is categorized as blasphemy against religion. Meanwhile, state actors are state institutions that issue official decisions on behalf of the state stating that a heretical teaching is prohibited, or activities are prohibited, etc.

Learning from the tables above, this study finds that the perpetrators of vigilantism in blasphemy charges against the *Ahmadiyya group, the Gafatar group,* and *the Meiliana* are very diverse, as depicted in figure 6.

Figure 6. The Actors of Vigilantism (Main Hakim Sendiri) Amid Blasphemy Allegations

Sources: Cited from various sources and analysed by the author.

In general, what is meant by “state actors” are public apparatuses acting for and on behalf of the state, working for central government institutions, regional government institutions, and the judiciary. Based on the three innocent blasphemy cases against *Ahmadiyya, Gafatar,* and *Meiliana*, at least three state institutions encourage the general public to perform the *Main Hakim Sendiri*. The first is the police. The police are an institution that is trusted by the public when it receives complaints about cases of blasphemy. The police do not have a single understanding when dealing with reports of blasphemy cases. The community considers the rise in cases of religious insults due to the slowness of the police in resolving reported cases. This inaction sparked public anger that led to vigilante action. The police appeared to allow violence against religious minorities accused of spreading heretical religion because they failed to anticipate any vigilante actions involving large crowds. In the case of *Ahmadiyya*, from 2010 to 2021, there were at least six vigilante incidents that demonstrated the failure of the police to prevent the recurrence of such violence. In the *Gafatar* case, the police failed to prevent violence against *Gafatar* members, including the expulsion of *Gafatar* residents and the burning of their homes in Kalimantan. In the case of *Meiliana,* the mediation initiated by the police to conduct a dialogue between residents and *Meiliana* was unsuccessful, and the police failed to prevent a mob rage that took the form of burning down *Meiliana*'s house and even several temples. The failure of the police to prevent violence against the *Ahmadiyya, Gafatar,* and *Meiliana* groups is a form of allowing vigilante justice to occur.

Second, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Attorney General, and the Minister of Home Affairs are the state actor that encourages vigilantism. The three institutions and its hereditary institutions released the discriminative policy, namely Joint Decree of the Minister of Religion, the Attorney General, and the Minister of Home Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Number 3 of 2008, Kep. 033/a/ja/6/2008, concerning warnings and orders to adherents, members, and/or community members of the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Muslim Community (JAI) that violated the right of Ahmadiyya to embrace their religion. Although, according to the Indonesian Constitution, the Regional Government does not have the authority to regulate religious activities, through these discriminatory policies, it prohibits Ahmadiyya religious activities, either in the form of prohibiting religious rituals of Ahmadiyya, as well as other religious activities. Third, governors, mayors, and the head of regents of local governments are also actors who incite vigilantism because they issue public policies that assert that *Ahmadiyya* and *Gafatar* are heretical religions. Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution protects every citizen's right to freedom of religion. Two ministers and the attorney general of the Republic of Indonesia have, in a joint decision, enacted policies that violate this right. The freedom of religion, which includes the ability to freely choose, embrace, and worship in accordance with one's own faith and beliefs, has been restricted by this policy and its subsidiary rules. To maintain the right to freedom of religion as a negative right, the state must remain neutral or refrain from enacting measures that diminish the nature of the right's realization. In the Ahmadiyya case, however, the state's activities through its policies led to infringement of the Ahmadiyya people's right to religious freedom. All these rules that mentioned in Table 5 are used to make it okay for vigilantes to act if the public thinks that law enforcement is taking too long to make community reports.

Table 9. State Actors Encourage Vigilantism Actions (Main Hakim Sendiri)

| No. | State Actors | Name of Regulations | Area |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | Minister of Religion, the Attorney General and the Minister of Homa Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. | Joint Decree of the Minister of Religion, the Attorney General, and the Minister of Home Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Number 3 of 2008, Kep. 033/a/ja/6/2008, concerning warnings and orders to adherents, members, and/or community members of the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Muslim Community (JAI). | Central Government |
| 2 | Secretary Circular  General of the Ministry of Religion, Attorney General  Young Intelligence, and Director General of National Unity and Interior Ministry Politics. | Secretary Circular General of the Ministry of Religion, Attorney General Young Intelligence, and Director General of National Unity and Interior Ministry Politics Number: SE/SJ/1322/2008, Number: SE/B-1065/DDsp. 4/08/2008, Number: SE/119/921.D.III/2008 concerning implementation Guidelines Ministerial decree Religion, Attorney General, and Minister within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. | Central Government |
| 3. | Governor of East Java Province. | Governor of East Java Decree Number 188/94/KPTS/013/2011regarding the Prohibition of the Activities of the Indonesian Admadiyah Congregation (abbreviated as JAI). | Province Government in East Java. |
| 4. | Governor of West Java Province. | West Java Governor Regulation Number 12/20110 concerning Prohibition of Activities Ahmadiyya Congregation in West Java. | Province Government in West Java. |
| 5. | Mayor of Depot City. | Mayor of Depok City Regulation No. 09  2011 concerning the Prohibition of Indonesian Admadiyah Congregational Activities in Cities Depok. | Local Government in Deok City. |
| 6. | Governor of East Lombok | Governor of East Lombok Decree Kep.11/IPK.32.2/L-2.III.3/11/1983 concerning prohibition  towards the activities of the Ahmadiyya Congregation, East Lombok Pancor Branch dated 21 November 1983. | Province Government in East Lombok |
| 7. | Governor of South Sumatera | Decree of the Governor of South Sumatera No. 563/KPT/BAN. KESBANGPOL&LINMAS/2008 on 1 September 2008 concerning prohibition  towards the activities of the Ahmadiyya Congregation. | Province Governor in South Sumatera. |
| 8. | Governor of South Sulawesi | Letter Governor of South Sulawesi Circular No. 223.2/803/Kesbang  on February 10, 2011, concerning prohibition  towards the activities of the Ahmadiyya Congregation | Province Government of South Sulawesi. |
| 9. | Governor of East Java | Governor of East Java Regulation No  188/94/KPTS/013/2011 concerning Prohibition of Ahmadiyya Congregational Activities  Indonesia in East Java | Province Government of East Java. |

Sources: Cited by the Author from various resources.

### Semi-state actors

MUI stands for the Ulema Council of Indonesia. At the time of its founding during the Soeharto era, on July 26th, 1975, it was an Indonesian cleric-led non-governmental community organization. The MUI's founding objective was to strengthen the faith of Indonesian Muslims, and it continues to urge Muslims to uphold the nation's unity and sovereignty. Thus, MUI is a politically neutral organization that does not engage in political activity. In light of subsequent events, however, the MUI became a quasi-governmental organization under the direction of the Ministry of Religion. Therefore, the MUI's responsibilities and powers cannot be separated from those of the government.

With the passage of the Blasphemy Law in 1965, MUI was required to determine whether a teaching could be classified as a religion. Even the MUI has the authority to determine if a religious doctrine deviates from the predominant religious doctrines in Indonesia. Here is where the issue occurs. The MUI through fatwa Number 6 Year 2016 concerning GAFATAR eventually assesses unsuitable religious teachings and issues a heretical fatwa if the teachings are considered to be aberrant. This is what MUI did against the organization Fajar Nusantara Movement (Gafatar). KH. Ma'ruf Amin, former chairman of the MUI, claimed that Gafatar was deemed heretical because:

“They went wrong because it was a transformation of Al-Qiyadah Al-Islamiyah and Ahmad Musadeq was its head. Millah Abraham mixes Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. If you go against that belief, you will be declared an apostate and leave the teachings of Islam.”[[93]](#footnote-93)

MUI is a semi-state institution, in the meantime, Mahful M. Tumurung, the previous head of Gafatar, stated:

“Religious belief and understanding are a constitutionally protected and guaranteed fundamental right for every Indonesian person.” In light of this, we assert that our religious views and understanding have diverged from those of the majority of Indonesians, and we affirm our commitment to Milah Abraham's teachings. As stated in our AD/ART, the Indonesian Ulama Council shouldn't issue heretical fatwas against us or Gafatar because we are a social organization based on Pancasila that works in the sociocultural area.” [[94]](#footnote-94)

Briefly, the primary reason the MUI considers *Gafatar* to be a false religion is because, according to the MUI's mistaken viewpoint, *Gafatar* denies Muhammad's status as the last prophet by appointing Musadeq as its head. In the meanwhile, the MUI alleged that *Gafatar* disregarded commands for prayer, Ramadan fasting, and hajj, as well as blended Islamic, Christian, and Jewish beliefs.

In the instance of Ahmadiyya, the MUI also issued a fatwa condemning Ahmadiyya's doctrines as heretical. In fatwa Number 10 has been issued by the MUI to restrict Ahmadiyya teachings and deem them to be heretical sects.

The various state actors mentioned in the earlier section failed to prevent deviant fatwas issued by the MUI, where the deviant fatwa by the MUI has become a tool for legitimizing the vigilante group's desire to take justice into their own hands.

The MUI is a semi-state institution. The MUI is an institution that always issues heretical fatwas against Ahmadiyya and Gafatar. Since 1980 the Ahmadiyya has been declared heretical for the first time by the MUI Fatwa. With the issuance of this deviant fatwa, the community feels they have the legitimacy to take vigilante actions when the police or law enforcement are slow or failed to reach public dissatisfaction.

The Main Hakim Sendiri does not only attack perpetrators who are accused of blaspheming religion, as in the three cases above, but the violence even extends to the destruction of property of a certain religion which is partly responsible for the blasphemy committed by its follower. This is as illustrated in the Meiliana case, where not only Meiliana's house was damaged by the mob, but the Buddhist temple and medical centre were also affected, burned, and damaged. Vigilante activity over blasphemy allegation did not always occur when a blasphemy case is alleged. In Indonesia, however, vigilantism often accompanied accusations of blasphemy. Even so, vigilante activities did not occur immediately or spontaneously. Main Hakim Sendiri is driven by policies or regulations that have placed the accused as the guilty party. Whether it's getting a deviant stigma after the MUI Fatwa or as a forbidden sect after various public policies issued by the local government. With the MUI fatwa and public policies declaring a sect or heresy or a statement said to be blaspheming against religion, non-state actors, namely individuals or groups of individuals, get support to carry out attacks against deviant groups, even burn their houses of worship, or expel from their village, as experienced by followers of Ahmadiyya or Gafatar. For instance, the public was angry and burned several Buddhist temples in Tanjung Balai after the MUI issued the Fatwa of The Indonesian Ulama Assembly (Mui) North Sumatera Province Decree Number: 001/KF/MUI-SU/I/2017 dated January 24, 2017, regarding blasphemy of Islam by Meiliana Saudari in the City of Tanjungbalai and recommended law enforcement to punish Meiliana. Mediation that has been initiated by local police has been discontinued without any agreement.

Moreover, the 1945 Indonesian Constitution guarantees the right of everyone to legal protection and a sense of security. Main Hakim Sendiri is a criminal act that is prohibited and can be punished by punishment under Articles 315 and 170 of the Criminal Code. However, in the case of the Ahmadiyya, the police did nothing when people damaged their houses of worship. In the case of Gafatar, the riots that were carried out for two consecutive days showed that the police were negligent in preventing the burning of the houses of Gafatar followers. In the case of Meiliana, it is the same.

Furthermore, why can religious leaders be categorized as vigilante actors? In the case of Meiliana, when she complained that the call to prayer was too loud, she told one of the religious leaders at the mosque who should be able to provide a solution to her complaint. However, complaints that previously could be categorized as private, spread so quickly among ordinary people with different narratives and sparked anger, “That Chinese forbids the call of prayer.”

By understanding why, along with the strengthening of law enforcement against blasphemy, the phenomenon of vigilantism has increased, this chapter aims to identify actors and factors driving the rise of vigilantism against those accused of blasphemy. This chapter will structure as follows: in the first section describes the Actors of Main Hakim Sendiri During Blasphemy Allegations of Meiliana, Gafatar and Ahmadiyya. The second section examines Main Hakim Sendiri Sparked by Islamic Populism in Indonesia. In the third section analyse Various Factors Influence the Occurrence of Main Hakim Sendiri. The last section discusses the extent to which Main Hakim Sendiri Threaten the Principle of Presumption of Innocence and Religious Freedoms.

### Non-state actors

Non-state actors are community leaders or religious leaders who support vigilante justice because they fail to prevent their followers from doing self-judgment or even participate in provoking the causes of their followers. After the MUI issued its “deviant fatwa,” hard-line Islamic groups pushed take the actions of *Main Hakim Sendiri* to attack the *Ahmadiyya* and *Gafatar* groups, force them out of the country, and take their property. As shown in Table 5, FPI has carried out various acts of violence to attack religious groups accused of deviating, such as Ahmadiyya, Gafatar, or someone who insults Islam, such as Ahok or Meiliana. In fact, the practice of violence by the FPI has not received solid response by law enforcers (the police), even though the principal of action of *Main Hakim Sendiri* is regular criminal act where the police do not need to wait for reports from victims or the public to punish the culprits. But this did not happen. The police tend to accept acts of violence perpetrated by the FPI.

## 5.2 Political Dynamic surrounding Blasphemy Cases

**5.2.1 Ahok’s case**

Referring to Marshall's view, that “religion can be politically manipulated only if it is both present and significant enough to be manipulated”, this section analyses the extent to which the Ahok and Meiliana cases meet significant reasons to be categorized as the political manipulation of religion. So, the first thing that needs to be seen is how these two cases are related to inter-religious conflicts and related to politics, both of which are manipulated.

First, in the Ahok case, inter-religious conflicts arose at the same time as the election for the Regional Head of DKI Jakarta. Both politics and religion have significant enough influence to be manipulated. Ahok, who initially had high electability before the blasphemy case, turned around significantly, where Ahok's electability declined sharply when the blasphemy case continued to be rolled out. In fact, hard-liner Islamic groups have continually urged the court to sentence Ahok.

During the case, it was continuously marked by public pressure to punish Ahok, who was commanded by the 212 Movement led by RHA. Likewise, the Meiliana case which occurred at the same time as the DKI Jakarta Pilkada (election) due to the 2017 Simultaneous Election. In summary, the chronology of the Ahok and Meiliana cases can be described in the table 1 below:[[95]](#footnote-95)

Table 1. The chronology of the case of Ahok

| Time | Chronology of the case | Socio-Political Dynamics |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Sept 27th, 2016 | Ahok made a working visit, made a speech in front of the people of the Kepulauan Seribu, conveyed the grouper breeding work program, alluded to the DKI Local Election of 2017. | Ahok's position as the Acting Governor of DKI Jakarta, which has been recorded since September 21, 2016, is registered as a Candidate for Governor of DKI Jakarta against his rivals Anis Baswedan and Yudhoyono in the 2017-2022 Pilkada. Ahok is paired with Drs. H. DJAROT SYAIFUL HIDAYAT, MSi as a candidate for Deputy Governor of DKI Jakarta. |
| Sept 28th, 2016 | The DKI City Government uploaded a video of Ahok while speaking in the Kepulauan Seribu with a duration of 1 hour 40 minutes. |  |
| Oct 6th, 2016 |  | Budi Yani uploaded video footage of Ahok to various social media, with the addition of the provocative narrative “Blaming Religion”. The video went viral. |
| Oct 6th, 2016 – Nov 2016. | After watching Budi Yani's video (not the original video), Ahok was reported by various Islamic organizations to the Criminal Investigation Department with a total of 14 reports, on charges of blasphemy. |  |
| October 9th, 2016 |  | The DKI Jakarta Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) issued a letter of reprimand to the defendant which reads: Do not take any actions and statements or comments that can disturb the lives of the people of DKI Jakarta in general, and Muslims in particular. |
| October 10th, 2016 | Ahok knows that there is an incomplete narration and provocation from Budiyani's video, but Ahok still apologizes to the public |  |
| October 11th, 2016 | The National Police conducts Preliminary Examination of the reporting witnesses. | The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) issued the Religious Opinion and Attitude of the Indonesian Ulema Council number: Kep-981-a/MUI/X/2016 which essentially justifies Ahok's statement as a blasphemy of Islam and recommends to the Government and law enforcement institutions to take firm action against Ahok. |
| October 15th 2016 | Police carry out the case. |  |
| October 16, 2016 | Police issued a warrant for Ahok's investigation to be named a suspect. |  |
| November 4th, 2016 |  | The demonstration of Defending the Qur'an was attended by 200,000 people at the Hotel Indonesia roundabout area, attended by various political figures, Chairman of the MPR Amin Rais, Deputy Speaker of the DPR Fahri Hamzah, Fadli Zon, Ahmad Dhani, religious leader Rizieg Shihab (chairman of FPI) demanded that Ahok punished. The demonstration ended in chaos, 2 residents and 79 police officers were injured.[[96]](#footnote-96) |
| December 2nd, 2016 | Ahok is not arrested | The community, led by the Islamist Hardliners groups, held an Action to Defend Islam at Monas, to guard the Ahok case. The big Islamic organizations NU and Muhammadiyah did not encourage their citizens to join the demonstration. |
| December 13th, 2016 | Ahok was tried for the first time at the North Jakarta District Court |  |
| December 20th, 2016 | Ahok's second trial was held. | The public demonstrated in front of the court demanding that Ahok be imprisoned.[[97]](#footnote-97) |
| April 20th, 2017 | The prosecutor read out the charges with a sentence of 1 year in prison with 2 years -probation for Ahok. |  |
| April 25th, 2017 | Ahok reads the Memorandum of Defense “Still Fighting Even though they are slandered” |  |
| May 8th, 2017 |  | The Anti-Ahok action by several hard-liner Islamic organizations who are members of the United Islamic Ummah Movement continues to demand the punishment of Ahok. The speech was carried out in front of the court and threatened if Ahok was released they would carry out a revolution.[[98]](#footnote-98) |
| February 17th, 2017. |  | The Dhikr and Tausiah action at the Istiqlal Mosque were attended by various political figures such as the General Chair of PAN Amin Rais, Former Minister of Education M. Nuh, Governor candidate Agus Harimurti, Governor candidate Anis Baswedan, Deputy Governor Candidate Sandiaga Uno (Ahok's rival) and was also attended by former MPR chairman Hidayat Nurwahid, former Minister of the Economy Hatta Radjasa, and FPI leader Rizieq Shihab. |
| May 9th, 2017 | Ahok was found guilty of blasphemy and sentenced to 2 years-probation. |  |

The table 1 describes how the religious and political dimensions are strongly figure out in the Ahok case. Religious issues can be seen that Ahok's case is like a conflict between Islam and Christianity, where Ahok as a Christian is accused of insulting Islam, when criticizing the opportunist leader candidates who often take refuge behind QS Al Maidah verse 51 so that Muslims do not choose non-Muslim leaders. The hate-spin begins since Ahok's speech was uploaded; Budi Yani (the follower of Hardliner Islam) has quoted Ahok's speech with a provocative narrative that Ahok has tarnished Islam. Budi Yani, a week after the video of Ahok's speech was uploaded, uploaded a 30-second snippet plus a provocative comment and posted it on his Facebook page on Friday, October 6, 2016. The transcript of the video says: “Blame of Religion?” …Father and Mother (Muslim voters) …being lied to by Al Maidah…and will go to hell (you too) are deceived … “It seems there will be something wrong with this video” By using the internet and social media, the video footage with the provocative narration went viral and succeeded in making public anger. Political brokers who have close ties to religious (Islamic) leaders and politicians use the issue that Ahok has tarnished Islam to mobilize the public with ostensibly true incitement to hatred, namely in the form of demonstrations of the anti-Ahok movement.

Political brokers, hardline Islamic groups, are indeed taking advantage of the moment with a hate spin strategy, as if Islam is being targeted by Ahok. A strategy that was sophisticated and successful enough that the Indonesian Ulema Council immediately issued a fatwa declaring Ahok blasphemy against Islam and asking law enforcement to punish Ahok. This can be seen in the real support of various politicians and their supporting oligarchs who were present at the Anti Ahok demonstrations, under the pretext of protecting Islam or Al-Qur’an. Of course, not all Islamic organizations and their followers support the movement. At least the largest Islamic organizations, namely NU and Muhammadiyah, do not recommend their members to attend the demonstrations that are held.

**5.2.1 Meiliana’s case**

The table 2 shows that political conditions that are quite boiling in Jakarta, have flowed unstoppably around the Meiliana case which emerged at almost the same time as the Ahok case. At least the table 2 also explains how the Meiliana case has a religious as well as political dimension, so it was played for the sake of the regional elections in Medan. Meiliana, who only protested to the loud sound of the call to prayer, was twisted as if Meiliana, a Chinese Buddhist, forbade the call to prayer in the mosque. This spin of hatred very quickly inflames public anger even within hours. The apology from Meiliana’s husband and the mediation that was held failed to resolve the conflict. The MUI, which initially refused to issue a blasphemy fatwa by Meiliana, finally succumbed to the wishes of political brokers because they felt that Islam had been polluted.

Table 2. Meiliana case: list of events related to Meiliana case and its surrounding socio-political dynamics

| Time | Chronology of the case | Socio-Political Context |
| --- | --- | --- |
| July 29th, 2016 | Meiliana protested to Nazir Masjid [Kasidi] about the very loud sound of Adzana from Al Maksun Mosque. “Sis, please tell the uak, lower the mosque's voice, Sis, my ears hurt, it's noisy. Sis in the past the sound of our mosque was not that big, right, now it's a bit bigger.” | Meiliana is an ordinary housewife, Buddhist and of Chinese descent. |
| 29 Juli 2016 sekira pukul 10.00 Wib | The Witness Kasidik met with the Head of BKM, SJAJUTI on Jalan Bahagia, Tanjungbalai Selatan Subdistrict, Tanjungbalai City, and said “Pak SAYUTI, the Chinese are in front of our house, how can we ask for the volume of our mosque to be reduced”. Then Witness SJAJUTI replied “yes never mind I will come to the mosque later we will talk at the mosque” |  |
| pukul 16.00 Wib selesai | After the Azhar prayer, Witness Kasidik met with Witness SAHRIR TANJUNG and said “Er, the Chinese in front asked to reduce the volume of this mosque, his ears were noisy, what's the solution” then Witness SAHRIR TANJUNG replied “yes, we'll let you know later, Mr. Lobe and Mr. Dai Lami” |  |
| Pukul 19.00 wib | After Maghrib Prayer, Witness Kasidik met with Mr. ZUL SAMBAS, Witness HARIS TUA MARPAUNG aka PAK LOBE and Witness DAILAMI then Witness Kasidik said “how is this China in front asking for the volume of the mosque to be turned down” then Mr. ZUL SAMBAS, Witness HARIS TUA MARPAUNG Alias ​​PAK LOBE and Witness DAILAMI answered “let's go to his house”, |  |
|  | Isya prayer, the husband of the Defendant, Witness LIAN TUI, came to the mosque to apologize but at that time the people around were telling stories to each other so that the community became crowded. |  |
| 21.00 Wib | Witness SJAJUTI Alias ​​SAYUTI together with the Head of the Environment came to the Defendant's house and took the Defendant to the Kelurahan Office. | At around 23.00 WIB, the people were crowded and shouted “burn... burn” then shouted “Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar” and because of the Defendant's actions, Witness ALRIFAI ZUHERISA Alias ​​ALDO and Witness BUDI ARIYANTO along with other masses damaged the Defendant's house and the monastery / Pekong in Tanjungbalai City. |
| 2 Desember 2016 |  | Witness HARIS TUA MARPAUNG, Witness Drs. DAILAMI, M.Pd. and Witness Rifai made a Statement Letter dated December 2, 2016, regarding asking the Police to conduct an investigation against Ms. MELIANA who we considered to have committed harassment, blasphemy and expressed hatred towards Islamic Religious Worship activities at Masjid Al-Maksum Jalan Karya Tanjungbalai and signed at on the stamp of six thousand. |
| 14 Desember 2016, |  | The United Independent Student and Community Alliance (AMMIB) submitted a letter to the Chair of the MUI Tanjungbalai City with Letter Number: Ist/038/B/AMMIB-TB/XII/2016 dated December 14, 2016, regarding Requesting Audiences and MUI Fatwas Regarding Allegations of Religious Blasphemy. By An Ethnic Chinese Named MELIANA. |
| 19 Desember 2016 |  | Tanjung Balai City MUI has held a meeting of the DP Fatwa Commission. MUI Tanjungbalai City and decided to request a fatwa from the DP. MUI North Smatera Province for the blasphemy by issuing Letter Number: A.056/DP-2/MUI/XII/2016 |
| 14 Desember 2016 |  | United Independent Student and Community Alliance (AMMIB) Number: Ist/038/B/AMMIB-TB/XII/2016 dated 14 December 2016, Request an Audience and MUI Fatwa related to blasphemy committed by an ethnic Chinese named MELIANA |
|  | Paused |  |
| January 24th, 2017 |  | The Tanjung Balai MUI Commission refused to issue Meiliana's Fatwa. However, the hard-liner Islamic groups FUI, HTI, Al-Washilah, AMMIB continue to press the FATWA of the INDONESIAN ULAMA ASSEMBLY (MUI) in NORTH SUMATERA Province Decree Number: 001/KF/MUI-SU/I/2017 dated January 24, 2017, regarding blasphemy of the Islamic religion BY SUDARI MELIANA IN TANJUNGBALAI CITY and recommends law enforcement to carry out legal proceedings. |
| August 13th, 2018 | Public Prosecutor started to prosecute Meiliana under the letter No. Reg. Case: PDM-05/TBALAI/05/2018 dated August 13, 2018. | The Meiliana case coincided with the Anti Ahok action in the Jakarta Local Election. Various anti-blasphemy movements are ongoing and have influenced the legal process in the Meiliana case. |
| August 21st, 2018 | Verdict 1612/Pid.B/2018/PN Mdn, Meiliana is guilty of “committing a criminal act intentionally in public to express feelings or commit an act which is essentially hostile, abuse or blasphemy against a religion professed in Indonesia […] with a sentence of imprisonment for 1 (ONE) YEAR 6 (SIX) MONTHS reduced while the Defendant is in temporary detention.[[99]](#footnote-99) |  |
| 27 Agustus 2018. | The Defendant's Legal Counsel has submitted a request for an appeal as stated in the Deed of Appeal made by the Registrar of the Medan District Court Number 200/Akta.Pid/2018/PN Mdn |  |
| Kamis, tanggal 25 Oktober 2018 | The High Court upheld the decision of the Court of first instance. Considerations of the Court of First Instance are taken over and considered by the Court of Appeal.[[100]](#footnote-100) | Various agencies sent Amicus Currie for the court to consider not convicting Meiliana:  Letter from the Indonesian Judicial Monitoring Society (MaPPI) Faculty of Law, University of Indonesia (FHUI) Number 258/UN2.F5/MaPPI/BI/IX/2018 dated September 10, 2018, regarding the submission of the Amicus Curiae.  Letter from the Institute for Criminal Justice Reform regarding Non-Criminal Complaints, published in September 2018.  Letter from the Indonesian Women's Coalition (KPI) Number 160/RKP/KPI\_SETNAS/IX/2018 dated 29 September 2018 regarding the delivery of Amicus Curiae.  Letter from the Coalition of Civil Society Concerns for Tolerance, Promotion of Human Rights and Equitable Development, dated 26 September 2018, regarding Amicus Curiae's Cover Letter.  Letter from the Islamic Community Alliance (AUI) of Tanjung Balai City, Number: Istimewa/013/B/AUI-TB/IX/2018 dated 17 September 2018 regarding Introduction.  Letter from the Commission for Disappeared Persons and Victims of Violence (KontraS) Number: 421/SK-KontraS/X/2018 dated October 12, 2018, regarding File Amicus Curiae; |
| March 27, 2019 | Meiliana's Cassation Application was rejected by the Supreme Court. Decision No. 322/K/PID/2019 |  |

Source: Cited from various sources by the Author

In general, cases of blasphemy involving religious leaders or figures end with the perpetrator apologizing to the public.[[101]](#footnote-101) But Ahok and as well as Meiliana are different cases. Ahok's apology, which was made on October 10, 2016, did not get acceptance in the public's heart, this was marked by the ongoing reports of accusations of blasphemy or blasphemy against Ahok. While Meiliana, her husband, Lian Tui was asking for apologize to Islamic societies in the Mosque, but angered mass continues to damage of Meiliana's house and several Buddhist temples.

It is difficult to say that the complainants had no political motivation to defeat Ahok in the DKI Jakarta local election.[[102]](#footnote-102) Even though Ahok had opposed this when stating his testimony in court. Many people think that the Ahok case is political. For example, the day after Ahok was named a suspect, the DPRI proposed the right of inquiry to revoke Ahok's nomination as a candidate for governor in the 2017 election.[[103]](#footnote-103) Every effort was made by political brokers so that Ahok was found guilty by the court. While Ahok had opposed it when he gave his testimony in court and said that he had no intention of insulting or tarnishing Islam. But the Ahok case was spined in such a way with various hatred to convince the public that Islam had become a victim of blasphemy. Incitement to hatred was then carried out by political brokers, gaining support from politicians and clerics, mobilizing the masses to conduct anti-Ahok demonstrations so that Ahok was punished. Apart from the fact that Anis Baswedan was a good Candidate for Governor, Ahok's punishment would bear sweet fruit for Anis Baswedan's victory. Blasphemy as a tool to get rid of Ahok can be said to be very successful.

Marshall argues that in the process of political manipulation of religion, it is usually due to the support and large role of religious leaders where this role gets quite significant support from groups, most of whom do not fully understand the essence of religion. In addition to what Marshall said, this study also finds additional indicators. The Author argue that it is not enough just to see how religious leaders support in manipulating religious issues for political purposes, but it is important to evaluate to what extent the courts are powerless to maintain their independency and impartiality when facing political or public pressures and how this situation force into court processes and decisions to become far from the principle of the rule of law and fair trial.

The process of law enforcement in the Ahok case starts from reporting until a court decision has permanent legal force. Ahok's case was reported by the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) South Sumatra, Habib Novel Chaidir Hasan, was reported to the Criminal Investigation Agency (Bareskrim) LP/1010/x/2016 on charges of violating Article 156a of the Criminal Code in conjunction with Article 28 paragraph (2) of Law Number 11 2008 concerning Electronic Transaction Information with the threat of five years in prison.[[104]](#footnote-104) Then followed by Muhammadiyah Youth who participated in reporting Ahok with the report number TBL/4846/X/2016/PMJ/Dit Reskrimum. 2016/PMJ/Directorate of Crime.[[105]](#footnote-105) Ahok was accused of blaspheming Islam because of his statement:

“[...] this [local] election is being pushed forward, so if I am not elected, I will stop it in October 2017 so if we run this program well, ladies and gentlemen, even though I am not elected as governor, this story will inspire you, so it doesn't matter. Don't worry, ah... later if you don't vote, Ahok's program will be disbanded, no... I'm until October 2017, so don't trust people, you can just in your heart you can't choose me, right? right, being lied to using Al-Maidah 51, various kinds of things are the rights of parents, so if you feel you can't be elected because I'm afraid to go to hell because of being fooled like that, it's okay papa, because this is your personal call, ladies and gentlemen, this program just goes on, So ladies and gentlemen, you don't have to feel bad, in your conscience you can't choose Ahok, you don't like Ahok, but if you accept the program, it's not good, so I owe you a debt of gratitude, don't you have a bad feeling, you'll die slowly from a stroke.”

Ahok's statement, which was a criticism of a political figure who abused Surah Al-Maidah verse 5 to defeat a non-Muslim leader candidate, was processed in such a way that it must be used as a tool to bring the case to court. So Ahok got a criminal sanction. So Ahok lost in the political contestation for the governor election. This can be seen from the first, as in the previous explanation, how religious (Islamic) leaders continue to persuade the public and declare Ahok as a perpetrator of blasphemy, who deserves to be punished. Second, how did the same attitude not occur when Ahok's criticism with a similar substance was written in a book published several years earlier, where there was no political context that prompted Ahok to question Ahok on the issue of blasphemy. This is where the spin of hatred finds its momentum.

### 5.3.2. Politization of Blasphemy Cases

The politicization of the Ahok case strengthened, when the law enforcement process continued to be intervened with various demonstrations urging the court to punish Ahok. The politicization of Ahok's blasphemy case reached its peak when a demonstration was held and was attended by various political and religious figures. Even the largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia, namely Muhammadiyah and NU, indicated that the 212 Demo has “political intention”.

“PB NU institutionally did not participate in this movement. This means that all NU members (nahdlyin) remain calm and do not participate in this movement. We have our way (own).”[[106]](#footnote-106)

Second, in the case of Meiliana, the conflict between religions depicted is between Buddhism as a representation of Meiliana and Islam. Meiliana's case emerged when Meiliana was accused of blasphemy against Islam after she complained about the loud sound of the Adhan coming out of the prayer room in front of her house. Meiliana complained that Toa's voice was so loud that he and his family were disturbed. The complaint was submitted to one of the managers of the mosque. However, this criticism was met with the opposite, where Meiliana was accused of blaspheming religion. The movement against Meiliana ensued. The movement to demand that Meiliana be punished continues to be mobilized by mass organizations even though the Meiliana case does not have enough evidence.

Law enforcement's scepticism was evident from the time the investigation process in the Meiliana case was stopped for two years because the police did not have enough evidence to make her a suspect. However, after the MUI intervened in the law enforcement process with the issuance of the FATWA OF THE INDONESIAN ULAMA ASSEMBLY (MUI) NORTH SUMATERA Province Decree Number: 001/KF/MUI-SU/I/2017 dated January 24, 2017, regarding blasphemy of ISLAM BY MELIANA SAUDARI IN THE CITY TANJUNGBALAI and recommended law enforcement to punish Meiliana. Then suddenly the Public Prosecutor No. Reg. Case: PDM-05/TBALAI/05/2018 dated August 13, 2018. Weak evidence in the Meiliana case, and the fact that Meiliana did not fulfil the element of intent to desecrate the religion [Islam] was in fact ruled out by the Court be it PN, PT, or the Supreme Court. The public was angry and burned several Buddhist temples in the area.

Political dimension appeared when the Meiliana case coincided with the local election agenda. Meiliana's protest because of the loudly volume of Adzan sound to the Mosque staff, which was originally only for internal staff, has gone viral and caught the public's attention. Peace efforts attempted by the National Commission for the Protection of Women did not bring good results. The act of vigilantism was regretted by the leader of the Muhammadiyah, Haidar Nazir, as a representative of moderate Islam. Nazir appealed to the public to have a mature attitude in dealing with inter-religious conflicts. Nazir gave an example that in the case of Meiliana, people who criticize about the sound of the call to prayer being too loud and disturbing should not be treated as a form of blasphemy against religion.

“However, we as religious people need to maintain tolerance in living in a pluralistic society. However, Nazir also deplored the unfair attitude of the people, when criticizing the sound of the call to prayer on the one hand but not criticizing the sound of loud music. But Nazir gave the view that when Meiliana's case had gone to court, then Muhammadiyah would respect whatever the court's decision was.”

The hate spin as stated by George (2016) has occurred in the Meiliana case. Meiliana, who initially only protested that the call to prayer was too loud and asked to be lowered directly in a private room to the mosque staff, has been twisted by elements who did not hear Meiliana's complaint directly with the statement that “There is a Chinese forbidding the call to prayer” thus sparking the anger of the people who in the end they attacked, damaged, and burned a number of Chinese houses of worship in Tanjung Balai. In addition to the hate-spin, the Court is also trapped in identity politics, where apart from the Court not having strong evidence about Meiliana's remarks that tarnished religion (Islam), the Court only relies on the evidentiary process from witnesses who did not hear and see what happened, as well as the MUI Fatwa which non-binding. Meiliana without sufficient evidence was sentenced to 1 year and 6 months in prison, while the vandals and looters of the monastery were only sentenced to between 1-4 months in prison. A fair justice system has also been ruled out by the Court.

From the view of the leadership of Muhammadiyah, it shows that the role of the court to enforce laws that contain justice, benefit, and legal certainty is the central point in deciding blasphemy cases. The professionalism and impartiality of the court in upholding the principle of the rule of law is the spearhead to assess whether the court is sterile from political influence outside the court or on the contrary, the court is involved in a political vortex that surrounds cases of blasphemy. At least A'yun (2020) and Tyson (2020) in their study both confirmed that there was political manipulation in the blasphemy case in the Ahok and Meiliana cases. This study corroborates their findings by adding new findings on how the court entered the vortex of power politics when enforcing the Anti-blasphemy Law in the Ahok and Meiliana cases.

Thus, if we refer to Marshall's view that both the Ahok case and the Meiliana case have a political dimension as well as a religious dimension. In addition, political manipulation of religion occurred where the court's decision significantly brought benefits to certain political forces where the imprisonment of Ahok and Meiliana in their respective cases significantly brought victory to Ahok and Meiliana's rivalry in the ongoing political contestation. However, to examine in depth the extent to which the court is involved in the vortex of political manipulation of religion, the next study will explain how Ahok and Meiliana were charged by the Court with a law that substantially contains legal defects. Second, how the court found them guilty of blasphemy without the support of sufficient evidence. Third, how the court bases its decision to punish the defendant by relying on the legal considerations of a non-legal institution [MUI] without compiling its own legal considerations.

### 5.3.5 Blasphemy Law Enforcement Prevent to Preserve Justice

#### 5.3.5.1 Continuing Public Disorder

The increasing actions of Muhammad Habib Riziq Shihab against religious minority groups show that the enforcement of the ABL law has failed to uphold justice. Members of religious minority groups, such as Gafatar or Ahmadiyya, who have been accused of religious defamation, have been tried and sentenced, but this has not satisfied the public, especially the religious vigilante groups. The court's verdict has failed to bring about justice, as the punishment given to those who committed acts of religious defamation has not effectively deterred the community from committing similar acts, and its impact is not widely known among the public.

Furthermore, in the instance of *Meiliana,* the court's concluded that Meiliana had insulted Islamic religion. Without backed by adequate evidence and witnesses, the court construed *Meiliana*'s criticism of the loudness of the mosque's loudspeaker, which was excessively loud, as blasphemy. Various defences, both in the form of Amicus Currie, a friend of the judiciary, and those put up by academics, NGOs in the field of human rights, and the National Commission for the Protection of Women, were not examined at all by the courts.[[107]](#footnote-107)

Apparently, before this case was processed by law enforcement, vigilante action also happened to Meiliana and her family. When the mediation process was ongoing, vigilante groups provoked the residents and continuously carried out the narrative that “Meiliana forbade the *Adhan*,” thereby causing their anger. In contrast, in a pledoi delivered by *Meiliana's* attorney, who said that *Meiliana* had never banned the call to prayer, she conveyed to the shop owner in a low tone on July 22, 2016, that: *“Sis, the voice of our mosque was not that big, now it's a bit bigger, right?”*[[108]](#footnote-108) The twists of hatred against *Meiliana* managed to quickly spark public anger for violent vigilantism. Not much different from followers of religions that are considered heretical, such as *Ahmadiyya* and *Gafatar*, followers of minority Buddhist religions like *Meiliana* are very vulnerable to becoming victims of hate crimes.

The Muslim community where *Meiliana* lives ended up taking vigilante action. They not only damaged *Meiliana*'s house but destroyed a Buddhist place of worship. The vigilante acts carried out by mobs have damaged the Tri Ratna Temple and the Dewi Samudera Temple on the banks of the Asahan River. At least three monasteries, eight temples, two Chinese foundations, a medical center, and *Meiliana's* house have been damaged. Due to this vigilante act, the police finally named eight suspects for acts of violence and Meiliana as a suspect for blasphemy (Islam). The eight suspects were then tried at the Tanjung Balai Court with the head of the Panel of Judges, Ullina Marbun, and in the end they were sentenced to a very light sentence, namely 1.5 months in prison, deducted from the prison term.[[109]](#footnote-109) Meanwhile, Meiliana herself was sentenced to 18 months in prison.

The facts above show that in Ahmadiyya, Gafatar and Meiliana cases, their followers continue to be persecuted and banned from exercising their freedom to worship or organize because of the government's failure to present a fair public policy. Instead of protecting their right to choose, exercise their right to religion, and worship, the government continues to issue regulations that seal their places of worship, prohibit their religious activities, freeze their organizations, and threaten the leaders of these groups with prison sentences. The state covertly supports MHS due to its inability to dissuade and prevent vigilante justice.

The act of vigilantism is a criminal act that is prohibited by the Indonesia Criminal Code, especially in Article 170 as follow:

“(1) Whoever commits violence against persons or property together in public, shall be sentenced to a maximum imprisonment of five years and six months. (2) Guilty punished: 1e. by a maximum imprisonment of seven years, if he intentionally damages property or if the violence, he commits causes any injury; 2e. with imprisonment for nine years if the violence causes serious bodily harm; 3e. by a maximum imprisonment of twelve years if the violence causes the death of a person.” [Translated by the Author]

In addition to the provisions of Article 170 of the Criminal Code, Article 351 of the Criminal Code concerning the prohibition of committing persecution, and Article 406 concerning the prohibition of vandalism, are provisions that are often used by law enforcers in preventing and prosecuting perpetrators of vigilante justice. Article 170 of the Criminal Code expressly threatens a heavy penalty, namely between 5 and 12 years in prison, for acts of vigilante justice, namely violence carried out jointly in public, regardless of whether it causes property damage, minor injuries, serious injuries, or death. This criminal act of violence that is carried out vigilantly is a general crime, where the police as law enforcers can arrest or detain perpetrators to be held criminally responsible. This means that the police do not need to wait for the victim to report the violence. The police, as protectors of the community, also have a legal obligation to stop these acts of violence as soon as possible. However, the attitude of the police in various vigilante justice against *Ahmadiyya* or *Gafatar* followers has been passive or one of omission. The vigilante justice experienced by *Ahmadiyya* followers has continued since 2010 up to 2021, despite the criminal penalties imposed by their leaders. For example, as mentioned in table 5.1. of the first section, from various netizen videos circulating, the police tend to allow the demolition of houses of worship and buildings, causing Ahmadiyya as targets to be injured and die.[[110]](#footnote-110) The West Kalimantan Police Chief, Inspector General Remigius Sigid Tri Hardjanto, explained that:

“The soft approach in securing buildings and houses of worship aims to avoid greater losses, namely the occurrence of conflicts between the emotional masses who want to tear down the buildings and the officers who secure them. This of course has the potential to cause injuries, even fatalities,”[[111]](#footnote-111)

In the case of vigilante justice against Gafatar, there were 21 defendants in the destruction of the Miftahul Huda Mosque in Bale Harapan Village, Sintang Regency, West Kalimantan. In the verdict read on January 6, 2022, they were only sentenced to 4 months and 15 days by the Pontianak District Court Judge.

The Islamic Defenders Front, or FPI, is the hard-line Islamic community organization most frequently involved in the actions of MHS. At least in this study, FPI was recorded as being involved in the attack on *Ahmadiyah* residents, *Gafatar,* destroying *Meiliana*'s house, and mobilizing large numbers of people in the *Ahok* case (see the table below). Unfortunately, the various actions of MHS taken by FPI did not receive firm action from the government. FPI violence is allowed by the state, so that violence occurs repeatedly with the same motive. This act of omission is a form of state support for vigilante groups.

Table 8. FPI takes MHS's action against a group accused of religious defamation

| No | Date | The Forms of *MHS* |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | February 10, 2011 | FPI's attack on the Ahmadiyya Congregation in Cikeusik, Banten |
| 2 | January 28, 2011 | FPI raided the Ahmadiyya An-Nushrat Mosque in Makassar, South Sulawesi, to attack and destroy the mosque's nameplate and furniture. |
| 3 | January 29, 2011 | FPI held a demonstration to force the Ahmadiyah congregation to leave Makassar |
| 4 | March 4, 2011 | The FPI mob caused trouble and set fire to the Ahmadiyya headquarters in Lubuk Pinang District, Muko-Muko Regency, Bengkulu. |
| 5 | March 4, 2011 | FPI mobs burn down a food stall belonging to members of the Ahmadiyya Congregation in Polewali City, Polewali Mandar Regency, West Sulawesi. |
| 6 | March 11, 2011 | Dozens of mobs from the FPI occupy the Al Ghofur Mosque belonging to the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Muslim Community (JAI) in Cianjur. |
| 7 | March 13, 2011 | The Ahmadiyya Mosque in Cisaar Village, Cipeuyeum Village, Haurwangi District, Cianjur Regency, was attacked by hundreds of FPI mobs. As a result, several parts of the building were damaged. The mob also burned Ahmadiyah books and books. A house belonging to an Ahmadiyah figure in Tolenjeng Village, Sukagalih Village, Sukaratu District, Tasikmalaya Regency, was damaged. |
| 8 | May 2, 2011 | FPI Jakarta demands the termination of the film Pocong Mandi Goyang Hip, starring Hollywood porn actress, Sasha Grey. |
| 9 | July 26, 2011 | FPI mobs vandalize a transgender meeting place in Purwokerto, Central Java. |
| 10 | August 8, 2011 | FPI members ransacked the Coto Makassar shop on Jl. AP Pettarani, Makassar for remaining open during the day during the fasting month. August 8 FPI mob destroys Rudi and Hajjah Adriani's food stall. |
| 11 | August 12, 2011 | FPI mobs destroy a food stall owned by Topaz Makassar Restaurant.[3] |
| 12 | August 13, 2011 | FPI mobs create trouble and burn the Ahmadiyya headquarters in Makassar. |
| 13 | August 14, 2011 | FPI mob destroys a mother's food stall in Ciamis.[3] |
| 14 | August 20, 2011 | FPI mobs sweep a food stall selling their wares during the day in the Puncak Bogor area, West Java. The action |
| 15 | January 22, 2015 | FPI demonstrates pressure on court when Ahok is in the Appeal court of East Jakarta. |
| 16 | March 24, 2015 | Reject Ahok, Jakarta Community Movement and FPI Front Siege DKI DPRD Office. |
| 17 | April 8, 2015 | FPI runs public pressure that GAFATAR Members Should Be Sentenced to Death. |
| 18 | June 12, 2015 | Residents to raid Ahmadiyya Congregation in Tebet. |

Source: collected by the author from various sources.

The constitutional guarantee of every citizen's right, as well as the government's primary obligation to respect, protect, and fulfil every citizen's religious freedom right, cannot be properly implemented. The 1945 Constitution guarantees protection for every citizen to choose and embrace their respective religion and/or beliefs (see Article 29 in conjunction with Article 28E). The two articles in the 1945 Constitution do not focus on certain religions or beliefs. Thus, if all religions or beliefs, including Ahmadiyya, are practiced in Indonesia, does the state have a constitutional obligation to protect every citizen's right to freedom of religion and belief?

However, Ahmadiyya followers cannot feel secure because they could become targets of violence at any time by the Vigilante group. This incident will continue to repeat itself if vigilante justices continue to get support from the government. It can be proven that after this study was completed, violence against the Ahmadiyya target group continued to occur. The violence against Ahmadiyya described above is a form of violation of human rights, especially the right to freedom of religion, the right to protection of privacy and a sense of security, the right to property protection, and the right to a place to live. Even the National Human Rights Commission has looked into it and said that the main evidence shows that forcing people to leave their homes and move is a crime against humanity that goes against Article 7 (1) letter d of the Rome Statute.

## 5.4 Conclusion

In contrast to vigilantism in ordinary crimes, where public outrage generally aims to punish perpetrators of crimes who are caught red-handed or for crimes that continue to occur in society where law enforcement fails to punish the perpetrators, vigilantism in cases of blasphemy is not solely driven by the existence of crime in society but by the monopoly of religious truth by established religions, thus viewing different religious teachings as crimes. Godly nationalism has been defined narrowly, where the state only protects established religions “adhered to in Indonesia” and can punish religions or religious teachings that contradict the main teachings of established religions. This narrow meaning of “Godly Nationalism” is contradictive with the right to freedom of religion and belief guaranteed in the Indonesian Constitution. Articles 29 and 28E expressly respect the right of everyone to choose and embrace their own religion or belief and worship according to that religion or belief.

Islamic populism is rising along with the failure of democracy in Indonesia. The democracy index is decreasing, nationalist parties are involved in corruption, and people's welfare is low (the poverty rate is increasing). The Islamic Party cooperates with hardline Islamist groups in the opposition. Strengthening the Blasphemy Law as a result of Growing Islamic Populism Moderate Islamic Organizations Infiltrated by Radical Islam Support the Strengthening of Anti-Religious Laws This is indicated by moderate Islamic groups supporting the criminalization of religious minorities and appearing in court to support the government in defending the Blasphemy Law. Moderate Islamic groups have been reporting witnesses in various blasphemy cases, giving expert testimony on blasphemy cases, and participating in supporting the 212 movement.

Unlike the Ahok case, which has a political undertone, the Ahmadiyya case is distinct from other blasphemy cases in Indonesia. The Ahmadiyya can be classified as a splinter Islamic group. In the case of Ahok, Ahok is a member of the Christian religion, which is one of the religions that has received recognition as an official religion in Indonesia. However, Ahmadiyya is categorized as heresy because it is not recognized as an official religion. This is based on the provisions of Article 1 of the Anti-Defamation Law, which states that Ahmadiyya are not included as a religion professed in Indonesia or traditional religions that are allowed to exist. The accusation of Ahmadiyya being a heretical religion was also used as a reason to dissolve Gafatar.

The growth of the *Main Hakim Sendiri* itself cannot be separated from state actors such as the Ministry of Religion, the Police, and the Governor, Regent, and City Representatives who continue to produce public policies that reinforce the heretical fatwas issued by the MUI. These various public policies have become a legitimacy tool for the public to take justice into their own hands when public trust in the police has decreased. Meanwhile, the police, as an institution tasked with maintaining public order and protecting the public, failed to anticipate and prevent vigilante justice so that the same incidents would continue to occur. Religious leaders continue to sharpen religious polarization by placing their religion as an exclusive religion so that it easily becomes the driving force behind the birth of heretical fatwas by semi-state institutions such as the MUI.

The existence of vigilante actors against minority religious groups that are accused of being a deviant religion or insulting religion continues to get fresh air when the various motivating factors are getting stronger. Godly nationalism, which forbids the presence of teachings or beliefs outside of an established religion, has placed the state in the position of regulator and controller of religion. Various public policies continue to be issued by the state to interfere in the religious affairs of citizens and determine the right religions and wrong religions. In such a position, the existence of the anti-defamation law continues to receive requests to be maintained. In the end, the majority religion became a popular religion, which determined the social life of the community

# CHAPTER VI

# EXAMINATION OF STATE AND RELIGION RELATIONSHIP IN INDONESIA FOLLOWING

# THE ENFORCEMENT OF ABL

## 6.1 Introduction

Discussions on the enforcement of the anti-blasphemy act cannot be separated from a country's decision in establishing religious ties, or what is referred to in various literatures as the relationship between church and state. Although there are no such rules in International Law that compel nations to adopt a given pattern of relationships, the current trend seen by the international community in accordance with International Human Rights Law is a pattern of interactions in which the state is religiously neutral. In order to guarantee the protection of the right to religious freedom, a state must recognize and accommodate the needs of all religions. The actual structure of state-religious relations established by a state indicates the extent to which freedom of religion is guaranteed. According to Fox (2006), the structure of state-religion relationships throughout Europe, North America, Asia, and Africa is not uniform but rather diverse. There are nations in which the relationship between the state and religion is explicitly severed, such as the United States. There were other states with an established religion, such as Denmark and the Unified Kingdom, which were united with religion. The approach in France and Germany, meantime, removes religion from the sphere of the state and prohibits religious minorities via the Proselytism Law. In Austria and Belgium, only a few religions were recognized as official, while others were not.

Nonetheless, as a result of the establishment of democracy and the rule of law, the pattern of interactions that formerly positioned the state as the guardian of a particular religion has altered to one in which the state tends to be religiously neutral. Democracy and the rule of law need the protection of everyone's right to freedom of religion, with the state required to respect all religions equally (Nieuwenhuis 2012). An-Na'im (2008), a Muslim scholar and specialist on human rights who analyses state and religious relations in Muslim countries such as Turkey, India, and Indonesia, supported Niuwenhuis's proposal. An-Na'im thoughts that Muslim countries should reconsider the close link between state and religion (Islam) in order to better preserve the right to religious freedom.

This chapter investigates in further detail how the Anti-Blasphemy Law gives an overview of the pattern of relations between religion and state in Indonesia, despite the fact that the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, the 1945 Constitution, has never expressly articulated it. Secularity cannot be met by inserting a constitutional provision stating that Indonesia is not a religious state but a rule-of-law state. To what degree the present laws forbid the state from intervening in the religious affairs of its inhabitants, or on the other hand, permit the passage of laws that allow the state/government to ban, limit, and even penalize particular religious groups, requires additional investigation. In addition, it is quick to conclude that the precepts of Pancasila “Belief in One Supreme God” provide foundation for non-secular thought, since it is a universal principle or abstract value. This chapter demonstrates that the interpretation and execution of the Indonesian Anti-Blasphemy Law by lawmakers/public policy and law enforcements, as well as the evolution of this law over time, have given rise to a true relationship between the Indonesian state and religion. How the current design of state-religious relations during the implementation of the anti-blasphemy legislation might contribute to the optimization of the right to freedom of religion, or perhaps constitute an impediment, must be investigated further.

The application of the anti-blasphemy law in the cases of *Ahok, Gafatar, Meiliana, and Ahmadiyya* provides a more comprehensive explanation of why pseudo-secularity between State and Religions under the regime of Indonesia Anti's Blasphemy Law is strengthening and endangering the right to freedom of religion.

The scholarship on the connection between the state and religion in Indonesia focuses mostly on normative historical research. Ota Atsushi, Oka-moto Masaaki, and Ahmad Suaedy (2010), for instance, highlight how Islam has hegemonized its relationship with Indonesia via the implementation of sharia norms, the establishment of a compilation of Islamic law as family law for Muslims in Indonesia. Consequently, this chapter does not explore contemporary trends in the connection between religion and the state, particularly after the reformation era. This chapter also does not cover Pancasila's perspective on the connection between Islam and the state, nor does it examine the perspectives of Islamic groups on the subject. As a result of the application of the anti-blasphemy law, however, it is essential to utilize this chapter as a study guide while documenting the evolution of interactions between the state and religion.

Second, Abdul Karim (2005) in his article entitled Religion and State Relations in Post Reformation Era. Briefly from the title, the Author seems to discuss in depth the relationship between religion and the state during the reformation period. But this article only discusses the historical aspect of the relationship between religion and the state in Indonesia, and very little mentions about how its relation during the reformation era. Karim briefly stated:

“In the reform era, the ambiguity of the “gender identity” of our constitution is getting worse. This indication began when the demands for amendments to the 1945 Constitution were failed to be carried out by law and policy makers”.

The normative historical perspective may be able to describe how the founding fathers envisioned the connection between religion and the state, but the wording of the constitution and the interpretations of the constitutionalists may not accurately reflect the actual situation. This section aims to explain accurately why judges are unable to completely actualize the principles of the link between state and religion in the interpretation of statesmen's constitutionalism when determining situations involving religion. Through an examination of blasphemy case decisions, this chapter will examine the connection between the state and religion, focusing on improving and implementing the legislation against blasphemy and its consequences for religious freedom in Indonesia. Therefore, the discussion of the relationship between state and religion as represented in numerous court decisions on blasphemy trials is deemed crucial in order to offer a clearer picture of whether the argument that Indonesia a religious state is not, but a religious state, is accurate or not.

This chapter is divided into …sections. The first section provides the description of the relationship between state and religion relationship and its various types. The second sections examine the state neutrality towards religions support fully protections of religious freedom. The third section then discuss further about what type of relationships of the state and religion that actually has been practiced in Indonesia following the current blasphemy law enforcement. The connection between the State and Religion under the regime of the Blasphemy Law will be evaluated using a variety of indicators, namely to what extent the established orthodox religions enjoy main governmental protection, how the government has controlled religious life and established rules about deviant faiths, how the ABL’s enforcement targets religious minorities and violates their rights, how the Court refers to the recommendation of religious organization in dealing with blasphemy cases. Finally, the fifth section provides a short conclusion.

## 6.2 State and Religion Relationship and its types

Diagram, engineering drawing

Description automatically generatedIn various literatures, the relationship between the state and religion has many facets, one of which is commonly known as the separation between state and religion. The notion of the state and religion relationship is also known as the relationship between church and the state in certain publications (An-Naim 2008; C. Durham and Scharffs 2019; Salim, Arskal, and Azra 2003). Durham and Scharffs (2019) categorize the relationship between religion and the state into eleven types as follow: (1) theocratic states, (2) established religion states, (3) religious status system states, (4) endowed religion states, (5) states with a preferred set of religions, (6) cooperation between states and religion, (7) states accommodating religions, (8) separation between states and religions, (9) Laïcité (10) secular control regimes, and (11) abolitionist regimes.

Figure 7. Relationship between state and religion

### 6.3. Implication of Relationship towards Religious Freedom

Durham and Scharffs underline that the form of state-religion relations influences the degree of religious freedom in a country (p.123). The Authors argue that each type of the relationship gives a picture to the degree of the right to freedom of religion. As describe on the loop at Figure 7 bellow, some institutional types are less likely to encourage religious freedom than others, while some are completely incompatible with it (p. 121). The type of the relationship between religion and the state is defined using a loop, allowing for a more precise identification of its impact on the right to religious freedom.

People often believe that a high degree of religious freedom corresponds with a low degree of religion-state identity, or a low degree of religious freedom correlates with a high degree of religion-state identification (C. Durham and Scharffs 2019). Durham and Scharffs claim that separation between state and religion does not necessarily lead to a high degree of FoRB and vice versa, because the type of religion-state interactions is elastic. The loop at Figure 7 illustrates the types of state-religion connection, the attitudes of the state toward religion, and the level of religious freedom in each type. The state can transition from one classification to another, such example from a theocratic state (positive identification) to a state with an established religion. Depending on the political and social climate of the nation, the transition might lead to either a total separation or an abolitionist regime (negative identification). Some nations, like as Norway, Finland, and the United Kingdom have total identification or religious institutions while preserving a high level of religious freedom. On the other hand, other countries such as the Soviet era of Russia and Albania have non-identification or non-establishment of religion or they has been practised a secularism. However, they have little religious freedom (p.122). Therefore, secularism is not the sole condition that ensures a high level of religious freedom. Other elements, such as social and political considerations and the interpretability of religious law by communities, must also be studied. To determine the relationship between religion and the state in Indonesia, it is necessary to examine in detail the extent to which anti-blasphemy law enforcement in Indonesia enable to fully protect the freedom for every religion or belief.

Abdullah An-Na'im (2008), one of the foremost Muslim intellectuals and specialists in Law and Human Rights, says that it is crucial for the Muslim community to apply secularism in the twenty-first century. An-Na'im argues that the coercive implementation of Sharia Law by the state in a majority Muslim community such as Indonesia, which also includes other religious groups, is contrary to a Qur'anic injunction emphasizing that the acceptance of Islam is voluntary and a person's free choice to obey his orders. This position validates an-rejection Na'im's of the notion of building an Islamic state, as the Qur'an itself states that “religious compulsion is forbidden.” Therefore, the word “secularism” in An-Na’im point of view should be understood as “secularity” as refers to the idea of Durham and Scharffs. The Authors emphasizes that that secularity, as an adjective, focuses on the nature of the state's relationship with religion, which neutralizes the state's position on religion or accommodates the interests of religious adherents without favouring one religion or forbidding others. On the other hand, the state should avoid secularism because the word “secularism” is defined as the state does not care or even cares about religious activity in the public domain, or even outlaws it. This perspective will jeopardize the status of religion itself since it can lead to an extreme form of secularism in which the state does not want to know about or even restricts or punishes its citizens who believe in or express their faith.

Durham and Scharffs recalled that secularism and secularity are distinct because, both theoretically and practically, they differ in terms of meaning, character, and degrees of freedom, as shown in Table 10.

Table 10. Distinction Between Secularity and Secularism

| Distinction | Secularity | Secularism |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Definition | “Secularity is an approach to religion-state relations that avoids identification of the state with any particular religion or ideology (including secularism itself) and endeavors to provide a neutral framework capable of accommodating a broad range of religions and beliefs” | “Secularism is a positive ideology that the state may be committed to promoting, an ideology that may manifest itself as opposition to religiously-based or religiously motivated reasons by political actors, hostility to religion in public life and an insistence that religious manifestations, reasons, or even beliefs be relegated to an ever-shrinking sphere of private life, or even in progressive proselytizing atheism, or what has been called “secular fundamentalism”. |
| State position | Secularity will be inclined towards negative liberty. States are avoiding to interference freedom of other people. | Secularism will be inclined towards positive liberty. States are willing to use their power, resources, or freedom to fulfil one’s potential who are willing to use coercive means to help us achieve what is food for us. |
| Upholding certain values | Secularity upholds multiple, plural, and ultimately incommensurable. | Secularism allows criminalization towards certain religions. |

Source: Cited from Durham & Brett Scharffs (2019).

## In conclusion, if a state intends to protect the full freedom of religion for all individuals, the relationship between the state and religion must be situated within the first type of relationship. The state must ensure that it does not establish a particular religion as the official religion or show hostility towards existing religions. Secondly, the state should be able to accommodate the interests of all religions without elevating the interests of one religion as the favored religion of the state. Thirdly, the state should refrain from interfering with the religious affairs of its citizens, meaning that the state should not position itself as the arbiter of truth, determining which religion is right or wrong. Fourthly, the state must be open to pluralism and the presence of new religions, and must not attempt to punish them.

## 6.4. Discussion and Analysis

### 6.4.1 Indonesia Practicing Various Types of Relationship Under ABL Regime.

Drawing on Durham and Scharffs theory, this study argues that during Joko Widodo's administration, the Blasphemy Law has been maintained, reinforced and used as a basis for prosecuting followers of minority religions. This study illustrates the type of relationship between state and religion during the implementation of the Blasphemy Law in Table 11 below.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| No | Type | Arguments |
| 1 | The prefered set of religions |  |
| 2. | Abolosionist regime |  |
| 3. |  |  |
|  |  |  |

In normative perspective, according to Article 29 of the Indonesian Constitution explicitly states that Indonesia is not a religious state, but rather a state based on law. In this sense, according to the Durham and Schaarffs’s figure 7, Indonesia appears to be a secular state, meaning that the founding fathers was expecting to have a distinct connection between the state and religion. However, in practice, it is not really happening. During the Soeharto until Jowo Widodo’s administration, the government of Indonesia continue to endoresed certain religions. The state gives more attention to the six religions, particularly Islam to be more protected in Indonesia than to other religions or beliefs. In the case of state-determined religious holidays, for instance, only religious holidays of the six affiliated faiths are considered, whereas other religions outside of them are not provided.

Second, Indonesia also practises the type of abolosionist regime, meaning that the government is maintaning the law to criminalized certain type of religions. Although the Indonesia Constitution does not specify the names of faiths accepted in Indonesia, but through the enforcement of the ABL, the judicial has been criminalized the followers of various minorities.

### 6.4.2 Challenges to Fully Protect the Rights to FORB Under Indonesia's Blasphemy Law Regime

1. **The Government Interfere Religious Life of the People**

Culture is produced and evolved under the influence of different factors, such as values, beliefs, and actions that become the norm in social life. According to the definition of culture by McCormick, culture is “an institutionalized and systematic collection of ideas, values, attitudes, and activities.” Therefore, in certain nations, a community's beliefs or religion cannot be separated from governmental life. This differs with the perspective of secularism, which is founded on the notion that religion and the state must be kept apart. The separation of church and state enables the government to respect all religions equally, allowing for greater social order. However, it is also anticipated that secularism may lead to intercultural problems because various cultures revere different religions. Extreme secularism can potentially lead to the restriction of religion in society or even to the establishment of an antireligious state (Scharffs 2017).

### 6.4.3 The Government Sponsoring Favor Religion

From its conception to its current implementation, the Indonesia’s Anti-Blasphemy Law (IABL) continues to help established religions receive official backing. Assistance in this situation is not limited to financial support to existing religious groups, but also in giving legal protection to its members in creating religious organizations and worshiping according to their faith and beliefs. Ironically, this study indicates that the Anti Blasphemy Law not only offers the big faiths more legal standing, but it is also utilized to punish religious members.

President Soekarno signed the IABL in 1965. [[112]](#footnote-112) It was designed to decrease social friction between conservative people and non-religious belief groups and atheists who were in opposition to Pancasila and posed a threat to the protected religion, national security, and national disintegration (Sihombing 2008).[[113]](#footnote-113) The events of the communist revolution of 1965 became a terrible chapter in Indonesian history, and the people did not want a similar catastrophe to occur again (Arief 2012). Following this dreadful occurrence, the House of Representatives issued the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia No. XXV/MPRS/1966, which outlawed communism, Leninism, and Marxism. [[114]](#footnote-114) The 1965 revolution movement urged Soekarno to step down and provided Soeharto the mandate to succeed him. The administration legislation under President Soeharto during the so-called “New Order” period was altered at that time. [[115]](#footnote-115)

As stated previously, Soekarno signed the President Stipulation in 1965,[[116]](#footnote-116) because he wanted to protect the established religions and beliefs in order to prevent the people's religions or traditional religious systems throughout Indonesia whose teachings were deemed to be in conflict with the fundamental principles of recognized religions. The body of the Blasphemy Law has no mention of the six religions that are infamously “recognized” by the Indonesian government. These paragraphs can be found in the explication, or the notes that follow the major provisions of the legislation (Fenton 2016). In accordance with the explanation of Article 1 of the President Stipulation of 1956, Indonesia recognizes Islam, Protestant Christianity, Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. [[117]](#footnote-117) However, this does not imply that the government prohibits Baha'i, Shinto, Jewish, and other religions. After the Reformation Period, under the presidency of Gus Dur, these five recognized faiths become six with the addition of Confucianism.

Furthermore, the IABL demonstrates that governmental protection for established faiths is preferred over protection for alternative religions. As the foundation for the establishment of the blasphemy legislation, Pancasila seeks to recognize their role and contribution to society throughout the independence struggle. Religions play a major role in Indonesian culture and have become an integral aspect of the country's philosophy (Nalle 2017). As a majority-Muslim nation, it is indisputable that Indonesian Muslims and Islamic organizations played a key role in achieving independence and national unity. However, the quest to build an Islamic state has proven extremely difficult due to the necessity to satisfy the non-Muslim viewpoints of numerous Indonesian provinces. Most founding fathers of Muslim ancestry prioritized Indonesia's unity. Schwarz cited by Nalle explains that Islamic groups such as Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union) and Muhammadiyah (the followers of Muhammad) played a significant part in the Dutch colonial's suppression in 1929.[[118]](#footnote-118) Many Muslim leaders, like Mohammad Hatta, Sutan Sjahrir, and Mohammad Yamin, backed the National Indonesia Party created by Soekarno. They have successfully announced Indonesia's unity. Therefore, on 1 June 1945, Soekarno articulated Pancasila, which consists of the five principles, as a basic national standard. The five principles are: (1) the beliefs of God the Almighty; (2) fairness and civility among peoples; (3) the unity of Indonesia; and (5) socioeconomic justice for everyone (Sezgin and Künkler 2014). Taking into account the aspirations of the Muslim population to form an Islamic state, Soekarno established the first principle as the foundation for all other principles. In the final text of Pancasila, the Belief in God with the commitment to implement the Shari'ah for Muslims, also known as the Jakarta Charter, has been removed. The judgment strikes a compromise between safeguarding the established faith and recognizing the majority Muslim community.

During the new order period, the IABL was maintained by the Soeharto Administration because President Soeharto wanted national stability, avoided horizontal conflicts that would affect the running of the government. Under President Soeharto administration, this law has been extended by the other law by adding Article 156a on the Indonesia Criminal Code. This Article used many times to eliminate the communism and atheism under the state ideology of Pancasila as well as to limit the right of non-recognized religions. There were at least three problems facing by Indonesia which could threaten the unity of Indonesia. The first was the spread of mystical beliefs that against Indonesian ideology, Pancasila. In the first principle of Pancasila is “Belief in One God the Almighty”. This principle has been understood that Indonesians are expected to hold a religion or believe in God. In that way, many beliefs of Indonesia who do not believe in God were expected to learn and get knowledge from other religions so that they can live as what they supposed to do according to the first principle of Pancasila.

Following the age of reform, the blasphemy legislation stood at a crossroads. On the one hand, the state desires to improve the protection of human rights, while on the other, national stability and security continue to be of paramount importance. As the highest court of justice in Indonesia, the Constitutional Court has determined that the blasphemy legislation must be revised since it is not consistent with the law now in effect. In the meanwhile, socio-political situations in Indonesia continue to need this law. Unfortunately, since the government approved Law No. 11 of 2008 about Electronic Information and Transactions (hereafter the Law of EIT), the IABL has become more restrictive of the right to freedom of expression.

### 6.4.4 The Government Monopolizes Religious Truth

Many groups believe that the Anti-Defamation Law in Indonesia exclusively protects six major religions. According to the data presented in the table above, the majority of community members who encounter violence or criminalization are members of religious minorities. However, the general population is unaware that the Anti-Defamation Law also poses a threat to followers of the six major faiths practiced in Indonesia. Ahok identifies himself a Christian. Christianity is one of Indonesia's six predominant faiths. However, as a result of animosity, the Anti-Defamation Law has been utilized as a political instrument to punish Ahok. Meiliana is also a Buddhist, which is one of the six major faiths practiced in Indonesia. Meiliana is likewise a target of blasphemy law enforcement, like Ahok. In the evolution of the case, the Anti-Defamation Law is utilized as a form of retaliation by individuals who denounce religious leaders for “insulting” their faith. As stated in Clause 156a letter a, the purpose of the blasphemy article is to safeguard the religions practiced in Indonesia, including Islam. The explanation for this restriction does not appear in the ICCPR, nor does it account for other limits under Indonesian blasphemy legislation. This differs from the goal of restricting the freedom of association, which is to defend the rights of others. The court ruled that the blasphemy of Islam violated the rights of Muslims; hence, safeguarding Islam entailed protecting Muslim rights.

Although the ICCPR has become a positive law in Indonesia on par with the IBLs, many legal officials lack the rudimentary skills necessary to execute the law. The 1945 Indonesian Constitution and the Human Rights Law provide freedom of religion and belief as well as freedom of expression. However, the government, court, and police utilized IBLs against defamation and blasphemy more frequently in order to curtail those freedoms. [[119]](#footnote-119) In a number of instances, the Court has understood that sect membership constitutes defamation of the state's recognized faiths, which is contrary to the goals of General Comment No. 34 of the ICCPR and the Ra-bat Action Plan.

In the instance of Gafatar, [[120]](#footnote-120) three leaders of the religious sect were detained in Jakarta on May 26 for blasphemy because, according to the Authorities, Gafatar's teachings blend Islam, Christianity, and Judaism in a manner that is incompatible with recognized faiths doctrines. In March, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Attorney General's Office announce a combined decree banning Gafatar and any connected groups. Since the Minister of Religious Affairs never granted it legal status, the Gafatar has no legal standing as a civil body. Before the court ruled that the Gafatar is guilty of violating the blasphemy statute, the government had previously classified them as an unlawful organization. In this regard, it was unclear what legal basis the government would employ to restrict the religious freedom of Gafatar members.

In the same month, the East Jakarta District Court sentenced the three top leaders of the outlawed Gafatar religious cult to between three and five years in prison for blasphemy. [[121]](#footnote-121) Gafatar is not protected by the IABLs since the government defines a religion as having a prophet, sacred book, and divinity, as well as being globally acknowledged. The court determined that, unlike the six recognized faiths mentioned in the IBL, Gafatar did not meet these standards. The Court restricts the Gafatar's freedom of expression in order to preserve the six recognized faiths, rather than for the other purposes listed in the ICCPR. The Gafatar's ruling breaches the ICCPR's guarantees of freedom of religion and speech.

Ustad Abdul Somad, a religious leader with thousands of followers in Indonesia, faced this situation. Due to the uncertainty of the criteria in the Blasphemy Law, Ustad Somad was also charged of blasphemy as a follower of the predominant faith of the majority [Islam].

**6.4.5 The Government Continue to Criminalized Minorities Groups of Religions**

Hardline Islamic groups supported by the MUI still insist that the blasphemy law be retained. This view received a breath of fresh air when the Constitutional Court declared that the blasphemy law was not unconstitutional. This study reveals that there are at least historical, and juridical-philosophical reasons put forward by this group. The first historical reason is that in 1965, Muslims in history had been the target of violence which caused deep trauma, so that maintaining this law would at least be able to prevent similar events from happening again in the future. This reason was also put forward by the former Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court, Mahfud MD, when he tested the anti-blasphemy law. Secondly, juridically, and philosophically, the idea of abolishing the blasphemy law is considered contrary to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. The idea is seen as turning Indonesia into a secular state that separates religion and the state. Such a model is seen as contrary to the first principle of “Belief in One God”. Hardline Islamists understand that the principle of Belief in One God allows the state to prohibit irreligious propaganda and teachings that are considered heretical. This view can at least be found in various MUI fatwas on heretical teachings.

Hardline Islamic groups have also stated that the idea of abolishing the blasphemy law is Islamophobia that must be countered**.** It is no doubt that the enforcement of the lower standard of BLs across the world are incompatible with the Art. 19 and 20 of the ICCPR. However, it would be difficult to push the predominant Muslim countries to repeal the BL since at the same time the law against hate speech is also applicable in many European countries and the application of its double standard still debateable (Joppke 2018; Keck and Winkley 2015; Kunelius et al. 2007). The idea of An-Na’im is not practicable in the country such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Brunei, or Malaysia. They have a strong counterargument that proposed by several Muslim predominant countries, including Indonesia to defend the existing of BLs. Following the wave of Islamophobia in Western countries triggered by the film “Innocence of Muslim” as well as the earlier case of Danish cartoon, Pakistan on behalf of Islamic countries, the OIC’s Human Rights Commission proposed the requirements of “international code of conduct for media and social media to disallow the dissemination of incitement material”. The OIC principle that freedom of speech should not be used as an excuse to demean and embarrass other people's religious beliefs. Although this film cannot be categorized as racial discrimination under Art.4 of ICERD or a hate war, it can be categorized as a form of incitement of hatred that violates Art.20 of the ICCPR because it targets hatred towards Muslims as minority groups in Europe. It is similar to the case of Geert Wilders who found guilty by the Dutch Court of insulting and incitement to discrimination of his statements and his movie *Fitna* against Muslim Moroccans group (Vrielink 2016).

Another Islamophobia was the case of the distribution of 12 cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad repeatedly in several countries of Europe from 2005 to 2006 cannot only be seen as a form of freedom of expression or criticism against radical Muslim that must be respected in a democratic climate. But the cartoons depicting the Prophet, which has long been understood by people of all religions in the world that Muslims have the belief not to depict the Prophet Muhammad, has hurt the feelings of Muslims in the world. The proof is very evident from the rapid reaction in the form of demonstrations in Denmark and Copenhagen (2005), London (2006) and condemnation from many Islamic countries and even encourage other brutal actions when the demands of apology or withdrawal to the authors and spreaders are not immediately carried out. However, the important point why many experts enter this case differently from other satirical cartoons is not without reason. Muhammad's portrayal of a terrorist is a form of spreading hatred targeting minority Muslims in Europe an invitation to the public to be anti-Islamic (Modood et al. 2006). Where hate speech against minority groups of religion or minority groups of racial is an act that has long been prohibited in domestic law in various countries in Europe such as Germany, Austria, France, and many others. This is as forbidden as the expression that the Holocaust never existed (see *David Irving v Penguin Books and Lipstadt*). Unfortunately the application of double standards also gets a space where anti-Sematic, homophobic, anti-Christianity can be punished as an hate speech based on Article 4 of the ICERD but Islamophobic is not considered as an expression of hatred under the Convention (Joppke 2018; Keck and Winkley 2015; Kunelius et al. 2007). The double standard of hate speech law application in Europe can be used to justify the enforcement of BL in predominant Muslim countries and strengthen the view that even in a secular state it still allows the state to favour the majority religion.

However, recent developments in various European and American countries have made significant changes in optimizing the protection of the right to freedom of religion. In addition, Muslim countries need to understand that the UN Resolution 16/18 on combating intolerance, negative stereotyping, and stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against persons based on religion or beliefs aimed to avoid the prejudice not only towards Muslims but also to other religions. The adoption of the Resolution 16/18 becomes a big challenge for the 57 OIC countries to amend their BL to be in line with the Resolution that focusing on abolishing intolerance, discrimination, incitement to violence against persons rather than targeting minority groups to protect Islam as the main religions in their country.

Historically, Law No.1/PNPS/1965 on Blasphemy (BL) was passed by Presidential Decree to avoid a repeat of the mass killings of Indonesians and Islamic leaders carried out by the Communist party in 1965 after the Communist coup in 1965 (Crouch, 2012). If the law is repealed, a legal vacuum is created. If a similar case were to occur, there would be no legal basis for criminal accountability. Mahfud MD, a coordinating minister for Law and Human Rights and former Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court in his 2010 decision stated that: “The repeal of the Blasphemy Law could jeopardize the unity of the nation, because if the APA Law is repealed, there will be a legal vacuum, so that if there is a conflict between religions there is no law that can prevent it, so it can trigger chaos in society.” This view is also reinforced by the Constitutional Court Judges in various decisions.

Secondly, there is no doubt that according to the Constitutional Court's Decision on the BL Judicial Review Petition on April 19, 2010, that the BL provisions are vague and multi-interpretive, so the Constitutional Court declared the BL unconstitutional. However, the Court did not repeal the law, but rather stated that the BL needs to be reformed and clarified (p. 212).

Third, after the Constitutional Court's decision in 2010, a draft law on religious protection was included in the 2019 National Legislation Program in which the draft law clarified the definition of religion, religious assemblies, Religious Harmony Forums, houses of worship, religious broadcasting, and others to guarantee the freedom of citizens to embrace their respective religions and worship in accordance with their religions and beliefs (DPR, 2019). Thus, the most recent political, legal, and social developments in Indonesia still require changes to the blasphemy law rather than abolishing it.

However, the empirical facts that occur in society contradict the above view. The enforcement of the blasphemy law tends to create horizontal conflict. This is as discussed in the previous chapter where conflicts between religious communities always accompany when the blasphemy law is applied. Conflicts occur because vigilante groups use the Blasphemy Law as a legitimate tool to attack other groups. Thus, the claim that maintaining the Blasphemy Law prevents religious intolerance does not get factual support in the sociological reality in society and therefore becomes irrelevant.

**6.4.6. The Government Continue to Justify Intolerant Acts**

The *Gafatar* group, which purports to be non-religious, has become a target of the Anti-Defamation of Religion Law and has been designated a “twisted” religious doctrine so it doesn't escape the crowd. AD, a *Gafatar* adherent, said

“Gafatar is not a religious organization, more precisely a social organization that focuses on social problems and helps prepare the nation to face various crises in the future, one of which is in the realm of unity (solidarity, tolerance, egalitarian) and Food Security and Independence (KKP) in the realm of unity, Gafatar held a blood donation campaign (symbolizing human values that do not see SARA differences), in addition to carrying out “Re-interpretation, re-internalization and re-actualization of Pancasila values”, We had established 1021 Pancasila villages throughout Indonesia (37 provinces). At the time of its establishment, Gafatar chose to become a legal mass organization, so it has a founding body (20 people) and a notarial deed of establishment, initially in 2011 there were 4 regional representative councils (DPD), DKI Jakarta, West Java, East Java, and Jogjakarta, each of which has its own SKT (Registered Certificate) Kesbangpol Province.”[[122]](#footnote-122)

The similar thing occurred in the case of Ahok. The court concluded in its legal analysis that Ahok's actions might disrupt interreligious peace. The court deemed Ahok less attentive to issues that may spark rage and disrupt unity. Ahok's defense stated that he did not want to offend Muslims, but trial evidence demonstrated that Ahok was aware that Al-Maidah was a section of the Qur'an that Muslims regarded to be authentic. The Muslim holy book has been denigrated and humiliated by Ahok's statement, *“Don't just trust what others say... (you) might be duped using Al-Maidah verse 51.”* However, according to the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief for 2006, [[123]](#footnote-123) Ahok's criticism of verse 51 of Al-Maidah is grounded on common knowledge. Therefore, he should not be penalized, even though his comments may offend and harm the sentiments of Muslims, because his opinion did not directly violate their right to religious freedom. In addition, as required by General Comment No. 34 of the ICCPR, Ahok's speech did not provoke enmity or violence in society. If the protest of one hundred thousand Muslims is a significant indicator of impending violence, the Court should investigate this factor, and its conclusions should be substantiated by substantial evidence.

## Pseudo-secularity harvests an illusion of religious freedom

In comparison to the relationship between the state and religion before and after Indonesian independence, the Anti-Blasphemy Law has altered the relationship between the state and religion. This thesis finds that in the colonial and pre-independence eras, there was a divide between Islamic groups that desired the establishment of an Islamic state and nationalist groups that desired a separation of religion and the state. However, since the Anti-Defamation Law was enacted and implemented, there has been a shift, in which Islamic groups have the support of nationalists. Using the Anti-Defamation Law to prosecute groups deemed as straying from Islam demonstrates this point. The Anti-Defamation Law, which was upheld by both the Reformation Era Government and the Joko Widodo Administration, demonstrates the cohesion of nationalists and Muslims on the link between religion and the state they wish to construct.

The Constitution of 1945 does not classify Indonesia as a religious state, but it does require Indonesia to be founded on the one and only Godhead, as stated in the First Principle of Pancasila. Yudi Latif (2011) analyses and discusses each of the Pancasila principles from a philosophical standpoint, debating the viewpoints of the nation's founding fathers and comparing them to the constitutions of other nations (Latif 2011). However, Latif (2011) does not explore the post-reformation relationship between religion and the state, Pancasila's perspective on the relationship, or how they deal with discontent or satisfaction resulting from the state-religious interaction. While As'ad Said Ali (2009) examines the idea of the Pancasila State, he does not address the link between religion and the state throughout the reform era (As’ad 2009). According to Din Syamsudin, former Central Executive of the Moderate Islamic Organization Muhammadiyah, as cited by Moh Dahlan (2014), the first group to assert that religion and the state are inextricably linked is the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, everything that pertains to religion also pertains to the state, and vice versa. So that there is no separation between religion and the state, and they become a single one. Al-Maududi is the figure backing this movement. Second, those who say that the connection between religion and the state is symbiotic and dynamic-dialectical, rather than direct, so that the two regions retain distance and respective control, so that religion and the state coexist. Religion requires state institutions to expedite its growth, and state institutions require religion to construct a just state in conformity with the spirit of divinity. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Muhammad Syahrur, Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Nurcholish Madjid are included in this group. Third, the group that believes religion and the state are separate spheres with no connection whatsoever. This organization distinguishes between religion and politics/state. Therefore, this group opposes the foundation of the state on religion and the incorporation of religious standards into public law. Ali Abd Raziq is one of the world's Muslim leaders who belongs to this group. R.R. Alford thinks that religion has no significant effect in the political views of its adherents; religious adherents typically have secular political views.

In Indonesia, the pseudo-secularity of state-religion relations creates an illusion of religious liberty. Using the Durham and Scharffs model, the figure below depicts the relationship between the state and religion in Indonesia under the Anti-Defamation Law system. In his work titled “Islam and the State in Indonesia from a Legal Perspective,” M. Ali Safa'at claims that the concept to replace the state's basis of Pancasila, which is the ideology of the Nationalist faction, with Islamic Law emerged in 2002. This reasoning at least supports this conclusion. The pseudo-secularity of state-religion relations produces dishonest religious freedom. The diagram below illustrates the connection between the state and religion in Indonesia under the Anti-Defamation Law regime, with reference to the Durham and Scharffs model. M.'s contribution at least bolsters this result. Ali Safa'at says in his work titled “Islam and the State in Indonesia from a Legal Perspective” that the concept to replace the Nationalist group's Pancasila with Islamic Law as the state's foundation emerged in 2002.

In the Reformation Era, the meaning of Pancasila, and especially the first principle of the “Belief in One Almighty God” has again been the subject of debate, resulting in debate on the relationship between state and religion. In 2002, the debate regarding the amendment of article 29 paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution without any fundamental change to Pancasila reflects a shift in the direction of Islamic politics away from efforts to make Islam the state's foundation towards efforts to implement Islamic law in the Constitution. The proposals were rejected by both houses of the Indonesian Parliament (MPR) (Safa’at 2020)

Despite the fact that this proposal was shot down in writing by the Indonesian Parliament, the growth of legal politics both in the centre and in the regions gave support to the notion. In his normative approach, Safa’at also indicates that the strengthening of the application of Islamic Law can be found from the proliferation of Islamic Law adopted as Positive Law by both the Central Government and Regional Governments. Safa’at says this can be found by looking at the proliferation of Islamic Law adopted as Positive Law by both the Central Government and Regional Governments. Safa’at argue that many Islamic rules have been incorporated into positive law, beginning with the old system and continuing through the reform order. The Marriage Law, the Marriage Registration Law, the Compilation of Islamic Law, the Zakat Management Law, the Hajj Law, the Waqf Law, the Sharia Banking Law, and the Sharia State Securities Law are among examples. On the other hand, the state is the entity that chooses the objectives to be pursued through the creation of these numerous laws. Where, in addition to the Law, it seeks to (1) combine the laws that apply to Muslims; (2) maximize the economic potential of Muslims; and (3) safeguard and facilitate religious life in people's lives through the Law, where it is expected to be able to do so. Therefore, this legislation, which is founded on Islamic law, must nonetheless fulfil the aims set by the state as an entity that is considered to be secular.

In terms of concepts, it would appear that the concept of making Islam the cornerstone of the state is still being opposed by members of the Indonesian Parliament. In spite of this, the reality of life in society is that when community groups challenged the Anti-Defamation Law through a judicial review at the Constitutional Court, the Nationalist group represented by the government received support from Islamic groups represented by moderate and non-moderate Islamic organizations in Indonesia. This occurred when the Anti-Defamation Law was being reviewed by the Constitutional Court. The following is a list of the perspectives held by various Islamic organisations about the Blasphemy Law:

“The aquo law is still needed in Indonesia so that if it is repealed it can 1) cause instability in Indonesia; 2) disturbing religious harmony; 3) disadvantage especially for minorities and anarchism can occur. The logic is that when there are no rules, it doesn't turn out right, but people will make their own rules”[[124]](#footnote-124)

Other moderate Muslim personalities, such as Prof. Dr. Amin Suma, Rahmat Syafi'i, Prof. Nur Syam, and MUI figures such as Dr. Adian Husaini, Amien Djamaladdin, and Yamin Rahman, [[125]](#footnote-125) endorse Hasyim Muzadi's viewpoint. Dr. Adian Husaini, a member of the Indonesian Ulama's General Assembly, stated, “The status quo statute [the Blasphemy Law] should not be challenged initially. If required, a new legislation that provides faiths with greater protection will be drafted.” [[126]](#footnote-126)

In the meanwhile, Muhammadiyah, a moderate Islamic group, provides its perspective on the Blasphemy Law, which in principle cites QS Al-Baqarah verse 256 and QS AL-Kafi verse 29 that “there is no coercion in religion since it is evident which method is correct and which is incorrect. In QS Al Kafi, it is said, “The truth comes from God; whomever desires to believe, let him believe; whoever desires to doubt, let him disbelieve in God's commandments.” [[127]](#footnote-127) Muhammadiyah also highlighted that Islam protects religious liberty, religious diversity, and religious views or convictions. According to our view of Surah Al-Baqarah verse 147 and AL-Maidah verse 48, this is the case. [[128]](#footnote-128) Muhammadiyah further highlighted that “in practicing religion and belief, individuals do not combine religious teachings and do not disregard the religious views of others.”[[129]](#footnote-129) The actualization, expression, and practice of religion in the public domain are an integral component of social life, hence Muhammadiyah members adhere to the Islamic life principles established on February 5, 2001 by the Central Executive Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta. There are four fundamental Islamic lives:

“[…]build brotherhood and guidance with others such as neighbours and other members of the community, both Muslim and non-Muslim; good for neighbours, neighbours with different religions, good and fair, showing positive attitudes. based on the principles of respecting human honour, fostering brotherhood and unity of humanity, [..] fostering a spirit of tolerance, respecting the freedom of others...[...]”[[130]](#footnote-130)

Meanwhile, other religions, such as the Indonesian Church Association (PGI) are of the view that

“for Law 1/PNPS/1965 to be criticized in terms of its function and content because it has multiple interpretations and tends to have multiple interpretations, it is feared that there will be too much state intervention in religious life. If things happen that violate or are considered blasphemous or deviant, it will not be done without an attitude or resolved with internal violence, without games and physical actions. And it has long been done among Christians so that those who are different or who also insult the teaching can return to the good of the group or people or church that will be left behind.”[[131]](#footnote-131)

From this perspective, there are still two divergent directions: NU and MUI want the Anti-Defamation Legislation to be maintained, while Muhammadiyah neither rejects nor accepts the offer of reform, preferring instead a state of religious freedom in which expression may be restricted by law. This indicates that Muhammadiyah viewed the Blasphemy Rule as a law that merely restricts the communication of ideas and not for those who select their faith. In the meanwhile, PGI desires a reform of the Blasphemy Law, which tends to be open to multiple interpretations and allows the state to meddle in an individual's religious matters. See also the views of the Bishops' Conference, which examines in depth the multiple interpretations of the articles in the Blasphemy Law and reaches the same conclusion as the PGI, namely that the Blasphemy Law violates the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by the 1945 Constitution, Indonesia is not a religious state, and the Blasphemy Law. irrelevant to the current era.[[132]](#footnote-132)

However, this time the ruling of the Constitutional Court differs from earlier decisions in that the Court no longer considers non-discrimination principles as key principles that should govern responses to the Blasphemy Law. In lieu of the freedom of articles in the Blasphemy Law that have multiple interpretations and are contrary to the 1945 Constitution, particularly regarding the right to religion, the Constitutional Court renders an ambiguous decision, on the one hand stating that the formulation of the Blasphemy Law has multiple interpretations and can lead to discriminatory actions against groups. On the other side, several faiths claim in their decisions that the Blasphemy Law is valid or does not violate the 1945 Constitution. The Court asserts, “whether or not the Blasphemy Law is abolished, there will be no disorder in society.” In the sake of societal safety and the anticipating of horizontal and vertical conflicts, blasphemy is extremely essential.”[[133]](#footnote-133)

The purpose of this Court's ruling is to demonstrate that the assertion that Indonesia is not a religious state that promotes secularism is, in reality, intended to demonstrate pseudo-secularism. The Constitutional Court still retains the Law on Blasphemy of Religion, which seeks to make the state the vehicle for punishing people based on their choice of religion, even though the consequences of this decision run counter to the central tenets of other religions. However, the choice of religion is an internal matter and an inviolable right, thus the state cannot restrict it in times of emergency or conflict. The Constitutional Court does not portray itself as a defender of human rights. The Court thinks that the Blasphemy Law, which obviously restricts freedom, is significant and must be justified for grounds that cannot be substantiated by factual evidence. Several clauses guaranteeing religious freedom in the 1945 Constitution were deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, which preferred to preserve the Blasphemy Law. Thus, the pseudo-secularity portrayed by the Blasphemy Law, which has been upheld by the Constitutional Court to far, produces a false sense of religious liberty.

In a democratic period in which the state is continually needed to guarantee and preserve the rights of every person to freely select and believe in their respective religions or beliefs, the state's secularity over religion is a must. The neutrality relationship between the state and religion must be expressly stated in the Constitution so that the ruling government cannot interpret the Constitution and all laws and regulations arbitrarily to support its own power interests, either by gaining the support of the majority by pretending to support religion or by targeting it. If the presence of religious opportunities is in opposition to the government or a danger to its authority, the government may prohibit their existence. A constitution that stresses the link between the state and religion will serve as a guide for lawmakers to assess the applicability of current laws to the degree that this might impede and threaten the preservation of the right to religious freedom. In addition to being able to act objectively, law enforcers are not readily able to use the law to prosecute adherents of certain religions or sects.

## 6.6 Conclusion

Previous studies on the state religion relationship concluded that separation between state and religion or secularity is an indication of a modern democratic country, where the state does not interfere religions and the society have a freedom to embrace, follow and practice their religion or faith according to their personal preference and believe (C. Durham and Scharffs 2019). This research finds out that the Indonesia Constitution does not set definition about relation between state and religion, therefore from the date of Independence declaration until today there is a dynamic type of relation between state and religion following the prominent political ideology controlling the regime at the time. Referring to Durham and Scharffs’s theory of the relationship between state and religion, this study found that the Government of Indonesia has been practised at least three types of relationships, the preferred religious set, the abolitionist regime, and the ……..

Indonesia’s constitution adopted secularism principle in its articles, Indonesia is the State that uphold the rule of law and not the State that ruled by religion. The constitution acknowledges and guarantees the right for every person to accept, follow and practice religion according to individual preference and belief. However, the Government is continue to utilizing the IABL to repress followers of minority group of religion from enjoying their freedom of religion, behind a fake assumption that Indonesia is a secular state that acknowledged any kind of religion. With the notion of a pseudo-secular state, the government has a leeway to manipulate the type of relation between state and religion and translate it into government policy following their political agenda. This condition is degrading democracy and reducing human rights protection.

The pseudo-secularity of the state-religious relationship is not conducive to promoting and ensuring the freedom of religion and worship in Indonesia. The ambiguous relationship between the two places the state in an ambiguous position; on the one hand, the Constitution provides confirmation and guarantees for the right to freedom of religion for everyone to embrace their own religion and belief, but on the other hand, the Constitution cannot cancel the existence of law. laws, such as the Blasphemy Law, which uses 'legitimate' religion as a means to punish 'perverted' religions. In this regard, the Blasphemy Law is defended deliberately to serve as a tool of power and will be utilized if it benefits that power, either to attack the religion he adheres to or to attract sympathy from the religious group he adheres to by punishing adherents of a religion who are viewed as threatening the interests of the adhered religion.

The absence of explicit regulation of the connection between state and religion in the Indonesian Constitution leaves wide room for any administration in power to interpret and establish the nature of the relationship between state and religion in line with power-serving political processes. This is evidenced by the constantly fluctuating pattern of relationships between the state and religion in Indonesia. The blasphemy legislation, which was applied to many regimes, including the old order, the new order, and the reform order, continued to be used to prosecute religious minorities after the reform order came into existence. The reform order, which is equipped with human rights legal instruments and a complete guarantee of the right to freedom of religion, is unable to curb the repressive nature of the government, which interprets the Blasphemy Law as justification for limiting the right to freedom of religion by punishing adherents of religions.

Under the Anti-Defamation Law, the government has established a state that both supports particular faiths and punishes its members. These factors endanger not just the existence of religion but also religious concord. The Blasphemy Law has become a political instrument of power that is purposefully defended in order to consistently bribe and win the support of the majority Islamic population by demonstrating that the government cares about and supports Islam. On the other hand, the Blasphemy Law is also utilized to intimidate oppositional majority groups.

The execution of blasphemy laws reveals official support for religion (Islam) motivated solely by political and economic considerations. As a result of the fact that the Anti-Religious Blasphemy Law simultaneously threatens or targets adherents of Islam as the majority faith. Cases in which religious individuals are claimed to have degraded religion through their religious lectures illustrate this point. In Indonesia, the pseudo-secularity of the state towards religion simply produces pseudo-governmental support for religion (Islam). In conclusion, the pseudo-secularity of the relationship between the state and religion currently adopted by Indonesia is not conducive to attempts to enhance democracy, but rather undermines the fully protection of the right to religious freedom for its citizens and threatening human rights.

# CHAPTER VII

# CONCLUDING REMAKS:

# REFORM OR REPEAL INDONESIA'S ABL?

## 7.1 Introduction

This chapter serves as a concluding chapter that succinctly summarizes the findings of the study and provides important recommendations simultaneously, both directed towards the government or non-state actors, as well as the general public. Specifically, this study also identifies the limitations that cannot be addressed and offers recommendations for future studies by scholars in the future.

## 7.2. Upholding the Rule of Law to Fully Protect the Right to FoRB

This study indicates that the ambiguity of the concept of "blasphemy" has resulted in confusion in the enforcement of the Anti-Blasphemy Law and hindered the realization of justice. As a country whose constitution adheres to the rule of law and has a commitment to protect human rights, it is Indonesia's duty and responsibility to adopt international human rights standards in adapting outdated and obsolete domestic laws, such as the anti-blasphemy law. The country should not, on the contrary, defend and strengthen it.

If the state intends to protect religions for the purpose of maintaining public order and avoiding horizontal conflicts, then firstly, the concept of blasphemy must be given a clear definition to avoid ambiguity. The category of insulting religion should be directed towards advocacy that contains incitement to the public to insult a particular religion aimed at preventing followers of that religion from exercising their rights and freedoms altogether. Thus, blasphemy is no longer defined too broadly, such as criticizing interpretations of religious teachings or practicing and disseminating different religious teachings.

Secondly, incitement to religious hatred should apply to all existing and future religions and beliefs. The state's preference for certain religions or beliefs should be avoided so that all religions or beliefs receive equal treatment and protection.

Thirdly, the country's laws, including the Anti-Blasphemy Law, should not be based on recommendations from certain religious organizations. This is to prevent the monopoly of truth about that religion from becoming the basis for judges to punish other religious teachings. The clarity and certainty of the Anti-Blasphemy Law must be emphasized and reformulated so that the guarantee and protection of the freedom of religion can be optimally realized.

## 7.2 Rethinking the Constitutionality of the ABL by Constitutional Court

This study found that the strengthening of the Anti-Blasphemy Law during Joko Widodo's administration cannot be divorced from the ambiguity of the Constitutional Court's decision that the ABL is constitutional. The Constitutional Court is the guardian of the constitution and protector of human rights, and its mandate requires a high level of legal and moral responsibility. In performing its authority to test the constitutionality of the Anti-Blasphemy Law, the Constitutional Court should interpret constitutionality not narrowly or solely based on the Indonesian Constitution. Instead, constitutionality should be broadly interpreted, including various international human rights law standards, which Indonesia has ratified, such as the ICCPR and its derivative instruments. This means that the Constitutional Court should not limit its interpretation of constitutionality to the provisions of the Indonesian Constitution alone. Rather, it should consider international human rights law, which has universal application and has been accepted by Indonesia as a world constitution, in making its decisions.

Although the Constitutional Court has repeatedly declared that the Anti-Blasphemy Law is not unconstitutional, this is not the final say. Citizens whose freedom of religion continues to be violated and criminalized under the enforcement of the Anti-Blasphemy Law may still have the opportunity to file a judicial review of the law in the future. The ambiguity of the Constitutional Court's decision should no longer occur. If the Constitutional Court believes that the Anti-Blasphemy Law is open to multiple interpretations and can be used to criminalize certain religions, then this understanding must be aligned with the Constitutional Court's final decision, which should declare the Anti-Blasphemy Law unconstitutional. This tradition has long been practiced by the Constitutional Court through various landmark decisions to restore and uphold the constitutional rights of citizens that have been violated by specific laws.

Secondly, the Constitutional Court should not hesitate to declare the Anti-Blasphemy Law unconstitutional out of fear that its annulment will create a legal vacuum that could lead to public chaos or greater horizontal conflicts. This is because the Criminal Code already contains provisions that threaten criminal sanctions for all forms of violence and destruction of private and public facilities.

Thirdly, the Constitutional Court cannot ignore the reality of the law enforcement of the Anti-Blasphemy Law, which continues to open up space for the politicization of religion and triggers the occurrence of religious populism in society, as well as the real impact of discriminatory actions and violence experienced by minority religious groups. Therefore, it is imperative that the Constitutional Court reconsider the constitutionality of the Anti-Blasphemy Law by opening the door as wide as possible for any citizen who wishes to file a judicial review of the law. This opportunity should be used to the fullest by the Constitutional Court to render a more just decision.

**4.2.3. Ratification of the New KUHP does not fixed the content of the law**

Responding to the polemic that occurred against the blasphemy law in 1965, the legislators did not learn from the polemic, and did not even follow up on the decision of the Constitutional Court which gave directions that it is important to revise the blasphemy law because its articles contain norms that are multi-interpretable. Instead of correcting the formulation of Article 4 in conjunction with 156a of the Criminal Code, the legislators ratified a Bill on Amendment to the Criminal Code into the New Criminal Code by adding a new chapter, namely “offences against religion” which had never existed before. The chapter contains 8 articles that regulate “blasphemy of religion” which previously was only regulated in 1 article which is Article 156a of the Criminal Code. Where in the chapter, offenses against religion are divided into two, namely (1) crimes against religion and (2) crimes against religious life.

The first type is regulated in 4 articles, namely Articles 341, 342, 343, and 344. The main objective is to “protect religions” from acts of humiliation. Acts that are categorized as insults to religion are (1) insulting the majesty of God, His Word, and His attributes; (2) mocking, desecrating, or demeaning religion, Apostles, Prophets, the Holy Scriptures, religious teachings, or religious worship.

In the author's view, the New Criminal Code strengthens the blasphemy law in Indonesia. First, the problem with Article 156a which basically only protects the religions professed in Indonesia, not protecting “religious adherents” will be continuing to happen. A formulation of article 156a opposes the right to freedom of religion because with the existence of Article 156a, the diversity of religions in Indonesia is threatened and their followers are vulnerable to be criminalized if their teachings are not in harmony with mainstream religions that are protected by the State. In fact, Indonesia is a country where there is a plurality of religions and beliefs. However, the addition of the chapter on “religious offenses” in the New Criminal Procedure Code shows that the core problems contained in Article 156a of the Criminal Code have not been corrected. The expansion of meaning that has been carried out by law enforcement in interpreting article 156a of the Criminal Code when punishing followers of minority religions who are considered deviant is formulated in the provisions of articles 341 to 344 of the Draft Law on Amendments to the Criminal Code.

Although the articles of new law no longer contain an explanatory article that mentions the name of 6 religions recognized in Indonesia, it does not mean that these articles on blasphemy do not threaten the existence of the religions themselves. What if the essence of the religious teachings is indeed different from one another, can these differences be interpreted as insults? This becomes problematic if the New Criminal Code criminalizes someone's beliefs that are different from mainstream beliefs held in Indonesia. The prohibition of “insulting” or “mocking” becomes very multi-interpretable if the meaning of the two words itself is very subjective in nature or only depends on the “feelings” of people who feel insulted or ridiculed so that the objectivity of the proof will be very difficult. If such a dispute is an inter-religious conflict, then should the state interfere in inter-religious affairs by punishing those who differ? Isn't the right to choose or believe in a religion the domain of every individual who adheres to a religion that the state should not interfere with, but instead must be protected by the state?

**7.3. To End Utilizing the ABL For Politization of Religions**

This study has found that there are at least several factors influencing the enforcement of ABL law. First, there is a weakness in the substance of the law, second, there is manipulation of religion in politics, and third, these factors are reinforced by state and non-state actors.

Therefore, this study recommends that law enforcement officials, particularly in criminal justice, exercise prudence in receiving and pursuing cases of blasphemy. Not all reports by the public need to be followed up, as not all claims of blasphemy are based on the intent to insult religion. Criticisms of certain religious teachings or the fact that some communities hold different beliefs should be respected and protected by the state. Manipulation of religion for political purposes, as reflected in the cases of Ahok or Gafatar, should be considered by law enforcement officials to maintain their independence, which means refraining from imposing punishment without sufficient intention and adequate evidence. The role of populist actors who mobilize the masses to continue to pressure for punishment should not undermine the independence of judges to examine and decide cases based on fair trials. Court decisions based on strong evidence will actually increase public awareness of the importance of respecting the decisions of judges.

**7.4. The Middle Ground to Reform the ABL to Preserve Justice**

This study found that the direction of reform of the Anti-Blasphemy Law after the Constitutional Court's decision in 2010 stating that the law is not unconstitutional has caused a division of views in society. As described in Table 15., the moderate Islamic groups supported by human rights experts and civil society organizations concerned with the promotion of the right to freedom of religion continue to push for the abolition of the blasphemy law because the vagueness of legal norms in the law has caused the enforcement of this law to cause continuous violations of the right to freedom of religion in Indonesia. Case studies on the criminalization of *Ahok, Meiliana, Ahmadiyya* and *Gafatar* are just a few examples of violations of the right to freedom of religion that have occurred in Indonesia in the past decade. However, the hard-line Islamists supported by the MUI, claim that the blasphemy law needs to be maintained for various reasons. Meanwhile, the government of Indonesia tends to support the hard-line groups’ point of view, while continuing to maintain the ABL, the government believes that the abolition of the law leads to horizontal conflict.

Table 15. Matrix of reasons from religious group position and government

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Reasons | Hardline Islamic Groups supported by MUI | The Government of Indonesia | Moderate Islamic Groups Supported by HR NGO and other groups of religions |
| Main idea | Maintain the Blasphemy Law | Maintain the law until it is amended. | Abolish the Blasphemy Law |
| Historical reasons | The blasphemy law needs to be maintained so that the violence against Muslims that has occurred in the past is not repeated. | The abolition of the blasphemy law will create a legal vacuum and it is feared that if blasphemy occurs, it will cause greater horizontal conflict if this law is revoked even though the replacement for the blasphemy law does not yet exist. Law making is the domain of the legislature, not the Constitutional Court. | Blasphemy laws in the past were made only for emergencies, which no longer exist today. |
| Philosophical & legal reasons | Abolishment of Blasphemy Law is incompatible with the Godly Nationalism and promote Islamophobia. | The Blasphemy Law does not contradict the Constitution, particularly Article 28 J where the state can limit a person's right to religious expression. | The blasphemy law violates the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution because both internal freedom and external freedom can be restricted, and the narrow interpretation of religions practiced in Indonesia is limited to only 6 religions, other than those 6 religions are vulnerable to criminalization. |
| Empirical Reasons | In Indonesia, new sects have sprung up whose teachings are contrary to the religions practiced in Indonesia so that they are not in line with the religion of Indonesia. | The enforcement of blasphemy law was successful to prevent the wider horizontal conflict among religious groups. | In most blasphemy cases encourages the act of *Main Hakim Sendiri* that cause recurrent conflicts among religious groups. |

The aforementioned debate poses a challenge to the efforts aimed at reforming the ABL, particularly if the government remains hesitant in upholding the rule of law and human rights. Therefore, this study posits that a middle path that upholds justice needs to be pursued by the Government.

## 7.5. Public Should Aware that Anti-Blasphemy Laws Actually Targeting Both Minority and Majority Groups of Religions

According to Indonesia’s law scholars, one of urgent reason for reforming the IABL that this law was only applicable to minority religious groups and this research found out that the law recently has moved direction politically to suppress majority Islamic groups that become opposition to government policies. It is no doubt that the IBL tends to discriminate minority groups (Forte 1994) inside and, or outside of the court. Inside of the court, Judges have applied the law to punish blasphemous with disproportionate penalties (Biswas 2020; Fagan 2019). The judge decision on blasphemy cases is usually using heavy sentencing such as 5 years jail time which should not be the same as criminal charge. Outside of the court, the IBL has been used more frequently by the local government as legal basis to issuing other relevant policies against the adherents of the heretical sect in Indonesia (van der Kroef 1953).

Furthermore, the hardline Islamist religious groups and the security forces have called the policies as justification for violent or attack minority religious groups (Howell, 2005). In the experts' notes, since the 2016 Ahok blasphemy case, the attitude of Muslim conservative intolerance has increased (Lindsey and Butt 2016; Mietzner and Muhtadi 2020). The study of Mietnzer is based on the findings of survey institutions such as the Indonesian Survey Institute shows that conservative Muslim groups tend to refuse to elect a President or a non-Muslim Governor, refuse to allow the establishment of non-Muslim places of worship in their neighbourhood, or refuse to accept non-Muslim teachers in Muslim schools (LSI 2016, p.17). Even Menchik (2014) criticizes the largest Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) who are ambiguous, on the one hand they support democratic values ​​such as tolerance and plurality, but on the other hand, they also support authoritarianism through refusing the heterodox religious teachings. Issues involving *aqeedah* [[134]](#footnote-134) that are in conflict with orthodox schools, such as blasphemy, are strongly opposed by these two moderate Islamic organizations. If modern Islamic organizations still reject diversity in religion, it is difficult to change the views of conservative Islamic groups. Differences in belief should be separated from the issue of their position as citizens. Differences in beliefs should not prevent a person from getting legal protection and human rights. The role of parliaments in interfaith dialogue with various religious organizations is vital in guaranteeing the protection of religious freedom in Indonesia.

Unfortunately, these problems do not always come to the attention of legislators. The legislators rarely hold public hearings with or advocate to these largest moderate Islamic organizations in regarding blasphemy legal reform and the urgency of respecting the right to religious freedom.[[135]](#footnote-135) Various local regulations and executive legal products that threaten the right to freedom of religion appear to be left alone and free from oversight by legislators. The passive attitude of lawmakers is based on the understanding that supervision of regional legal products is the full authority of the central government, or through a judicial review mechanism adopted by citizens who feel their constitutional rights are impaired. Meanwhile, the process of amendment to the blasphemy law seems to stand in the way and tends to get weak political support.

After a decade, until recently, the bill of religious harmony is not discussed by Parliament or ratified yet, and public debates continue. Blasphemy's legal reform in Indonesia has been run in very slow because of the deadlocked in Indonesia Parliament[[136]](#footnote-136) and the fear of the spread of communism.[[137]](#footnote-137) The legislators are still hesitant to draft the legal concept of blasphemy, in order to make a balance between protecting majority of religious groups from being insulted, upholding a state ideology of Pancasila in believing “One God, the Only God”, and preventing religious minorities from being a target of criminalization. As consequences, the enforcement of the IBL continued and unsettled the community. Due to ambiguity of legal norms and strong social influence, the court tends to punish blasphemy defendants with severe punishment. Most blasphemy defendants are the adherents of minority religions such as Ahmadiyya, Shia, Gafatar. Slow progress on parliament to reform Indonesia blasphemy law will keep the door for future criminalizing to any actions that considered defamation toward recognized religions, symbols of recognized religions and any sacred aspects of religions including a new interpretation of religions that considered non-canon. Therefore, as long as the new IBL that compatible with IHRL does not available yet, coercion toward or discrimination against minority religions will continue to happen in the future.

**7.4. Shifting the concept from a combating defamation of religion approach to a combating hate speech approach**

Another idea of revising the ABL is shifting the concept from a combating defamation of religion approach to a combating hate speech approach. Most of the BLs use the former approach rather than the later one. What are the different between the two? Following the Rabat Plan of Action of 2012 (RPA of 2012) on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, Jeroen Temperman, a Professor of Law from University of Erasmus and Human Rights expert, offers an idea for shifting from combating religious defamation approach that focus on protecting religions into combating hate speech approach that focus on protecting the right of individual (Temperman 2015). In predominant Muslim countries who hesitate to repeal the law, it is possible to amend the law as long as the new law could reach fully realization of human rights protection of FoRB and FoE. This study is started from analysing the intersection between the concept of FoE, FoRB and BL, then examining why the idea to abolish the BL is not practical particularly in predominant Muslim countries and analysing why the idea of secular state proposed by An-Naim (2008) is unlikely accepted. Finally, using Temperman's ideas and the RPA of 2012 as starting point, this paper offers a middle ground of reforming the BL to shift its concept from protecting religions into protecting the right of individual including some other changes to eliminate the defects in the law and to amend it in accord to international human rights standard.

Temperman (2015) argues that the combating defamation of religion approach would not comply with the principle of human right since its focus on the protection of religious system or personal feelings on religion. There is no such provision in the IHRL aims to protect religious system or personal feelings. Although in some previous cases, the ECtHR protect religious feelings, but the decisions were criticized by scholars. In the case of *Otto Preminger v. Austria*, the ECtHR concluded that thestate is permissible to intervene the FoE if such expression is intended against the religious feelings of others (p.14). The court also concluded that it was legitimate aim to protect the right not to be insulted in their religious feelings by others (p.13). In this sense, the *Otto Preminger* case is considered incompatible with Art. 19 and the perpetrator should not be punished (Kuznetsov 2015; Temperman 2015).

While the combating hate speech approach is more relevant with the RPA of 2012 that suggest to all members of the ICCPR to consider six aspects namely the context, speaker, intent, content, extent, and likelihood of defining restriction of FoE, incitement to hatred (Shepherd, 2017). The later approach is also relevant with the RPA since its focus on the protection of the right of individual from the danger or extreme speech that attacks or discriminates or hates any person’s race, religion, ethnicity as articulated in Art. 20 (2).Unfortunately, in the case of Ahmadiyya in Indonesia, the BL protected the majority of religious system (Marshall, 2018; Crouch, 2012). But when the incitement of hatred and violation against Ahmadiyya happened, the State failed to protect Ahmadiyya’s followers equally (Djamin 2014). In the case of *Norwood v UK (2004),* an extreme right-wing party of BNP member was displaying poster with words “Islam out of Britain – Protect the British People” was considered by ECtHR as anti-Muslim hate speech. This hate speech expression discriminates Muslim as minority groups of people in the U.K. to become a target of hatred. In the case *M'Bala M’Bala v France (2015),* the comedian for anti-Semitic insulted a certain race against Jews. This expression also discriminated Jews people in France. In this sense, the enforcement of BL that focus on protecting religious system violate Art. 19 (3) and Art. 20 (3) of the ICCPR.

The compromise way that can be done to fully realization of the protection of FoRB and FoE is to reduce the spectrum of culture relativism through expanding the spectrum of universality until the political and social context are ready to repeal the BL through referendum like what had recently happened in the Ireland in October 2018 (ICCL, 2018). As the state’s members of the ICCPR, the States have the obligation to undertakes such measure that all rights mentioned in the covenant are respected within their domestic territory (Art. 2). In this section, using the RPA of 2012, the blasphemy provisions in Austria and Pakistan are analysed comparatively in order to unpack the defects of the law. In general, the BL in Austria is in medium-level standard compared to in Pakistan. In Art. 188 of Austria Criminal Code (Austria Blasphemy Law - ABL) is articulated better than in Art. 295-C of Pakistan Penal Code (Pakistan Blasphemy Law – PBL). In Art. 188 of ABL states that:

**Whoever** publicly disparages or mocks a person or a thing, respectively, being an object of worship or a dogma, a legally permitted ride, or a legally permitted institution of a church or religious society in Austria, in a manner capable of giving rise to justified annoyance, is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six month or a day-fine for a period of up to 360 days. (Stressing added).

While in Article 295-C of Pakistan Penal Code mentioned that

**Whoever** by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.” (Stressing added).

The ABL articulates the limitation clause more clearly than the Pakistan’s Blasphemy Law. Although both provisions explicitly using the word “[w]hoever”….” but the ABL emphasize the legal personality norm and adding the words “liable to imprisonment for a term..[..]”. In this sense the ABL only applicable for someone that liable to imprisonment such as to adults not to children. While in the PBL does not mention it. The RPA recommends that the speaker’s status or position in the society particularly when he or she speaks in public intentionally targeted certain groups should be considered. The intention means that an act requires a relationship between the object, the subject of speech and the audience that likelihood or imminence of incitement happened means that some degree of risk of harm must be identified (the RPA, 2012: p. 11).

Second, the “publicly” norm also mentioned explicitly in the ABL but not in PBL. It means that such action cannot be punishable if the expression done in private room. The RPA (2012) describes that the speech act should be considered as public nature, means that “the statemen circulated in a restricted environment or widely accessible to the general public”. Beside this, the context of the speech act should be prevalent with social and political conditions at the time the speech was delivered and shared (p.11).

Third is the legality norm. The ABL uses the word “[…] a legally permitted ride or legality permitted institution [..]”. The provisions show that the ABL is made by legislative body that have the authority to making the law. Unfortunately, the similar norm is hardly found at the PBL. The RPA does not specifically mention about it since its clearly stated at Art. 20.

Fourth is the proportionality norm. The ABL uses the words “[..] for a term not exceeding six month or a day-fine for a period of up to 360 days.” It means that the sanction is proportional with the severe of the wrongdoing. While in the PBL, the provision does not clearly mention the norm of criminal liability, the norm of publicly, the norm of legitimate aims. Moreover, the words “imputation, innuendo, or insinuation’ are considered as vague concept. The purpose of this law is merely to protect the religious system, which is only for Islamic religion, but not including other religions. In this sense, the law is targeted to only minority religions. Furthermore, the proportionality norm is problematic since the law threaten with death penalty of imprisonment for life. This norm is incompatible with the ICCPR Article 6 of the right to life.

However, in the ABL there is no specific purpose articulated why such expression is restricted. It uses the words “disparages or mocks a person or a thing, respectively, being an object of worship or dogma’ means that the law still protects to the thing not only individual as human beings. The words disparage or mocks have very broad meaning that could become a subject of subjective interpretation. For example, in the case of *E.S. v Austria*, the applicant, E.S., spoke at the seminar attended by 30 peoples made several statements about Islam and the Prophet Muhammad by called him as *paedophile* (Milanovic 2018).The Court found that E.S. defamed Prophet married a child or had a sex with a child in order to show that he was not a worthy subject of worship. But E.S. called him a paedophile which would imply that he had primary sexual tendencies towards children more generally. She is disregarding the notion that the marriage had continued until his death (Milanovic 2018). The court found the public nature of the seminars and that at least some of participants have disturbed by her speech (para.14). The manner in which religious views were attacked could invoke the State’s responsibility in order to guarantee the peaceful exercise of the rights under Art. 9. She found guilty based on the law prescribed at Art. 188 of the Austria Penal Code and fine for 480 Euro. The Court concluded that presenting objects of religious worship in a provocative way capable of hurting the feeling of the followers and violation the spirit of tolerance based on Article 10 subsection 2 of the ECHR. In this sense, although the sanction is very low, only USD 240, the court still focus on protecting “religious feelings’ rather than protecting the right of individual.

According to Article 19 (3), the States are permitted to limit of FoE if all requirements mentioned on Article 19 (3) are met. At least there are three legal scopes of limitation namely (1) legality test, (2) necessity test, and (3) proportionality test. This limitation is similar with Article 18 (3) and Article 20. However, violation of Art. 19 (3) or 18 (3) are not always criminally punishable. But violation of Art. 20 (3) could be considered as criminally punishable if the act matched with the three tests. First, the legality test means that the limitation should be lawful and based on the law to avoid arbitrary or unreasonable punishment. The word ‘law’ here is a regulation that made by legislative body. The law should be responsive, clear, precise, and predictable. If the law that used to limit the right is made by executive body lower than an act, then it would be problematic. If the law has repressive character or too vague in which the norms are not clear or ambiguous, then the implementation of such law may be problematic as well. Second, the necessity test means that the aims of limitation should corelate a “pressing social needs” (Gerards 2013). The aims are in order to protect at least one of the reasons either (1) to protect the right and reputation of others (2) to protect national security, (3) to protect public order, (4) to protect public morality, (5) to protect public health. This aims of limitation are narrower than in Art. 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), but similar to other regions such as Asian Declaration of Human Rights (Art.8), American Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 13), African Charter of Human Rights (Art. 9), and Cairo Declaration of Human Rights (Art.32). The problem is the difficulty to find the common understanding of what the exact meaning of each aspect. Therefore, in most cases the translation of each aspect depends on the subjectivity of Judges. Third, the proportionality test means that “achieving a particular aim must be important enough to justify the damage which will be caused to individual rights” (Anđelković 2017).

In order to develop the high-level standard of BL, the three-test mentioned above must be combined with some principles that mentioned in the GC No. 22 of FoRB, the Declaration of 1981, the CG No. 34 of FoE, the RPA that I have discussed earlier. The high level standard of Blasphemy law must contains at least seven considerations namely (1) legality norm meaning that prohibition is regulated by law with clear norms, (2) legal personality norm meaning that the person can be fully accountable for the wrongdoing he or she did, (3) intention norm meaning that the person has a specific intentions to attack certain individuals or groups based on race, ethnicity, religion (4) publicly norm meaning that the speech is delivered openly in public considered the context and the relation between the speech and the harm, (5) legitimate aims norm meaning that the purpose is valid to fulfil one of the objectives stated in Article 19 (3), (6) harmful test meaning that the speech likelihood causing hostility or violence against certain target groups of people, (7) proportionality norm meaning that the proportional punishment is adjusted to the level of danger from the impact caused.

## 7.4 Future Step to Reform the ABL

According to the Report from (Theodorou 2016), some have successfully repealed the ABL law, but Indonesia has yet to transform into a country that is willing to abolish blasphemy laws. The author believes that the term "abolishment" will face various sharp rejections, and in the end, will harm the essence of achieving optimal justice and respect for the freedom of religion of minority religious groups. In fact, the abolition of the Blasphemy Law has not been successful as a way to dampen phobias against religion or non-religion in European and Western countries. Therefore, shifting the direction, meaning, and purpose of the Blasphemy Law to prevent intolerance and advocacy of hate speech based on hatred against certain religions is considered a more appropriate step than abolishing it. This is especially true in today's world, where diversity and the merging of cultures and societal values can no longer be avoided as the world becomes increasingly borderless.

Therefore, in the Indonesian context, reforming the law through an amendment process is a more promising middle ground for achieving justice and gaining public support compared to the "abolition" strategy. The strategy of revising the law has received sufficient support from moderate and hardline Islamic groups, religious minorities, the government, and human rights defenders who argue that the efforts to abolish the ABL through the Constitutional Court have not yielded optimal results due to strong opposition from various parties. Thus, the strategy to press for the abolition of the ABL needs to be reconsidered.

This change in strategy makes sense for several reasons. First, international human rights law essentially allows restrictions on religious expression with the aim of protecting public morals. However, as Nevelle Cox (2020) notes, what constitutes public morals needs to be agreed upon through dialogue and deliberation mechanisms to accommodate the diversity of moral standards in society. This can serve a positive function by promoting social cohesion and preventing discrimination based on religion. This is solely to prevent the abuse of the anti-blasphemy law to criminalize dissenting opinions or minority rights.

Therefore, the first step that needs to be taken is for the Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of the Blasphemy Law. One mechanism that could be used is for the Constitutional Court to remain open to judicial review petitions filed by civil society organizations who feel that their constitutional rights have been violated by the existence of the Blasphemy Law. The Constitutional Court needs to use the lens of "world constitutionalism" to carefully examine the international human rights law standards that are not fully accommodated in the Blasphemy Law, and order the lawmakers to fix it.

Although Neville Cox's view (2020) states that the existence of blasphemy law is not inherently contrary to international human rights law, the issue lies in how the law is formulated and enforced. This study argues that if the formulation and enforcement of a law deviate from or are not fully compatible with international human rights law norms, then the law is in conflict with international human rights law. Therefore, this study recommends that amendments to the Blasphemy Law need to be formulated carefully with high normative standards and in line with international human rights law. The normative formulation must be valid, with limitations only possible for necessary purposes, such as important considerations (such as protecting public morality and maintaining tolerance), and reasonable sanctions.

The concept of legitimate limitation norms involves several essential elements. Firstly, law-makers need to reconsider the definition of the term "blasphemy" to ensure that it is expressed clearly and explicitly. This means that the scope of blasphemous acts, which are considered to be harmful and prohibited, must be explicitly formulated so that it is not interpreted widely and subjectively by law enforcement officials. Exemptions from punishment must be regulated, such as criticism of the interpretation of religious teachings, or worship or propagation of religious teachings that differ from orthodox teachings that should not be qualified as "blasphemy". Secondly, the element of "intent" should be introduced so that acts or words that are not intended to insult or defame religion should not be punished. This includes cases where such acts or words are committed by those who cannot be held criminally responsible, such as the mentally ill, children, or those under guardianship. Thirdly, the prohibition of blasphemy should apply to all religions or beliefs, meaning that all religions or beliefs should be guaranteed equal treatment. Therefore, ABL does not need to mention the names of religions or beliefs that will be protected, to anticipate the possibility of emerging religions or beliefs in society in the future. Finally, the formulation of sanction norms should be accurate and proportional. The threat of a prison sentence of more than 2 years up to 10 years is too heavy and disproportionate, except in cases where the blasphemous actions lead to hate speech, inciting others to attack or commit violence against a person or group of people based on religious hatred. The concept of hate speech as a form of blasphemy must also be formulated accurately and precisely by clarifying its definitions and essential elements.

The process of amending the ABL must be accompanied by the revocation of various public policies that are no longer relevant and discriminatory. The existence of a clear and precise law should no longer require implementing regulations at the central or local level, such as ministerial regulations, governor regulations, or regent/mayor regulations, which only broaden the interpretation of what is regulated in the law. Therefore, it is important for the state, through the work programs of the National Commission on Human Rights or the National Commission on Women, to raise awareness of human rights law at the national and local government levels, as well as among religious leaders and organizations. This is important to ensure that public officials and religious leaders do not become actors supporting intolerance and are able to avoid structural violence against minority religions caused by the emergence of public policies that have the potential to violate the human rights of religious minorities and become a source of inspiration or legitimacy for vigilante actions by society.

Moderate religious organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah should not easily fall into practical politics and should provide guidance to other religious organizations to be more inclusive in responding to conflicts between religions. The positive and real contributions that these two moderate religious organizations have made in various forms of public service for all races, all groups, and all religions should be maintained and can serve as a good example in building tolerance and diversity in Indonesia.

Equally important is to ensure that the law enforcement process against the Anti-Blasphemy Law is based on the principles of fair trial and justice. The judiciary should be able to realize its independence, so that the "presumption of innocence" must be prioritized. Public dynamics that take the form of public mobilization, protests, vigilante justice, or viral reporting should not be the main basis for deciding on a case. The principle of fair trial obliges the judiciary to examine and decide cases based on convincing evidence, and to pay attention to the rights of the accused, including the right to legal counsel. Evaluation and monitoring of the judiciary over the law enforcement process needs to be periodically carried out.

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1. Blasphemy means (1) anyone who denying the holy individuals of trinity as God; (2) asserting or maintain that there is no more Gods than one; (3) deny the truth of Christianity; and (4) denying the Old and New Testament scriptures as divine authority [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. See the First Laws of the State of South Carolina 159 (Michael Glazer, Inc. 1981) (cited hereinafter as "Act No. 202", supra note 3.) [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. See the case of Asia Bibie vs. Pakistan, the Supreme Court of Pakistan of CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.39-L OF 2015 (Against the judgment dated 16.10.2014 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Crl.A.No.2509/2010 and M.R.No.614/2010). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. See also the case of Moh-Ezra vs. Malaysia, In Selangor, Moh Ezra was convicted blasphemy under Section 16 of Selangor State Syariah Law after his company ZI Publications Sdn Bhd publishing the book “Allah, Love and Liberty” written by a Canadian author Irshad Manji. The book is considered disseminating of any wrongful belief and teachings against the Islamic Law. See also Pub. Prosecutor v. Amos Yee Pang Sang, [2015] SGDC 215 ¶ 27 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The BLs were initially introduced in 1860 under colonial rule incorporated in criminal law inherited from England. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. See the Blasphemy Law of Indonesia regulates under the Law Number 1/PNPS/ 1965, and Art. 156 and Art. 157 of Indonesia Penal Code and the Information of Electronic Transaction (IET) Law Year 2008 particularly in Art. 27 and 28. In Malaysia, the blasphemy laws can be found in Art. 298 of the Act of Anti Sedition 1948 and Amended in 2015 (Section 3 and 4) and Art. 2333 of Deed of Communication and Multimedia 1998. In Philippines, the blasphemy law can be found in Art. 132 and 133 of Philippine Revised Penal Code; In Singapore, the Bl regulates under Art. 298 Chapter XV of the Singapore Penal Code (Cap 224) [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Global Trends in NGO Law, A quarterly review of NGO legal trends around the world. See the UN General Assembly Resolution 59(1), December 14, 1946. See ICNL, The Right to Freedom of Expressions: Restriction on Fundamental Rights, Vol.6,1. Retrieved at http://www.icnl.org. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. See the ICCPR was adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 16, 1966, entry into force 23 March 1976, and ratified by 165 countries. It is available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a\_ccpr.htm [hereinafter ICCPR]. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. See the ICCPR was adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 16, 1966, entry into force 23 March 1976, and ratified by 165 countries. It is available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a\_ccpr.htm [hereinafter ICCPR]. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. The UNGC reinforces it with the adoption of GC No. 34 concerning limiting the right to freedom of expression. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. See Art. 19(1) of the UDHR states that “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Subsequently, in Article 19 of the ICCPR states (1) Everyone has the right to hold an opinion without any interference. (Stressing Added). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. See Art 19(2) of the ICCPR. (2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, or in print, in the form of Art, or through any other media of his choice. (Stressing Added). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Article 19 (3) of the ICCPR provides FoE's limitation clause: “The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) for respect of the rights or reputation of others; (b) for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.” (Stressing added) [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. According to Black Law Dictionary, blasphemy is defined as “Any oral or written reproach maliciously cast upon God, His name, attributes, or religion [….] It embraces the idea of detraction, when used towards the Supreme Being, as “calumny” usually carries the same idea when applied to an individual [….]” (155-56). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. See UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22 (48), adopted by the UN. Human Rights Committee on 20 July 1993. U.N. Doc.CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (1993). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. See UNGC No. 22 Para. 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. To end discrimination against minority religions, in 2013, the UN of General Assembly adopted the Rabat Plan of Action (RPA) on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination hostility, or violence. (See United Nations General Assembly A/HRC/22/17/Add.4). [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. The RPA documents, p.11. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Ibid., 374 and the General Comment 22 (48), ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. See also Art. 9 (2) of the European Convention of Human Rights and Art. 8 Asian Declaration of Human Rights. Similarly, Article 8 of the Asian Declaration of Human Rights (ADHR) articulates that a state can only limit such rights if the limitation has been determined by the statute made by legislation to guarantee basic human rights and freedoms and respect the rights of others. The limitation must be considered as one of the conditions, namely (a) protecting national security; (b) taking care of public order; (c) protecting public health; (d) protecting public morals; (e) achieving community welfare. Compared with the limitation requirements contained in the ICCPR, the criteria of limitation in the AHRD seems more lenient because it adds another aspect of “achieving public welfare” as one of the considerations that can be used to make restrictions. Meanwhile, the AHRD does not provide a concrete definition. Thus, this loose limitation can be interpreted broadly by each country. Therefore, the extended limitation in ADHR by adding one aim to “achieving community welfare” is not in line with the Art. 19 (3) of the ICCPR. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. During the period of “Guided Democracy” under President Soekarno, the President Stipulation No. 1/PNPS/1965 was established as a means of maintaining the functionality of the state. Soekarno's regime was characterized by a concentration of power in the executive branch, which allowed the President to issue Presidential Stipulations (Penetapan Presiden/PNPS) or Presidential Directives (Peraturan Presiden) through the exercise of executive power. Thus, Law No.1/PNPS/1965 was enacted through a Presidential Stipulation rather than an Act (Undang-Undang). However, in 1969, the Indonesian government upgraded the status of this law to that of national legislation by enacting Law No. 5/1969 (Ismail, 1994). [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. The Indonesian expert Edward Omar Sharif Hiariej explained that PNPS was issued by President Soekarno on January 20, 1965. Exactly two weeks after the massacre of Muslims in Madiun. here was a sadistic murder when the kiai (Ulama) and santri (Islamic students) were praying at dawn, the Koran was trampled upon, torn apart as a form of blasphemy. Retrieved at https://www.jawapos.com/nasional/hukum-kriminal/14/03/2017/begini-awal-mulanya-pasal-penodaan-agama. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. See Keputusan Presiden Nomor 150 Year 1959 concerning Back to UUD 1945. Announced at Lembaran Negara Nomor 75 Year 1959. See also Mahfud M.D., 2001. Dasar dan Struktur Ketatanegaraan Indonesia, Jakarta: Rineka Cipta, p. 99. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. See Tabel 1. Chapter I. According to its Constitution, both Malaysia and Pakistan are Islamic countries, while Indonesia is not, even though Indonesia is the biggest Muslim population in the world. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. President Stipulation No. 1/PNPS/ 1965 was enacted under the "Guided Democracy" of Soekarno. He held legislative power and ensured the state functioned while maintaining its stability. Soekarno's regime was characterized by close to absolute power, as the President had the authority to release Presidential Stipulations (Penetapan Presiden/PNPS) or Presidential Directives (Peraturan Presiden) according to the President Decree. Therefore, Law No.1/PNPS/1965 was enacted through the President instead of an Act (Undang-Undang). In 1969, the government advanced it to the status of national legislation through the enactment of Law No. 5/1969. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. At this conference it was also agreed to establish the Indonesian Islamic Army (TII), the Imamah Council (Council of Ministers), the Fatwa Council (Supreme Advisory Council), and the drafting of the Qanun Azizi (Basic Constitution). [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Notes from the Ministry of Religions Affair in 1953 mentioned that there were 360 groups of believers that made the significant role for the General Election Year 1955. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. On today’s value, equal to IDR 63,612,750,112 or USD 4,362,416 [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. See Article 2 Tap MPRS No. XIX/ MPRS/ 1966. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Pancasila consists of 5 Sila (Principles). The first Sila states: “Believe in God the Almighty.” [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. The Indonesian expert Edward Omar Sharif Hiariej explained in the Ahok’s case that PNPS was issued by President Soekarno on January 20, 1965. Exactly two weeks after the massacre of Muslims in Madiun. here was a sadistic murder when the kiai and santri were praying at dawn, the Koran was trampled upon, torn apart as a form of blasphemy. Retrieved at https://www.jawapos.com/nasional/hukum-kriminal/14/03/2017/begini-awal-mulanya-pasal-penodaan-agama. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Provisional People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia No. XXV/ MPRS / 1966 concerning the dissolution of the Indonesian communist party. Statement as a Prohibited organization throughout the territory of the Republic of Indonesia for the Indonesian Communist Party and prohibiting any activities to spread or develop communist / Marxist ideals or teachings. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. On 11 March 1966 President Sukarno was forced by the Army generals to sign a letter transferring power to General Suharto. In Indonesia, Sukarno’s letter was known as ‘Super Semar’, an abbreviation of ‘Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret’ (Letter of Order of the 11 March). However, from a Javanese Shadow puppet (wayang) story, Semar is a royal servant known for a powerful spirit and strength. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. *See* Verdict No. 1537/Pid.B/2016/PN JKT. UTR and Verdict No. 11PK/Pid/2018. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. *See* Verdict No. 784/PID/2018/ PT.MDN. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. *See* Verdict No. 1107/PID.Sus/201/PN.Jkt.Tim. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. *See* Verdict No. 56/PUU-XV/2017; Verdict No. 312/Pid.B/2011/PN Srg; Verdict No. 314/Pid B/2011/PN.Srg. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. See Verdict No. 1537/Pid.B/2016/PN JKT. UTR and Verdict No. 11PK/Pid/2018. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. See BBC Indonesia. Pelaporan Ahok Atas tuduhan menghina agama dan pemilih. October 2016.Retrieved from bbc.com. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. See Kompas.com. Ahok Dilaporkan Dua Organisasi ke Polda Metro Jaya. October 7th, 2016. 19:20 WIB. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. See Verdict No. 56/PUU-XV/2017; Verdict No. 312/Pid.B/2011/PN Srg; Verdict No. 314/Pid B/2011/PN.Srg. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Rohmatin Bonasir. Kenapa Ahmadiyya Dianggap Bukan Islam: Fakta dan Kontroversinya. BBC-19 Februari 2018. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-42642858 [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Rohmatin Bonasir. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. See https://www.viva.co.id/berita/nasional/180745-pertikaan-ahmadiyah-di-cisalada. See also ELSAM, “Diskriminalisasi dan Kekerasan Terhadap Agama Minoritas,” 22 December 2014, accessed from http://referensi.elsam.or.id/2014/12/diskriminasi-dan-kekerasan-terhadap-agama-minoritas/ [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. See https://metro.tempo.co/read/1520885/mui-depok-ahmadiyah-sudah-berulang-kali-diajak-berdialog [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. See BBC.My 25th, 2016. Pengrusakan Masjid Ahmadiyah Kendal Karena Tidak Adad Niat Baik Pusat. https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita\_indonesia/2016/05/160525\_indonesia\_ahmadiyah\_kendal. See also Kompas. May 23rd, 2016. Peruakan Masjid Ahmadiyah di Kendal Dikecam. Retrieved from https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/05/23/16054031/perusakan.masjid.ahmadiyah.di.kendal.dikecam?page=all Accessed on June 25th, 2021. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. See https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1090715/sekelompok-orang-serang-dan-usir-penganut-ahmadiyah-di-ntb [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Kompas. Kronologi Massa Rusak dan Bakar Bangunan Milik Jemaah Ahmadiyah di Sintan. Retrieved from https://regional.kompas.com/read/2021/09/03/154505478/kronologi-massa-rusak-dan-bakar-bangunan-milik-jemaah-ahmadiyah-di-sintang. Accessed on June 20th, 2021. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. https://www.republika.co.id/berita/qyyfvr320/masjid-ahmadiyah-dirusak-begini-tanggapan-ketua-mui [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. See Verdict No. 1107/PID.Sus/201/PN.Jkt.Tim. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Interview with a former member of Gafatar, Mr. AD. in August 2021. See also https://nasional.tempo.co/read/655980/diduga-sebar-ajaran-sesat-anggota-gafatar-terancam-penjara [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Interview with AD, a former member of Gafatar in January 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita\_indonesia/2016/01/160121\_indonesia\_gafatar\_pengungsi [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Republika.co.id. Ajarkan Aliran Sesat, Aktivitas Gafatar Resmi Dilarang Pemerintah [Teaching heretical sects, Gafatar activities are officially banned by the government] https://khazanah.republika.co.id/berita/dunia-islam/islam-nusantara/16/03/24/o4jj6h377-ajarkan-aliran-sesat-pemerintah-resmi-larang-aktivitas-gafatar [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. https://www.hrw.org/id/news/2016/04/05/288202 [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Mantan Ketua Gafatar meminta bantuan hukum kepada Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Jakarta. See https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/eks-ketum-kutuk-keras-tindakan-pembakaran-lahan-milik-gafatar.html [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. See Verdict No. 784/PID/2018/ PT.MDN. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. This statement was conveyed by Ranto Sibarani, Meiliana's attorney, when answering a Tempo reporter's question when asking about the chronology of Meiliana's blasphemy case. See Tempo.co. https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1119663/ini-kronologi-kasus-penistaan-agama-meiliana-di-tanjung-balai [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. See District Court Decision of Tanjung Balai No. 461/Pid.B/2016/PN Tjb; No. 457/Pid.B/2016/PN-Tjb; No. 462/Pid.B/2016/PN Tjb; No. 463/Pid.B/2016/PN Tjb, No. 451/Pid.B/2016/PN-Tjb; No. 458/Pid.B/2016/PN-Tjb; No. 460/Pid.B/2016/PN Tjb; No. 477/Pid.B/2016/PN Tjb. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. For instance, in Article 1 of the 1965 Defamation Law states: “Everyone is prohibited from deliberately telling in public, advocating, or seeking public support, to interpret a religion adhered to in Indonesia or to carry out religious activities that “resemble” the religious activities of that religion, which interpretations and activities deviate from the main principal of that religion.” The blasphemy violation as referred to in Article 1, then according to Article 2, if it is committed by an individual, the government can give a warning mostly to stop the act. But if it is done by an organization or a group of traditional beliefs, the government can dissolve the organization or declare it as a banned organization or deviant sect. In Article 2 states: (1) Anyone who violates the provisions mentioned in article 1 is given an order and a strong warning for his actions in a joint decree of the Minister of Religion, the Minister / Attorney General and the Minister of Home Affairs. (2) If the permit in paragraph (1) is carried out by an organization or a religious sect, the President of the Republic of Indonesia can dissolve the Organization and label the Organization or sect as a prohibited organization/sect, one after the President has received consideration from the Minister of Religion, the Minister / Attorney general and the Minister of Home Affairs. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. See Banda Aceh District Court Decision Number 80 / Pid.B / 2015/PN Bna on behalf of defendant T. Abdul Fatah Bin T. Muhammad Tahib; Decision of the Jantho District Court number 03 / Pid.C / 2015 / Pn-Jth dated 6 February 2016) [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. To end discrimination against minority religions, in 2013, the UN of General Assembly adopted the Rabat Plan of Action (RPA) on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination hostility, or violence. (*See* United Nations General Assembly A/HRC/22/17/Add.4). [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. See the Decision Number 140/ PUU/2010, p.294. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. Loc. Cit. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. “Penetapan Presiden No. 1/1965 tentang Pentjegahan Penjalahgunaan Dan/Atau Penodaan Agama,” Suara Merdeka, 9 Mar. 1965: 1. Cite from Menchik, Ibid. p. 608. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. See This is also confirmed by a Judge of Constitution Court when answer the question from the Author. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. Many authors indicate that the IHRL is embedded in the provisions of the 1945 Constitution since Indonesia has ratified 9 out of 10 of the core international human rights instruments, such as the ICCPR, the ICESCR, the CERD, the CAT, the CEDAW, the CRC, the CPD, the CMW. See Jimly Asshiddiqie, “Universalization of Democratic Constitutionalism and The Work of Constitutional Courts Today,” Constitutional Review 1, no. 2 (March 28, 2016): 1, https://doi.org/10.31078/consrev121. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. According to Article 18 (1) of the ICCPR, the right to freedom of religion or beliefs is divided into two dimensions. One dimension is related to the right to hold and change religion. This right is also known as the forum-internum, in which no one or no state can interfere with the liberty of any person to hold or choose the religions or beliefs. The second dimension is the right to manifest the religions or beliefs or known as forum-externum. For example, everyone has the right to practice, worship, teach, and observe the religions or beliefs, either alone or in society, either private or public and could be a subject of such limitation under Art. 18 (3). [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. ECtHR stands for European Court of Human Rights. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Otto Preminger v. Austria, 19 Eur. H. R. Rep. (ser. A) 34, at ¶ 56 (1994), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ application number 13470/8). [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. To end discrimination against minority religions, in 2013, the UN of General Assembly adopted the Rabat Plan of Action (RPA) on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination hostility, or violence. (*See* United Nations General Assembly A/HRC/22/17/Add.4). [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Ibid., 277-279; 288. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. See Banda Aceh District Court Decision Number 80 / Pid.B / 2015/PN Bna on behalf of defendant T. Abdul Fatah Bin T. Muhammad Tahib; Decision of the Jantho District Court number 03 / Pid.C / 2015 / Pn-Jth dated 6 February 2016) [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. See the Decision Number 97/PUU-XIV/ 2016, 53. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Ibid., 277-279; 288. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. In 2011, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) adopted its landmark Resolution 16/18 to combat intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief. UNHRC Resolution 16/18 was historic as it “corrected” the 1999 UNHRC Resolution on Defamation of Religion by putting the rights of individuals at the centre of the protection regime. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. “Penetapan Presiden No. 1/1965 tentang Pentjegahan Penjalahgunaan Dan/Atau Penodaan Agama,” Suara Merdeka, 9 Mar. 1965: 1. Cite from Menchik, Ibid. p. 608. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. See This is also confirmed by a Judge of Constitution Court when answer the question from the Author. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. The Jakarta Post. May 13th, 2017. “Do Not Claim Monopoly religion truth”. Retrieved from https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/05/13/do-not-claim-monopoly-on-religious-truth.html Accessed on July 17th, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. Loc. Cit. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Asfinawati, the former lawyer for the defendant and former chief of legal aid at YLBHI, was interviewed by the author on March 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. See the Appeal Court of East Jakarta’s Decision Number 1107/Pid.Sus/2016/PN Jkt.Tim. See also the High Court Decision in Jakarta Number 105/Pid/2017/PT. Jkt. Page 26. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. See the ruling of the High Court Decision in Jakarta Number 105/Pid/2017/PT. Jkt. Page 27. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. See https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1090715/sekelompok-orang-serang-dan-usir-penganut-ahmadiyah-di-ntb [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. Kristian Erdianto. Kompas.com with the title “Destruction of the Ahmadiyya Mosque in Kendal Condemned”, Click to read: https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/05/23/16054031/perusakan.masjid.ahmadiyah.di. kendal.denounced?page=all. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. See https://metro.tempo.co/read/1520885/mui-depok-ahmadiyah-sudah-berulang-kali-diajak-berdialog [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. See Anonym, Fatwa MUI untuk luruskan penyimpangan, cited from http://www.eramuslim.com/berita/nas/7b14122123-fatwa-mui-luruskan-penyimpangan.htm. accessed on April 2, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. See USCIRF (2020). Violating Rights Enforcing the World’s Blasphemy Laws. Retrieved from https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2020%20Blasphemy%20Enforcement%20Report%20\_final\_0.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. USCIRF conducted a study of 674 cases of blasphemy and found 78 of them were Pakistan, Egypt, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Russia, Algeria, Malaysia, Kuwait, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan have been accompanied by mass protests, as well as vigilantism in the form of threats, and/or violence. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. Bbc.com/Indonesia/Fatwa MUI nyatakan Gafatar sesat. February 3rd, 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. Ibid. Bbc.com/Indonesia/Fatwa MUI nyatakan Gafatar sesat. February 3rd, 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. See also Liputan6.com. Kronologi Ahok Ditetapkan Sebagai Tersangka. Nov 16, 2016, 11: 56 WIB. Retrieved from liputan6.com on May 16, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. See Merdeka.com “Penyebab Demo 4 November, Tuding Pimpinan Institusi hingga Manuver Politik.’, August 30, 2021. See also Detik News. 79 Polisi Terluka Saat Rusuh Demo 4 November, Paling Parah Tertusuk Bambu., Nov 4th, 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. See Detik News. Masa Anti Ahok Ramaikan PN Jakarta Utara. Dec 2oth, 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. *See* Detik News. GUIB Jatim Aksi Anti Ahok, Risma Turun Tangan, May 08th, 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. See Court Decision No. 1612/Pid.B/2018/PN Mdn [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. See Court Decision Nomor 784/Pid/2018/PT MDN, p. 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. For example, Sukmawati, she is the younger sister of Megawati Soekarno Putri (former president of the Republic of Indonesia). Sukmawati was twice accused of blaspheming Islam because first, in 2018, she read a poem entitled “Indonesian Mother” at the 29th anniversary event Anne Avantie Berkarya has been accused of blaspheming Islam where Sukmawati said that the bun is more suitable for Indonesian women than the hijab. Second, in 2019 Sukmawati was again reported to have committed blasphemy because she answered a question in a forum about which one is better Al Quran or Pancasila as well as comparing the Prophet Muhammad and Soekarno. Both the first and second cases were both reported to the Criminal Investigation Department as a criminal act of blasphemy (Islam). However, Criminal Investigation Agency (BAREKRIM) closed the case by stopping the investigation because it did not have sufficient preliminary evidence. See Tempo.co.id.Penyelidikan Kasus Puisi Sukmawati dihentikan, ini alasan polisi. https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1098712/penyelidikan-kasus-puisi-sukmawati-dihentikan-ini-alasan-polisi (accessed on June 19th, 2022). See also mysharing.co. Kasus Dugaan Penghinaan Nabi oleh Sukmawati Dihentikan. http://mysharing.co/kasus-dugaan-penghinaan-nabi-oleh-sukmawati-dihentikan-tidak-adilnya-hukum-di-negeri-ini-semakin-jelas/ Meanwhile, a well-known cleric, Ustad Abdul Somad, who said “The cross is inhabited by the genie of the heathen, because of the statue that hangs on it. Likewise, the red cross symbol on the ambulance, it's an infidel' symbol” for answering questions from the recitation participants was finally reported to have tainted Christianity. UAS was not willing to apologize, but MUI appealed to the Police Chief not to punish UAS and take non-legal or familial paths. See also https://www.medcom.id/nasional/hukum/5b2Gjmek-polisi-tolak-laporan-dugaan-penistaan-agama-terhadap-abdul-somad [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. See Kompas.com. Ahok-Djarot Resmi Jadi Cagub dan Cawagub. Retrieved at https://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2016/10/24/17044601/ahok-djarot.resmi.jadi.cagub-cawagub. (Accessed on June 19th, 2022). [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. See Kompas.com. Kasus Ahok Memunculkan Dinamika Hak Angket Di DPR. Retrieved from https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/02/14/07441161/status.ahok.munculkan.dinamika.hak.angket.di.dpr. (Accessed on June 19th, 2022). [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. See BBC Indonesia. Pelaporan Ahok Atas tuduhan menghina agama dan pemilih. October 2016.Retrieved from bbc.com. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. See Kompas.com. Ahok Dilaporkan Dua Organisasi ke Polda Metro Jaya. October 7th, 2016. 19:20 WIB. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. Sekretaris Jenderal Pengurus Besar NU, Helmy Faishal Zaini. BBC News. “Bersifat Politis”, NU dan Muhammadiyah tidak ikuti Aksi 212 di depan DPR. February 17th, 2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. See (1) Letter from the Indonesian Judicial Monitoring Society (MaPPI), Faculty of Law, University of Indonesia (FHUI), Number 258/UN2.F5/MaPPI/BI/IX/2018, dated September 10, 2018, regarding submission of Amicus Curiae; (2) A letter from the Institute for Criminal Justice Reform regarding non-criminal complaints, published in September 2018; (3). Letter from the Indonesian Women's Coalition (KPI) (number 160/RKP/KPI\_SETNAS/IX/2018 dated September 29, 2018) regarding sending Amicus Curiae; (4). Letter from the Coalition of Civil Society Concerned with Tolerance, Human Rights Promotion, and Equitable Development, dated September 26, 2018, in response to the Cover Letter Amicus Curiae; (5). Letter from the Muslim Alliance (AUI) of Tanjung Balai City, Number: Istimewa/013/B/AUI-TB/IX/2018, dated September 17, 2018, regarding introduction; (6). Letter from the Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence (KontraS) dated October 12, 2018 concerning Submission of Amicus Curiae;  [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. This statement was conveyed by Ranto Sibarani, Meiliana's attorney, when answering a Tempo reporter's question when asking about the chronology of Meiliana's blasphemy case. See Tempo.co. https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1119663/ini-kronologi-kasus-penistaan-agama-meiliana-di-tanjung-balai [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. See District Court Decision of Tanjung Balai No. 461/Pid.B/2016/PN Tjb; No. 457/Pid.B/2016/PN-Tjb; No. 462/Pid.B/2016/PN Tjb; No. 463/Pid.B/2016/PN Tjb, No. 451/Pid.B/2016/PN-Tjb; No. 458/Pid.B/2016/PN-Tjb; No. 460/Pid.B/2016/PN Tjb; No. 477/Pid.B/2016/PN Tjb. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. See DetikNews. Kapolda Kalbar Jelaskan Posisi Polisi Saat Masjid Ahmadiyya Dirusak. Cited from https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5713120/kapolda-kalbar-jelaskan-posisi-polisi-saat-masjid-ahmadiyah-dirusak Accessed on September 27, 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. Ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. The President Stipulation No. 1/PNPS/ 1965 was enacted under the “Guided Democracy” of Soekarno. He was maintaining the state by took over the legislative power and tried to ensure that state was functioning. The characteristic of Soekarno’s regime was close to an absolute power which according to the President Decree, the President had the power to released Presidential Stipulation (Penetapan Presiden/ PNPS) or Presidential Directive (Peraturan President). Therefore, the Law No.1/PNPS/1965 was enacted through President instead of Act (Undang-Undang). It was later in 1969, the government elevated it to the status of national legislation through the enactment of Law No. 5/1969. [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. The Indonesian expert Edward Omar Sharif Hiariej explained in the Ahok’s case that PNPS was issued by President Soekarno on January 20, 1965. Exactly two weeks after the massacre of Muslims in Madiun. here was a sadistic murder when the kiai and santri were praying at dawn, the Koran was trampled upon, torn apart as a form of blasphemy. Retrieved at https://www.jawapos.com/nasional/hukum-kriminal/14/03/2017/begini-awal-mulanya-pasal-penodaan-agama. See also Michael S. Densmoor, 2013. The Control and Management of Religion in Post-Independence, Pancasila Indonesia. A Thesis. Georgetown University Washington, DC April 13, 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. Provisional People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia No. XXV/ MPRS / 1966 concerning the dissolution of the Indonesian communist party. Statement as a Prohibited organization throughout the territory of the Republic of Indonesia for the Indonesian Communist Party and prohibiting any activities to spread or develop communist / Marxist ideals or teachings. [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. On 11 March 1966 President Sukarno was forced by the Army generals to sign a letter transferring power to General Suharto. In Indonesia, Sukarno’s letter was known as ‘Super Semar’, an abbreviation of ‘Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret’ (Letter of Order of the 11 March). However, from a Javanese Shadow puppet (wayang) story, Semar is a royal servant known for a powerful spirit and strength. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. During the Old Order, President had the power to release President Stipulation as one of the legal sources that must be obeyed by the people. But, in the New Order, the strong power of President was reduced by the Temporarily People Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara/MPRS) as stated on the Resolution No. XX/MPRS/1966. According to the Resolution, President could not release the President Stipulation anymore. However, President still could release Presidential Decree which both had the same character, though. Therefore, the President Stipulation No. 1/PNPS/ 1965 has been changed into the Law No. 1/PNPS/1965, but the title and the content of the law were remaining the same. [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. The IBL, ibid. Article 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. Ibid. P.7 [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. *See* Indonesia 2016 Human Rights Report. Retrieved at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265550pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. *See* Tabel 1.1. on Appendix. [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. See Article 1 of the IBL. [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. Interview with AD, the Gafatar follower at 2:38 PM, on 4/18/2020]. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief 2006 [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. KH Hasyim Muzadi, a Nahdatul Ulama figure, when giving a statement as an expert in the judicial review of the Anti-Defamation Law at the Constitutional Court. Quoted from the Constitutional Court Decision Number 14/PUU-/2009. Page 121. [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. See the Constitutional Court Decision Number Page 121-152. [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. Ibid. Page 151. [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. Ibid. Page 156. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. Page. 157. [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. Ibid. Page 156. [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. Page 158-159. [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. Page 162. [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. Page 167-168 [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. Page 304. [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. *Aqeedah* is the belief and trust in Allah, the worth of worship and divinity, belief in angels, books, apostles, destiny, the last days, and everything that is authentic in religion. Including the belief that Muhammad peace be upon him, as the last Apostle. Therefore, Sunni Muslims rejects teachings that believe there is a last prophet besides Muhammad. [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. In an interview with a member of Parliament it was stated that a public hearing with a religious group was conducted by Parliament. However, with the discussion of the IBL replacement bill not yet being demonstrated, a better public consolidation for FORB has not yet been achieved. [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. The results of interviews with members of Parliament confirmed that the IBL replacement bill was included in the National Legislation Program, but so far it has not been discussed because there is still a deadlock. *See* Appendices 2, the interview transcript, p. 59-60. [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. Historically, Law No.1/PNPS/1965 against defamation of religions or Indonesia Blasphemy Law (hereinafter IBL) was endorsed by a Presidential Decree to avoid a repeat of the mass killings of the Indonesian people and Islamic leaders carried out by the Communist party in 1965 after a Communist coup in 1965. [↑](#footnote-ref-137)